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Abstract 
This thesis examines the emergence of risk oversight since the global financial 
crisis, considering how different actors construct the idea of oversight and 
examining multi-level accountabilities that make it an organisational reality. 
The practice of oversight is assessed by 61 interviews and 17 weeks of field 
immersion in major financial institutions in London. The research questions are: 
‘How does the practice of risk oversight differ from management?’, ‘How has 
the concept of oversight evolved?’, ‘Where exactly within financial 
organisations does risk oversight happen?’, and ‘How do Risk Committee 
members operationalise their risk oversight role?’ Tentative conclusions are 
also drawn on the extent to which enhancements in risk oversight since the 
crisis have strengthened financial institutions’ ability to manage risk. 
 
The first empirical chapter considers the evolution of regulatory attitudes to risk 
oversight before and after the financial crisis, and discusses the changing role of 
non-executives. The second empirical chapter on board risk committees 
discusses their accountability and relationships, both within and outside the 
firm. It shows board risk committee members to be an important part of the 
fabric of oversight who are still ‘feeling their way’ towards a stable definition of 
their roles and functions. The third empirical chapter discusses how oversight is 
organised within financial institutions. This is now commonly done through the 
‘Three Lines of Defence’ framework. This is an idealised framework for risk 
governance that delineates how three layers of risk involvement (production, 
risk management and internal audit) are differentiated and also defined by their 
relations of oversight to each other. The last chapter discusses information 
intermediaries: the people within firms who create information flows within the 
oversight structures. Information is at the core of any oversight practice and this 
chapter shows that providing it to risk overseers, accurately and 
comprehensively, is a continuous struggle for the various parties involved.  
 4	  
CONTENTS	  
CHAPTER	  1:	  Introduction	  ..................................................................................................	  9 
CHAPTER	  2:	  Literature	  Review	  ........................................................................................	  14 
CHAPTER	  3:	  Methodology	  ..............................................................................................	  39 
CHAPTER	  4:	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Responsible	  Oversight	  ....................................................	  58 
CHAPTER	  5:	  Board	  Risk	  Oversight	  ...................................................................................	  92 
CHAPTER	  6:	  Risk	  Oversight	  in	  Management	  ..................................................................	  145 
CHAPTER	  7:	  Information	  Intermediaries	  .......................................................................	  172 
CHAPTER	  8:	  Discussion	  .................................................................................................	  206 
Appendices	  ..................................................................................................................	  215 
References	  ...................................................................................................................	  218 
 
  
 5	  
EXPANDED	  CONTENTS	  
CHAPTER	  1:	  Introduction	  ..................................................................................................	  9 
1.1.	  Summary	  and	  Research	  Questions	  .......................................................................	  11 
CHAPTER	  2:	  Literature	  Review	  ........................................................................................	  14 
2.1.	  Agency	  Perspective	  ..............................................................................................	  21 
2.2.	  Regulation	  Theories	  .............................................................................................	  27 
2.3.	  Corporate	  Governance	  and	  Audit	  Committees	  .....................................................	  31 
2.4.	  Conclusion	  ...........................................................................................................	  37 
CHAPTER	  3:	  Methodology	  ..............................................................................................	  39 
3.1.	  Introduction	  .........................................................................................................	  39 
3.2.	  Document	  Analysis	  ...............................................................................................	  41 
3.3.	  Field	  Immersions	  ..................................................................................................	  44 
3.4.	  Interviews	  ............................................................................................................	  48 
3.5.	  Identifying	  Themes	  ...............................................................................................	  56 
CHAPTER	  4:	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Responsible	  Oversight	  ....................................................	  58 
4.1.	  Introduction	  .........................................................................................................	  58 
4.2.	  Corporate	  Governance	  in	  the	  UK	  ..........................................................................	  62 
4.3.	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  ...........................................................................................	  69 
4.4.	  Walker	  Review	  .....................................................................................................	  72 
4.5.	  Individual	  Responsibilisation	  ................................................................................	  77 
4.6.	  Conclusion	  ...........................................................................................................	  89 
CHAPTER	  5:	  Board	  Risk	  Oversight	  ...................................................................................	  92 
5.1.	  Introduction	  .........................................................................................................	  92 
5.2.	  Audit	  vs	  Risk	  Committees	  ...................................................................................	  102 
 6	  
5.3.	  Role	  Ambiguity	  and	  Conflict	  ...............................................................................	  110 
5.4.	  Accountability	  and	  Key	  Relationships	  .................................................................	  119 
5.5.	  Conclusion	  .........................................................................................................	  142 
CHAPTER	  6:	  Risk	  Oversight	  in	  Management	  ..................................................................	  145 
6.1.	  The	  Three	  Lines	  of	  Defence	  (TLD)	  .......................................................................	  145 
6.2.	  Ambiguity	  in	  Definitions	  .....................................................................................	  153 
6.3.	  Operational	  Challenges	  of	  the	  TLD	  Framework	  ...................................................	  163 
6.4.	  Conclusion	  .........................................................................................................	  170 
CHAPTER	  7:	  Information	  Intermediaries	  .......................................................................	  172 
7.1.	  Introduction	  .......................................................................................................	  172 
7.2.	  Information	  Intermediaries	  ................................................................................	  178 
7.3.	  Strategic	  Role	  of	  NEDs	  ........................................................................................	  184 
7.4.	  Practice	  Challenges	  ............................................................................................	  198 
7.5.	  Conclusion	  .........................................................................................................	  203 
CHAPTER	  8:	  Discussion	  .................................................................................................	  206 
8.1.	  Contribution	  and	  Summary	  of	  Findings	  ..............................................................	  206 
8.2.	  Practice	  Implications,	  Limitations,	  Future	  Research	  ............................................	  211 
Appendices	  ..................................................................................................................	  215 
Appendix	  I:	  TLD	  interview	  questions	  .........................................................................	  215 
Appendix	  II:	  Interview	  questions	  for	  NEDs	  ................................................................	  216 
Appendix	  III:	  List	  of	  Publications	  ...............................................................................	  217 
References	  ...................................................................................................................	  218 
  
  
 7	  
 
Tables	  and	  Figures 
Figure 2.1: Oversight vs Management ........................................................................ 16 
Figure 2.2: Chapter Structure Overview ..................................................................... 19 
Table 3.1: List of Interviewees within the Investment Bank ....................................... 50 
Table 3.2: List of Interviewees within the Insurance Firm ......................................... 51 
Table 3.3: List of NED Interviewees ........................................................................... 52 
Figure 4.1: Regulatory Convergence ........................................................................... 60 
Table 4.1: Documents Timeline .................................................................................. 61 
Figure 4.2: Risk Appetite Framework ......................................................................... 85 
Table 4.2: Main Categories of risk in a typical bank and their measurability ............. 86 
Table 5.1: Risk and Audit Committee Charters ........................................................ 106 
Table 6.1: Three Lines of Defence Examples and Approach .................................... 146 
Figure 6.1: PwC TLD Framework ............................................................................. 155 
Figure 6.2: KPMG TLD Framework ......................................................................... 155 
Figure 6.3: EY TLD Framework ............................................................................... 156 
Figure 6.4: Deloitte TLD Framework ....................................................................... 156 
Table 6.2: Summary of Big Four representations ..................................................... 157 
Figure 6.5: Three Lines of Defence According to McKinsey ................................... 158 
Figure 6.6: Three Lines of Defence According to McKinsey in 2014 ...................... 159 
Figure 7.1: FSA’s operational risk framework .......................................................... 187 
Figure 7.2: COSO Risk Appetite Process .................................................................. 191 
 
  
 8	  
Acknowledgements  
First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisors Professor Michael Power and 
Dr. Matthew Hall for their continuous support and advice during the past four years, 
as well as the London School of Economics Accounting Department full PhD 
scholarship that made my research possible.  
I am immensely grateful to the interviewees that were very generous with their time 
and the two firms that kindly allowed me to observe them. 
A special thank you to Sir Howard Davies – I learned more from our conversations 
than I could possibly describe, and this PhD would not be what it is without his help 
in accessing interviewees.  
I would also like to thank my parents and Tobias Prinz who were often more 
confident in me than I was. Thank you to David Kendix for the countless lunches and 
insightful discussions, and Sarantos Kaptanis for teaching me about academia and 
always being there for me.  
Finally I am thankful to Andy Krasny, Victoria Tuomisto, João Oliveira, Jan Sramek, 
Kata Pfiszterer, Debra Ogden, Katya Radkovskaya, Dorothy Toh, Julia Morley, 
Daniel Polanco, Miguel Lim, Alistair DuPont, Julian Au, Nastya Zhvalevskaya and 
all the other people in my life who supported me in various ways throughout. 
 
  
 
  
 9	  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
  
“The growth of risk management is often stimulated by what appear to be its 
failures” (Mikes, 2011). 
 Despite its failures during the global financial crisis, recent years have seen an 
explosion of interest in risk management and risk oversight (Power, 2007; Arena, 
Arnaboldi, & Azzone, 2010) – “it is not an exaggeration to view risk management 
as one of today’s most significant sense-making referents that actors use in the field 
to develop understandings of action and inaction” (Gendron, 2014). Risk oversight 
is “a defining feature of improving consistency in risk management” (Ashby, 
Palermo, & Power, 2012), but academics “are pointing to failures in the overall risk 
oversight processes” (Beasley, Frigo, Fraser, & Simkins, 2010).  
What is risk oversight?  
‘Oversight’ of risk is variously discussed in terms of macro-prudential 
regulation (Bernanke, 2008, 2011; Hanson, Kashyap, & Stein, 2010; Yellen, 2011), 
micro-prudential regulation (Carmassi, Gros, & Micossi, 2009; Goodhart, 2009; 
Herring & Carmassi, 2008), board-level oversight (Ho, 2012; Jalilvand & Malliaris, 
2013; Leech, 2012; Spira & Page, 2003), and business unit level risk oversight 
(Bessis, 2011; Mikes, 2011; Miller & Waller, 2003) among other contexts. The 
purpose of this thesis is to access the practice of risk oversight via interviews and 
observations, and focus on how risk oversight is made real for and by different 
actors.  
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An in-depth exploration of the risk oversight phenomenon in the practice of 
large financial institutions in the UK is presented at the levels of (1) regulation, (2) 
boards, and (3) firms themselves. The study is supported by two 8 and 9 week-long 
field immersions and 67 interviews, mostly conducted in London.  
London is an appropriate place to conduct this study because it is one of the 
world’s two leading international financial centres1 (ZYen, 2015), and was thus 
strongly affected by the global financial crisis of the late 2000s.  
This thesis gives a top-down exploration of the practice of oversight: first 
from the regulatory perspective (primarily using document analysis), then Board-
level oversight (based on interviews), followed by the ‘Three Lines of Defence’ 
(TLD)2 organisational structures (based on regulatory and consultancy documents), 
and finally explaining Information Intermediaries (with the help of interviews 
within organisations). Chapters about Regulation and Organisational Structures 
(TLD) are more descriptive, while those on Boards and Information Intermediaries 
are more analytical. The combination of documentary and interview-based evidence 
allows a comprehensive discussion of risk oversight. 
The empirical chapters are organised as two pairs of studies that shine light on 
each other: Regulators (Ch4) – Boards (Ch5), and TLD (Ch6) – Information flows 
(Ch7). These pairs belong to each other because boards are key actors in realising 
regulatory goals, and information flow processes are a way of operationalising 
TLD. Furthermore, boards oversee TLD with the help of information flows. Chapter 
4 on Regulators and 6 on TLD are primarily based on analysis of documents and 
                                                
1	  According to the 2013 ZYen Global Financial Centers Index - it has been ranked 
second after New York based on the 2014 and 2015 ZYEn Global Financial Centers 
Indexes.	  
2	  Three Lines of Defence is a frequently accepted framework of risk oversight in 
financial institutions: conventionally with business unit-level risk management 
considered the first line, independent risk management function second line, and 
internal audit third line. More detail in Chapter 6.	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show an evolution of regulatory focus on boards and of TLD as an oversight 
structure. Chapter 5 on Boards and 7 on Information flows show the practice reality 
of those two areas, and are primarily based on interviews and observations.  
 
 
1.1. SUMMARY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
 The use of the relevant academic literature is an essential component of 
academic writing (Brodkey, 1987). Most of the academic background is given in in 
the second chapter, and the four empirical chapters include relevant academic 
references throughout, not as separate sections within each chapter.  
After laying out the theoretical foundation (Ch2) and methodological tools 
(Ch3) to tackle the research questions, Chapter 4 presents an overview of regulatory 
developments and their historical context over the past three decades in the UK, 
which has particular relevance to the foundational aspect of practice, as it is then up 
to practitioners to interpret the guidance.  
 
Chapter 4 asks, “How has the concept of oversight evolved from the regulatory 
perspective? How does regulatory focus on risk oversight manifest itself?” It 
presents an evolution of regulatory attitudes to corporate governance and financial 
regulation, and shows a convergence of these two strands of regulation around their 
interest in Boards and Board Risk Committees. This chapter also demonstrates an 
increased stringency of regulatory requirements that lead to a higher degree of 
responsibility Boards have for meeting them, that I describe as a process of 
responsibilisation.  
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Chapter 5, at the core of the thesis, looks into the meaning of the Board’s 
oversight role, and asks “How do risk committee members understand and 
operationalize their risk oversight role?” Accountabilities and ambiguities that arise 
in the process are examined with the help of 15 interviews with Non-Executive 
Directors (NED3s), with a focus on how they understand their oversight role and 
how they balance a number of various accountability relationships (with 
shareholders, regulators, and management). Role ambiguity is a major part of this 
discussion, with a specific focus on directors’ sense-making of how they 
operationalise their roles.  
 
Chapter 6 asks, “How is Risk Oversight operationalised at the organisational 
level?” and demonstrates the practice of the “Three Lines of Defence” (TLD) risk 
oversight and management framework. Practitioner representations and interviews 
show that the framework imposes structures that allow some scope for interpretation 
by practitioners. The representations of framework are not decoupled, and 
practitioners are reacting to these representations: Power discusses “the significance 
of ideas and concepts in structuring practices”, and asserts that “[i]deas are not 
something apart from practice - concepts and classifications are the ideational 
building blocks of the practice domain” (Power, 2007). Based on this assertion, one 
key principle that permeates this research is that since ideas are interlinked with 
practice, in order to truly understand the development of either, it is beneficial to 
look at both. Operational challenges are at the core of this chapter. Due to the 
pervasive institutionaliation of the risk management discipline (Power, 2004, 2009), 
models like TLD commonly attempt to describe the current state of the regime, but 
lead to a variety of possible modes of interaction between the practitioners across 
and within these lines, thus resulting in blurred boundaries.   
                                                
3	  Note: Non-Executive Director is the UK term, while in the US the role is called an 
Independent Director. In the UK there can be NEDs who are not considered to be 
independent, e.g. former executives of the firm, or directors who have served a long 
term, but this practice is now discouraged and rare.	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Chapter 7 examines the role of information flows in risk oversight process and 
asks “How do the NEDs involved in Risk Oversight get the information they need?” 
The chapter investigates the answer through two field observations and 46 
interviews: it introduces and explains the role of information intermediaries who 
help link the whole system together by translating data into relevant information. 
This chapter demonstrates the interactive and iterative nature of information flows 
and breaks down the information process into the development, communication, and 
monitoring stages. It investigates practical manifestations of risk appetite and 
concludes that it is at the core of TLD because all these lines are ultimately 
defending the firm against the risk of exceeding risk appetite, with potentially costly 
consequences. This chapter is more speculative than the others, and raises a number 
of questions that could be addressed in more depth by future research. 
 
The concluding discussion attempts to answer the question within the title of 
this thesis – namely can the recent enhancements to risk oversight and governance 
be fairly characterised as ‘closing the stable door (after the horse has bolted)’, or has 
it led to the establishment of a regime that is genuinely more robust and that, while 
not necessarily preventing another financial crisis, could at least be expected to 
make it less likely and to limit the damage caused. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 The realist approach to risk prevalent in economics or medicine, for example, 
treats risk as “objective, measurable, assessable and independent of the related 
social processes” (Andersen, Garvey, & Roggi, 2014). This thesis takes a social 
constructivist approach and implies that “practices and activities are seen as 
dangerous, or risky, through a process of developing shared meanings among 
people within an organisation or across a community” (Andersen et al., 2014), and 
indeed the way risk is viewed is influenced by organisational processes and actors. I 
use a similar approach to investigating board risk committees as Gendron did when 
examining Audit Committees as “constructed in the eyes of individuals who attend 
meetings” (Gendron & Bédard, 2006). The answers to the research questions, 
therefore, are descriptive of the actors’ perceptions about their roles. This chapter 
explains which academic perspectives were chosen to shed light on the 
abovementioned research questions. 
 In “Organized Uncertainty” Power distinguishes between the construction of 
risk objects and the construction of risk management. The construction of risk 
objects “has a long tradition in scholarship which exhibits the considerable variety 
of ways in which risks become part of political and institutional agendas” (Power, 
2007), while the construction of risk management is “a relatively underexplored 
theme in the risk management field” (Power, 2007). The focus of this study is not 
on risks themselves, nor on construction of risk objects (Hilgartner, 1992), but 
rather on organisational structures and processes that are in place to manage and 
oversee them, and on the people who do so and therefore shape their meanings. 
Power understands risk governance as “designs for the management of risk 
management” (Power, 2007). 
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 “What we might call ‘first-order’ risk objects are increasingly subsumed 
within a model of management process, which in turn constructs them as ‘auditable’ 
risk objects” (Power, 2007). Not focusing on risks themselves allows to have an 
agnostic attitude to whether those ‘first-order’ risks exist and how they could be 
mitigated, and instead to focus on the second-order construction and oversight of 
those risks, as well as the actors’ construction of meaning, in line with Bhimani’s 
observation: “Concepts like risk and governance are ultimately social constructs 
shaped by the contexts they inhabit” (Bhimani, 2009). 
 A lot of the concepts dealt with throughout the thesis could be best understood 
within the context of their evasiveness and lack of clear definitions. To demonstrate, 
Andersen et al. (2014) observe: 
“Risk appetite, risk appetite framework, risk tolerance, risk culture, risk limits, 
and risk capacity are newer terms in the risk-taking lexicon that have come 
into vogue recently […] the precise meaning and metrics of these terms are 
evolving and thus there is still considerable inconsistency in their use” 
(Andersen et al., 2014).  
Despite the variation in the underlying meaning that different users might 
attach to these terms, these terms are commonly used – often without individual 
authors attempting to define them. Indeed, that equivocality is even true of terms 
such as ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’, because “it has been conceived and framed by 
different professional disciplines and theoretical traditions that see risk in certain 
contexts and through the lens of specific needs” (Andersen et al., 2014).  
 
  
 16	  
 
Corporate governance, despite being an ambiguous term itself, organises risk 
management and oversight: 
“Corporate governance considers the role of the board in its fiduciary role 
towards the official owners, the shareholders, and their obligations to fend off 
major disasters while optimising the value-creating potential of the enterprise” 
 (Andersen et al., 2014). 
The OECD researchers state that “Corporate governance involves a set of 
relationship between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders” (OECD, 2004). According to Cadbury, corporate governance is “a 
system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury, 1992), and 
according to Walker “The role of corporate governance is to protect and advance 
the interests of shareholders through setting the strategic direction of a company and 
appointing and monitoring capable management to achieve this” (Walker, 2009). 
Despite the numerous definitions of what corporate governance means, “there is a 
general agreement that governing a corporation and managing a corporation are 
distinct activities” (Andersen et al., 2014). 
FIGURE 2.1: OVERSIGHT VS MANAGEMENT  
 
Source: “Managing risk and opportunity”, pg. 13 in Andersen et al (2014) 
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In Andersen’s et al. representation of corporate governance, unlike 
management, governance is responsible for oversight and supervision: “Effective 
oversight of risk-taking is an important governance function and will remain a key 
responsibility of the board” (Andersen et al., 2014). In terms of governance 
structures, the empirical focus of the thesis is on oversight by the board risk 
committee, and on the risk management frameworks within the organisation itself.  
“Oversight” is a broad term (Acheson, 2004), one which encompasses a wide 
range of activities and agents. One of the purposes of this research is to shed some 
light on this broad concept of oversight and show the ways it manifests itself in 
practice through the actors’ sense-making. This chapter therefore explores the 
possible ways academic literature might help shape a framework that will direct this 
research towards finding the answers to those questions, as well as explaining the 
research methods used.  
While investigating the literature, the goal was not to find how the term 
‘oversight’ is used directly within different academic domains, but rather to identify 
literatures that focus on issues similar to oversight, and analyse how their discourses 
might be helpful to understanding how oversight is perceived and practiced by 
actors in the field. The objective of this chapter is thus to position the rest of the 
thesis within current academic debates and to draw out the relevance that these 
literatures have to understanding the practice of oversight.  
As early as 1973, Stephen Ross explained that “Essentially all contractual 
arrangements, as between employer and employee or the state and the governed, for 
example, contain important elements of agency” (Ross, 1973). Agency theory 
makes an important contribution to accounting research and is central to accounting 
theory, following Kunz & Pfaff  “[a]gency theory and its advocated view of the firm 
as a complex nexus of contracts constitutes one of the major pillars of theoretical 
accounting” (Kunz & Pfaff, 2002).  
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Agency perspective is particularly relevant to and useful for my research, 
because this thesis describes a number of complex explicit and implicit contractual 
arrangements between different levels of oversight within the financial sector – 
“levels of oversight” is an analytical term used in this thesis to describe the 
oversight relationships between regulators and the board (Chapter 4) at the highest 
level, between the board and managers (Chapter 5), and levels of risk oversight 
employees within the business (Chapter 6). Agency perspective is helpful in 
thinking about different levels of principal and agent relationships which interact 
with each other. 
The agency perspective is used as an appropriate framework for understanding 
complicated interactions, while accepting its limitations as a concept whose origin 
lies in economic theory, and thus acknowledging that “agency theory models are not 
intended to be literal descriptions of the world” (Lambert, 2006). However, despite 
not giving a literal description of practice, agency theory provides a helpful broad 
framework for positioning the specific issues addressed in this research. And, 
additionally, I fill out and supplement this broad conception of the agency view-
point with two strands of literature and thinking more directly relevant to the areas 
of study - the enforced self-regulation literature and the literature on audit 
committee effectiveness. In these settings agency theory is  a helpful general 
perspective in understanding how the concept of oversight manifests itself in 
practice. 
In his studies of oversight by audit committees, Gendron advocates 
“multivocality” (Gendron, 2009) and departure from typical uses of agency theory. 
Related to Gendron’s suggestion, a theoretical framework used in this research in 
order to dissect and explain the components of oversight could include insights from 
two independent, but overlapping theories: agency and regulation. The research is 
also heavily rooted in the audit committee literature as a proxy that helps explain 
risk committees. A number of other theoretical frameworks could also have been 
appropriate, such as for example governance or management control. Regulation 
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and audit committee literatures were selected due to their direct fit with the 
empirical material about oversight. 
Figure 2.2 is an adaptation of the Andersen’s model to this research and 
demonstrates how the use of the abovementioned academic perspective is 
connected. In addition to the board (especially risk and audit committees) who 
oversee the firm’s management, the role of the financial regulators and their 
oversight of the board is also considered. Agency language is used throughout the 
thesis in order to simplify the complicated relationships between varieties of actors; 
however contribution to the agency theory is not the objective of this thesis. Some 
of the relationships discussed have principal-agent attributes are: regulators – board 
members, board members – executives, executives – employees in their firms.   
 
FIGURE 2.2: CHAPTER STRUCTURE OVERVIEW  
 
 
Source: Own representation, inspired by “Managing risk and opportunity”, 
page 21 Andersen et al (2014) 
 
Chapter 7 
Chapter 5 
Regulator 
Executive 
Board 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 6 
Agency 
Audit 
Committees 
Regulation 
Literatures 
 20	  
 
The literature review is organised the following way: first agency perspective 
is discussed because it is the foundation which provides a framework that will be 
used in every chapter throughout the thesis, and then elements of regulation and 
audit committee literatures are discussed, as the ones more accurately appropriate to 
the studies of regulation and board risk committees. 
Chapter 4 investigates the ‘principal-agent’- like regulatory oversight of the 
board, with a specific focus on the regulation of risk oversight. Regulation 
literatures are used in this section. Chapter 5 looks at the Board’s role through the 
lens of Audit Committee literature, drawing the parallel between the Risk and Audit 
committees. Chapter 6 examines the governance framework within financial 
institutions, and the agency interaction between the managers and the board. 
Finally, Chapter 7 is about information flows and agents who operationalise it, 
therefore agency ideas apply most directly. 
  Due to the breadth and complexity of literatures covered, the discussion of the 
literature that follows does not aim to be comprehensive, but rather to help frame 
the reference points and methodological choices for a better understanding of the 
empirical phenomenon of oversight in a way that will aid understanding of 
oversight practice issues throughout the thesis. This chapter will demonstrate how 
application of these three academic research spheres shapes the questions on risk 
oversight and formulates the important issues addressed in this thesis: i.e. the 
practice of risk oversight in financial institutions with a focus on the UK experience. 
The thesis will, fundamentally, be treating oversight as an agency issue, and will 
apply the regulation and audit committee literatures as empirical subsets of the 
wider agency theme, as a way of better understanding the way actors’ behaviours 
are shaped.   
 
  
 21	  
 
2.1. AGENCY PERSPECTIVE 
 
“The [agency] model is arguably the most popular model in use by accounting 
researchers today as evidenced by the body of extant accounting literature. 
[…] Its basic propositions are easy to understand, intuitively appealing, and 
empirically tractable” (Cohen & Holder-Webb, 2006). 
According to Kaplan and Atkinson, there are two principal-agent relationships 
in a typical firm (Kaplan & Atkinson, 1998): one is between the shareholders and 
managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and another is at the institutional level - 
between top managers and individual divisions within the firm (Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1991).  Kaplan and Atkinson do not mention the Boards as 
intermediate layer of agency relationships. It is suggested, however, that a 
‘principal-agent’ – like interaction between non-executives and the regulators is also 
a relevant one – despite not strictly working for the regulators, boards interact with 
regulators on behalf of the firm in making regulatory oversight possible. 
Agency theory, as expressed above, provides a useful framework to think 
about the relationships within oversight framework; it is also a popular, well-
developed and mature framework in accounting research. The structure of this 
section is as follows: firstly, the origins and definition of agency theory are 
mentioned, and then the key aspects of agency that are useful to the problem of 
oversight are described, specifically: information asymmetry and the problems 
arising from it, and the costs of overcoming that asymmetry. 
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2.1.1. BACKGROUND 
 
Although agency theory was originally developed as an economic model4 of 
behaviour (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973), it has over time become a more 
general and widely accepted empirical phenomenon as evidenced by the analytical 
assertion that agency theory became an “industry that explores every permutation 
and combination of agency experience in the corporate form” (Shapiro, 2005). This 
agency experience is manifested by the fact that “[a]n agency relationship exists 
when one or more individuals (called principals) hire others (called agents) in order 
to delegate responsibilities to them” (Baiman, 1990). The term “hiring” is quite 
specific, but it is worth noting at this point that agency relationships can also be 
observed in most other manager-subordinate relationships. 
Looking back to Eisenhardt as the starting point, the reason agency theory is 
relevant to the investigation of the phenomenon of “oversight” is that the agency 
problem “arises when (a) the desires or goals of principal and agent conflict and (b) 
it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually 
doing” (Eisenhardt, 1989). There are several oversight relationships that could be 
observed in the financial organisations, each of which has aspects of principal-agent 
interaction.  
A primary way this research differs from standard agency theory, is that 
agency theory often describes the goals of the principals and agents as conflicting, 
and entails an assumption that portrays agents as lazy and purposefully elusive: 
indeed, “standard agency theory has often been criticized because of its 
                                                
4 For further discussion of economic foundations of accounting-related topics see: 
“Economics in Management Accounting" (Bromwich, 2006). 	  
 23	  
presumptions about human behaviour” (Kunz & Pfaff, 2002). While extent to which 
the goals of principals and agents diverge is not the focus of the empirical chapters, 
the focus here is on the nature of the interactions themselves, and on the places 
where these interactions happen in practice. 
One of the assumptions borrowed from agency theory is that since there are a 
number of complicated information flows in the financial services institutions that 
make oversight happen, it is difficult or expensive to oversee and verify all the 
information used during the oversight process. 
“Common to all principal-agent models is an information asymmetry 
assumption” (Baiman, 1990).  Risk oversight provides a clear example of this 
information asymmetry in the agency relationship, because from the perspective of 
organisational design, oversight can be seen as being about agents giving 
appropriate information to the principals in order to help the principals execute their 
role. The agents have more information about the issue than the principals because 
they are closer to, and more directly involved in, the business process, but principals 
need this information in order to manage and monitor the agents well. This 
information asymmetry aspect of the theory is very relevant to accounting research, 
because accounting and risk management tools are a part of overcoming this 
problem. 
And indeed, in relation to accounting research, some argue that “[a]gency 
theory has been one of the most important theoretical paradigms in accounting 
during the last 25 years. The primary feature of agency theory that has made it 
attractive to accounting researchers is that it allows the explicit incorporation of 
conflicts of interest, incentive problems, and mechanisms for controlling incentive 
problems into our models” (Lambert, 2006). Following that line of thought, this 
section demonstrates the specific aspects of agency theory that will be helpful to 
answer questions about oversight. 
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2.1.2. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
 
Information flows and knowledge transfer between the agents and principals, 
as well as amongst the agents themselves, plays an important part in reality of the 
information asymmetry problem. Jensen and Meckling differentiate between 
specific and general knowledge, and define specific knowledge as “knowledge that 
is costly to transfer among agents and general knowledge as knowledge that is 
inexpensive to transmit. Because it is costly to transfer, getting specific knowledge 
used in decision-making requires decentralizing many decision rights” (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1995).  
Furthermore, “[t]he cost of transferring knowledge depends on factors such as 
the nature of the knowledge, the organizational environment, and technology. […] 
Transfer, as we use it, means effective transfer, not merely communication. The 
recipient of knowledge is presumed to understand the message well enough to act 
on it” (Jensen & Meckling, 1995). Understanding effective information transfer, 
according to the actors involved, will be especially relevant to Chapter 5, as it looks 
at different functions of the risk management process within organisations, and 
Chapter 7 that investigates how information providers within firms help non-
executives, who are likely to have more general instead of very specific knowledge, 
to perform their role.  
Transformation of risk-related data into useful and relevant information that 
the ‘recipients’ such as management and boards can act upon is one of the key 
problems explored in Chapter 7.  Information flows are central in setting business 
strategy: for example, Bhimani and Langfield-Smith find that “strategy 
development and implementation must be translated into tangible and identifiable 
activities to make them amenable to structured informational visibility” (Bhimani & 
Langfield-Smith, 2007).  
 25	  
 
Information asymmetry can create a so-called ‘moral hazard’ whereby 
“individuals engage in risk sharing under condition such that their privately taken 
actions affect the probability distribution of the outcome” (Hölmstrom, 1979), and 
might therefore take more risks since the burden is shared. Overcoming the agency 
problem is not merely about minimising information asymmetry and moral hazard, 
but also about the alignment of incentives monitoring practices associated with it 
(Andersen et al., 2014). 
 
2.1.3. MONITORING  
 
Another central problem in agency situations such as oversight is the cost of 
oversight in agency relationships, “It is generally impossible for the principal or the 
agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the 
principal’s viewpoint” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This problem is especially 
significant in complicated financial institutions where both the number and the 
technical complexity of transactions are of such magnitude that only a few people 
close to these transactions might be able to understand them (and even then, might 
not understand them entirely). In such institutions, a considerable amount of 
information, as well as understanding its impact, might be private to certain groups 
of agents alone. 
Since agency literature looks at incentivising agents, and functions under the 
premise that monitoring (observing agents’ behaviours) and oversight (used here as 
a more active term, implying a possibility of modification in agents’ behaviours) are 
costly and not possible to the full extent due to the information asymmetry.  An 
underlying idea is that “The agent is assumed to have private information to which 
the principal cannot costlessly gain access” (Baiman, 1990). This insight is 
particularly relevant to Chapter 4 that discusses regulatory oversight of the firms, 
and Chapter 5 that investigates the corporate governance interaction between the 
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boards and the mangers.  Hilb (2005) distinguishes between strategic and 
monitoring dimensions of corporate governance, and explains that strategic 
dimension could be most helpfully addressed with the use of stewardship and role 
theories, while agency and stakeholder theories are best for understanding the 
monitoring dimension (Hilb, 2012).  
Simons characterises management control systems as “more than devices of 
constraint and monitoring: management control systems are the formalized 
procedures and systems that use information to maintain or alter patterns in 
organizational activity” (Simons, 1990). Therefore, according to this definition, 
information is not just a passive object that plays a part in the oversight process, but 
it also has an instrumental performative role in forming organisational behaviour. 
Chapter 6 discusses dome of the effects that information flows within the Three 
Lines of Defence organisational structure have on shaping the way risk oversight is 
operationalised in practice. 
When exploring the agency issue empirically, one can observe a number of 
principals and agents; but their relationships are more complicated and multi-
dimensional than classic agency theory allows: indeed, “Agency theory presents a 
partial view of the world that, although it is valid, also ignores a good bit of the 
complexity of organisations” (Bhimani, Ncube, & Sivabalan, 2015). Therefore the 
rest of this literature review is extended to include regulation and audit oversight 
literatures which are directly relevant to the thesis, and add a level of specificity to 
the wider agency approach that the thesis follows loosely without attempting to 
contribute to agency theory. 
 
  
 27	  
2.2. REGULATION THEORIES 
 
The application of a principal-agent framework to the study of regulation, 
originally proposed by Loeb and Magat  (Loeb & Magat, 1979) in the Journal of 
Law and Economics, allows examination of key aspects of the problem such as 
information asymmetry. Debates about regulation could be seen as having many 
fundamental overlaps with the agency literature: there are principals (regulators) 
who monitor the agents (regulated). Regulators themselves, however, are also 
agents acting on behalf of the government and the public.  
This thesis treats regulators as proxy principals and does not deal with the 
“who guards the guards” problem in depth; the assumption here is of the benevolent 
regulator, i.e. the “regulator who seeks to maximise total surplus (consumers’ plus 
firms’ plus taxpayers’) in society” (Laffont & Tirole, 1993)5. 
 
2.2.1. PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION 
 
This thesis selectively uses certain aspects of regulation literature primarily in 
order to explain the changes in risk oversight imposed by micro-prudential 
regulators on firms. Furthermore, in later sections regulation theory explains the 
role of non-executive directors as pseudo-regulators: “Regulating the ‘risk society’ 
is a burgeoning academic and policy area and there are signs that existing systems 
of regulation, for example UK financial services, are coupling the correction of 
market failure with the management of risk as their organising principles” (Black, 
2002).  
                                                
5 For an exploration of the problem of the self–interested regulator see parts V and VI 
of Laffont (1993).	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Focusing on UK-based financial institutions and regulators, the two useful 
concepts are principles-based and risk-based regulation (Baldwin & Black, 2008; 
Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2010; Black, 2004; Walker, 2009). These two concepts 
help demonstrate the way micro-prudential regulation6 evolved over time: e.g. 
Baldwin et al in The Oxford Handbook of Regulation explain that “Principles-based 
regulation, and in particular its associations with firm judgment and with industry 
guidance, has strong resonances with the self-regulation techniques which enrol 
market actors in the regulatory process and which are a longstanding but disputed 
feature of regulatory landscape: […] financial market regulation in recent years has 
seen a move away from self-regulation and towards greater centralization” (Baldwin 
et al., 2010). 
The mechanism of micro-prudential regulation is based on the assumption that 
the regulators issue rules (which create mandatory binding obligations) and 
guidance (which explains how to comply with the rules and is non-binding) relating 
to the desired behaviour by the firms. These rules and guidance are used by 
regulators who oversee how firms comply with all of them, bearing in mind that 
should the firms not comply, they may be punished. Regulatory oversight thus 
manifests itself at the end of the regulatory process, where the corrective action 
taken as a result involves telling the firms to alter their behaviour: regulatory 
oversight could therefore be seen as a form of externally influencing the firm’s own 
management process. 
 
  
                                                
6 Macro-prudential regulation looks at the way firms interact with each other in 
financial markets and create the potential for systemic risk, while micro-prudential 
regulation focuses on the capital soundness of individual financial institutions. 
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2.2.2. ENFORCED SELF-REGULATION 
 
 The concept of 'Enforced self-regulation' (Baldwin et al., 2010) adds to agency 
literature because it “characterizes the potentially cooperative relationship between 
regulator and regulated” (Power, 2007), where regulatory activities then focus on 
the “oversight of the self-regulatory activities” (Lodge, 2014).  Therefore, when 
regulators allow organisations to self-regulate, they need to determine a way of 
seeing into each organisation in order to enforce this self-regulation and to check 
how the organisation self-regulates. This gives internal control systems, a special 
case of self-regulation, “a central role” (Power, 2004) and means that firm-focused 
research helps to understand the practice of enforced self-regulation. While it might 
seem that it is at the opposite end of the spectrum from any governmental 
regulation, Sinclair argues that there can be a “spectrum of coexisting policy 
choices” (Sinclair, 1997). According to its proponents, self-regulation is a more 
responsive and context-driven kind of regulation (Schulz & Held, 2004), and might 
result in regulated institutions being more prone to “buy into” the ideas and thus 
avoid regulatory arbitrage (Fleischer, 2010). Those who oppose it base their 
arguments on the “powerful distrust of profit seeking private enterprises regulating 
their own business activities” (Omarova, 2011). 
In order to develop their own systems for compliance with the rather vague 
definitions of a self-enforced regulatory regime, financial institutions increased the 
size of their internal compliance functions and hired external consultants (Power, 
Ashby, & Palermo, 2013). While the loose definitions and requirements given by 
the regulators could have led to a variation in the level of compliance, these 
variations might have been flattened out and made more uniform by the presence of 
consultants (e.g. the consultancy arms of the big 4 accounting firms) who have a 
strong influence on the process of interpreting and ‘translating’ regulatory 
requirements.  
Omarova observes “Amid widespread, and largely justified, scepticism toward 
banks' and other financial institutions' ability to act in a socially responsible or 
publicly minded manner, a call for allowing them to run their own affairs is 
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counterintuitive”, but argues that what is needed is a new self-regulatory regime 
“which would focus explicitly on the issue of systemic risk prevention and impose 
the responsibility of protecting the public from financial crises directly on the 
financial services industry” (Omarova, 2011). 
The enforced self-regulation approach “requires organizational self-regulatory 
arrangements to be verifiable. There must be a regulatory correlate visible and 
auditable at the organization level – and this is how the internal control system has 
become a key resource for this kind of regulatory style” (Power, 2013). Due to the 
strong emphasis on the internal risk regulatory mechanisms, enforced self-
regulation “could be seen as a form of subcontracting regulatory functions to private 
actors” (Hutter, 2001). The role of the government can be seen in that case as 
“regulation of self-regulation” (Schulz & Held, 2004) or “meta-regulation” (Black, 
2001). 
This thesis looks at the regulation of risk at the entity-level within financial 
institutions and at the corporate governance that is in place to support the risk 
management and oversight processes. Hood et al observe that risk regulation 
regimes entail three components: “standard setting, information gathering and 
behaviour modification” (Hood, Rothstein, & Baldwin, 2001); in terms of the 
practical implementation of this pattern, regulators need the support of businesses in 
order to provide them with information required for oversight.  
The currently mandatory Basel capital framework requirements “encourage 
financial institutions to develop more effective internal risk management practices 
by allowing them to rely on their internal models for measuring the riskiness of their 
assets” (Omarova, 2011). In fact, Power observes “The self-control activities of 
organisations have become an essential component of regulatory agendas” (Power, 
2004). Enforced self-regulation is an underlying theme of the risk oversight 
discussion throughout this thesis, because while the first line of defence (see 
Chapter 6) self-regulates, the board (see Chapter 5) needs a way of looking at it and 
getting information which will allow it to see what is happening and allow it to 
choose where to intervene, should it deem it necessary to do so. In this way boards 
could be seen as similar to the regulators, since they share many elements of 
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functionality, and philosophies coming out of regulation theories can be used to 
characterise the activities boards engage in as they oversee management. As 
transmitters of self-regulation between the firms and regulators, non-executive 
directors are heading risk oversight within the firms, and crucially both they and the 
regulators are relying on information intermediaries within the firms (Chapter 7) in 
order to make it possible. 
Regulatory interactions with the board risk committees will be discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5. The next section focuses on the literature that is mostly directly 
helpful in understanding boards and the board risk committees. 
 
2.3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AUDIT COMMITTEES  
 
There are many definitions of corporate governance, but there is a “general 
agreement that governing a corporation and managing a corporation are distinct 
activities” (Andersen et al., 2014): i.e. the governing actors of a corporation are the 
shareholders (or board members who act as their representatives) who provide 
“oversight, accountability, and supervision” (Andersen et al., 2014) while executive 
management takes control over the operations and daily functioning. This leads to 
the creation of an inherent principal-agent relationship between the shareholders 
(often a large widely dispersed group) who act as the principals and who are usually 
not insiders, despite providing the financing, and on the other hand the managers 
and employees who know more about the firm. While the limited liability nature of 
listed firms naturally “reduces the security enjoyed by lenders and provides 
incentives for increased risk taking on behalf of shareholders” (Spira & Page, 
2003), corporate governance systems aim to solve this ingrained principal-agent 
conflict between the shareholders and their agents within the firm. Accountability 
mechanisms, such as “financial reporting, internal control and audit” (Spira & 
Page, 2003) facilitate risk management within the corporate governance framework, 
enabling boards to act on behalf of the shareholders to address the collective action 
problem.  
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Corporate governance literature conceptualises the role of the board in various 
ways, focusing e.g. on the board’s role to monitor (Fama, 1980) and control 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990) management in the classic agency sense where 
management is seen as opportunistic and it is thus the role of the board to protect 
shareholder value; or to support (Huse, 2007) managers who already intrinsically 
want to do a good job (Donaldson, 1990) in the stewardship theory sense 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Daily et al explain that stewardship theory serves “both 
as a complement and a contrast to agency theory” (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 
2003). Spira and Bender compare and contrast the work of audit and remuneration 
and discuss the tension between strategic and monitoring aspects within the NED 
role on these committees - they find that these roles are not as strictly opposed to 
each other as some commentators suggest. They also note that "Structure and 
composition of board sub-committees can be mandated: conduct and relationships 
cannot" (Spira & Bender, 2004). 
 
Roberts et al. study work and relationships of the non-executives though in-
depth interviews and find that this traditional theoretical distinction “between 
agency and stewardship theory, and control versus collaboration models of the 
board do not adequately reflect the lived experience of non-executive directors and 
other directors on the board”. To solve this mismatch between theory and their 
findings, they use “accountability as a central concept in the explanation of how 
boards operate” (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005). ‘Accountability’ is interpreted 
as an aspect of the principal-agent interaction, where boards are accountable to a 
number of entities including the regulators. 
Roberts et al find that “the role of the non-executive is to both support 
executives in their leadership of the business and to monitor and control their 
conduct” (Roberts et al., 2005): this point leads to a question about the level of 
involvement that NEDs need to have within the business which is discussed in 
Chapter 5. Developing that further, “The contrast of oversight and support poses an 
important concern for directors and challenges them to maintain what can become a 
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rather delicate balance” (Daily et al., 2003), thus the boundaries of the NED role are 
a relevant focus of research.  
 
2.3.1. BOUNDARIES OF THE BOARD RISK COMMITTEES 
 
Gieryn explains “demarcation” as “ideological efforts by scientists to 
distinguish their work and its products from non-scientific intellectual activities. 
The focus is on boundary-work of scientists: their attribution of selected 
characteristics to the institution of science […] for purposes of constructing a social 
boundary that distinguishes some intellectual activities as "non-science"” (Gieryn, 
1983). Chapter 5 shows the way NEDs define their oversight role on the boundary 
between risk oversight and risk management. Mikes applies Gieryn’s work on 
boundaries (Gieryn, 1983) to the realm of risk management practice and 
distinguishes risk experts based on their approach to calculative cultures. They can 
be divided into two camps: either quantitative enthusiasts or quantitative sceptics. 
Mikes states that “experts try to define what is and is not their remit, often with 
respect to competing or complementary fields of expertise” (Mikes, 2011). Based 
on that observation about role definitions and on the fact that risk and audit are 
often spoken about together, investigation of the audit committee literature can be a 
helpful way of thinking about risk committees. 
Spira and Bender observe that in the UK “The establishment of board sub-
committees has been strongly recommended as a suitable mechanism for improving 
corporate governance, by delegating specific tasks from the main board to a smaller 
group and harnessing the contribution of non-executive directors” (Spira & Bender, 
2004). These committees typically include an Audit Committee, Risk Committee, 
Nomination Committee, Remuneration Committee, etc. The focus of this thesis is 
on risk oversight as conducted primarily by risk committees, but as discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
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Mikes explains that “’professions’ originally emerged as a demarcation 
problem, i.e. a problem of boundaries between “special” and ordinary occupations” 
(Mikes, 2011), and shows that while Abbott (Abbott, 1988) looks at the actual 
characteristics of the professions that make them different from others, Gieryn uses 
the notion of boundaries (Gieryn, 1983) to “emphasize its rhetorical, discursive 
nature: how does group X define itself through descriptions of how they are not like 
groups Y and Z?” (Mikes, 2011). According to Zietsma and Lawrence, boundary 
work researchers have focused either on “professional/occupational boundaries” 
(Abbott, 1988; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010) or “ways in which actors work to 
establish coordination across boundaries” (Carlile, 2002; Zietsma & Lawrence, 
2010). The Three Lines of Defence framework involves separate groups 
coordinating various tasks and working together: business units, risk managers, and 
internal auditors. The way their roles are defined and operationalised is discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Boundary-work focuses on actors’ definitions of their roles in relation to 
others: what is it that they do that the others do not? But confusion in boundary 
work might result in role ambiguity: e.g. Kahn et al. (1964) defined role ambiguity 
as a “lack of necessary information available to a given organizational position” 
(Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal, 1964), which can be extended to mean 
“a concept that explains the availability of role-related information” (Ahmad & 
Taylor, 2009). Chapter 5 investigates the NEDs’ self-perceived role ambiguity both 
in terms of the scope (what falls under the realm of the Risk Committee) and depth 
of involvement. 
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2.3.2. AUDIT COMMITTEES 
 
Gendron and Bedard observe in 2006 that “The audit committee (AC) is one 
of the main corporate governance mechanisms upon which are predicated 
stakeholders hopes in constraining the behaviour of corporate managers” (Gendron 
& Bédard, 2006). They advocate for qualitative studies of audit committee (AC) 
effectiveness and explain that “macro perspectives on AC effectiveness can only 
provide meagre insights on a variety of fundamental issues such as: the way in 
which attendees of AC meetings make sense of AC effectiveness; the extent to 
which meanings of AC effectiveness differ significantly across attendees; and the 
way in which these meanings are produced” (Gendron & Bédard, 2006). 
Methodology chapter that follows explains the way the same principle has been 
applied to studying risk committees and the organisations they oversee, keeping in 
mind the concepts of accountability and oversight as constructs of the actors who 
perform them.  
The earlier increased focus on the oversight responsibilities of audit 
committees has been discussed widely, often as a relationship between the audit 
committee inputs and financial reporting outputs7. Beasley et al. interviewed 42 
members of board audit committees, and framed their findings as a tension between 
tension between the agency theory “view of the audit committee as an independent 
monitor of management versus the institutional theory view that audit committees 
may often be primarily ceremonial in nature, with a focus on providing symbolic 
legitimacy but not necessarily vigilant monitoring” (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, 
& Neal, 2009) – they found that “members strive to provide effective monitoring of 
financial reporting and seek to avoid serving on ceremonial audit committees”.  
                                                
7 See “The Audit Committee Oversight Process” (2009) by Beasley et al for an 
overview 
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Gendron and Bedard (2006) find that audit committee effectiveness is 
constructed through “ceremonial features of meetings”, “reflective interpretations of 
the substance of meetings” and “reflective interpretations of informal practices” 
(Gendron & Bédard, 2006). When studying oversight and construction of 
accountability, the separation between ceremonial and reflective features can also 
be relevant. Gendron and Bedard’s paper “focuses on the micro-production of 
meaning within the small circle of people who attend AC meetings. We did not 
examine how meanings of AC effectiveness are constituted beyond this circle, in 
the eyes of outsiders” (Gendron & Bédard, 2006). ‘Micro-production’ of meanings 
of oversight and accountability, is also the focus of my study. However, the research 
object here – oversight – is explored not just from the way it is constructed by the 
board members (Chapter 5), but also from the perspective of regulators (Chapter 4), 
and risk governance frameworks within the firm (Chapter 6). 
Beasley et al. show that “the extant literature largely fails to examine the 
process used by audit committees as a whole or by individual audit committee 
members when fulfilling their oversight responsibilities” (Beasley et al., 2009). This 
finding was also confirmed in a comprehensive literature review in 2010, when 
Bedard and Gendron reviewed 103 audit committee studies, and one of the key 
areas missing is related to the process dynamics surrounding Audit committees. 
Taking these observations into account and assuming that risk committees are 
similar to audit committees in that “AC members’ capacity to play their monitoring 
role depends, in large part, on the quality of the information they receive” (Bédard 
& Gendron, 2010), this thesis extends the view beyond looking at information from 
the perspective of the receivers into also researching the suppliers of information, 
and the process that information goes through in Chapter 7. 
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2.4. CONCLUSION 
 
Agency perspective is used throughout the thesis as a reference point in 
understanding the risk oversight interactions, but the aim is not to contribute to 
agency theory itself, but rather to use it to see how oversight plays out in practice. 
 This chapter has explained three areas of literature used to construct the 
academic framework for the empirical findings that follow. Oversight is seen 
primarily as an agency problem, so the agency perspective is examined as the 
broadest conceptualisation of oversight relationships. Agency presents a general 
framing resource to the problems of oversight. Making it more specific, the aspects 
of regulation theory highlighted could also be seen as a subset of the agency 
problem – for example, enforced self-regulation involves regulators enlisting parties 
they regulate in helping them perform their role. Regulation literature is used as a 
particularly focal reference point when illuminating the increasing regulatory focus 
on individual responsibility in relation to risk oversight in Chapter 4.  
 Narrowing the focus further towards the board risk committees, one of the 
main areas of research in this thesis, parallels are drawn with the literature on audit 
committees. Audit committee literature is discussed because of the assumption that 
despite the differences that will be explained in Chapter 5, a lot of the knowledge 
about audit committees will be transferrable to the less researched domain of risk 
committees. Underlying aspects of agency relationships will be discussed 
throughout the thesis, but more precisely Chapter 6 will focus on corporate 
governance and Chapter 7 on information problems. 
The chapter has demonstrated how this project could be situated in relation to 
other bodies of literature; agency literature is treated as a useful broad framework, 
and regulation literature makes agency theory more descriptive of the empirical 
phenomenon of oversight in practice. Audit committees make the comparison with 
risk committees even more direct.  
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To conclude the brief literature overview, this thesis uses elements of agency 
as a useful framework and a point of orientation rather than explaining oversight as 
a pure agency problem or attempting to contribute to the agency theory. Oversight is 
costly and could be simplified into the interactions between principals and agents. 
As demonstrated above, adding regulation literatures allows us to unpack the 
concept of oversight and give richness to agency theory. The following section 
deals with the consideration of social science research methodologies appropriate to 
address the research questions, and describes why these methods were chosen in 
order to add depth that formal agency models cannot achieve.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A frequently voiced concern in management accounting literature is the 
‘relevance gap’ between research and practice (Aram & Salipante, 2003; Pettigrew, 
1997; Roberts et al., 2005). Hall notes that “Accounting research, and management 
research more generally, has been criticised for becoming far too removed from the 
practices and activities it seeks to investigate and illuminate” (Hall, 2010). This 
thesis seeks to bridge the gap between research and practice by basing research on 
practitioner sense-making about the field and their roles – therefore rooting theory 
observations in findings from the field.  
 
A number of authors have urged accounting and management researchers to 
adopt qualitative approaches (Ferreira & Merchant, 1992; Vaivio, 2008). The broad 
objective of this research is to understand the concept of ‘risk oversight’ as 
operationalised by practitioners, and a decision was made early on that using 
qualitative research methods would be the most appropriate way to address the 
questions involved, in line with Gendron and Bendrand’s suggestion to note “the 
significance of actors reflectivity in constituting social realities” (Bédard & 
Gendron, 2010).  
 
When it comes to qualitative research, Langley distinguishes between those 
researchers who are formulating “a priori process theories and testing them using 
coarse-grained longitudinal time series and event-history methods”, and those who 
“plunge into the processes themselves, collecting fine-grained qualitative data […] 
and attempting to extract theory from the ground up” (Langley, 1999). This thesis is 
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based on the latter attitude towards collecting qualitative ground-up data with mixed 
qualitative research (Flick, 2014), using several methods: Analysis of Regulatory 
and Practitioner Documents (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000), Immersion in the Field 
(Delamont, 2004; DeWalt & DeWalt, 2010; Jorgensen, 1989; Kawulich, 2005) and 
Semi-Structured (Gillham, 2005) interviews.  
 
The research aims to illuminate practice, and analyse the micro-practices that 
work together to provide organisational risk oversight. In order to answer the 
research questions: ‘How does the practice of risk oversight differ from 
management?’, ‘How do various actors operationalise their risk oversight roles?’ 
and ‘How do information flows shape oversight?’, data has been collected from 
three categories of qualitative sources: (1) documents, (2) field immersions, and (3) 
interviews. To my knowledge a comprehensive study of this kind has not been done 
before, due to the depth of data collected from a number of difficult-to-access 
qualitative sources. Documents were used to trace the evolution of concepts, 
interviews to understand how practitioners make sense of their roles, and field 
immersions to see how information flows happen. Chapter 4 is based on content 
analysis of regulatory documents produced by the Financial Services Authority – 
the main UK financial institutions regulator in the relevant period. Chapter 5 relies 
on a combination of interview materials and publications by regulators and 
consultants. Chapter 6 builds primarily on document analysis, while Chapter 7 is 
more rooted in the interviews. The two field immersions within firms as well as 
attendance at many academic and practitioner conferences are primarily used in 
support of interview and documentary material.  
The aim was to develop knowledge of discourse and of how practitioners 
make sense of their role in the risk oversight processes. The first field immersion 
was largely exploratory about the current field of risk management in practice, and 
full time exposure to it in a setting of a financial institution allowed me to be deeply 
immersed into the topic, instead of formulating beforehand a hypothesis to be 
tested, the immersion followed the Barker et al view that “an unstructured approach 
[…] is suitable to an under-researched area, because in contrast to a narrower 
approach of formulating and testing hypotheses, it enables the emergence of 
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hypotheses that might not have been apparent in advance” (Barker, Hendry, 
Roberts, & Sanderson, 2012). This lack of a hypothesis is partially creditable for the 
emergence of the object of analysis: ‘risk oversight’ as the narrow space for further 
research, as shown below. While the second participant observation and the 
interviews were more focused on different aspects of risk oversight, they were not 
conducted to test hypotheses. The rest of this chapter explains the process of data 
collection and analysis in more detail. 
 
3.2. DOCUMENT ANALYSIS  
 
Some argue that content analysis is “the most important research technique in 
social sciences. It seeks to analyse data within a specific context in view of the 
meaning someone – a group or a culture – attributes to them” (Krippendorff, 1989). 
Borrowing from communications research studies, content analysis can be used for 
many purposes that were classified e.g. by Berelson 1952, including describing 
trends in communication content and revealing the focus of institutional attention 
(Berelson, 1952). Document analysis conducted as a part of this research was more 
interpretative and discursive than pure content analysis, but the choice of the 
method was informed by the literature on content analysis.  
Document analysis informs Chapter 4 (The Emergence of Responsible 
Oversight), focusing on the evolution of the concept of risk within UK regulation, 
and Chapter 6 (Risk Oversight in Management), discussing the operationalisation of 
the ‘Three Lines of Defence’ corporate governance framework. Content analysis did 
not include thematic analysis or production of “thematic networks: web-like 
illustrations (networks) that summarize the main themes constituting a piece of text” 
(Attride-Stirling, 2001). The reason for that was a methodological decision not to 
take a narrow evidence sample and investigate micro-patterns within documents, 
but instead to focus on evolution of key concepts over time.  
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Due to the choice of the financial industry as a focus of my study, content 
analysis has been conducted of each publicly available on their website document 
produced by the Financial Services Authority (and later Prudential Regulation 
Authority and Financial Reporting Council), and also selectively looked at the 
documents produced by other regulatory bodies and consulting firms.  
In order to analyse all publicly available regulatory documents since the 
foundation of the Financial Services Authority, the data base on their website was 
thoroughly investigated, and every single document was searched for key words 
‘risk’ and ‘oversight’, with a specific focus on the conjunction ‘risk oversight’, and 
read the context within which each those terms appeared, as well as copied these 
paragraphs into a separate timeline. This process allowed observing changes in the 
regulatory attitudes and opinions about risk oversight. A disadvantage of that 
approach is that there is a danger of not picking up content when synonyms are used 
instead of the chosen search words, but the volume of the documents dictated that 
approach. 
Coding of findings, or in other words looking for patterns and common 
themes, was conducted iteratively as the research went on, in a grounded theory 
fashion: grounded theory recommends analysis from the onset of the study on 
because “it directs the next interviews and observations” (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). 
The reason for that choice in terms of document content analysis was that a 
chronological timeline was followed, and therefore whenever one of the key terms 
emerged a description of the context in which it was used was noted. Manual 
process was used instead of textual analysis software, highlighting the key words 
within paragraphs that were useful in understanding the regulatory approach to risk 
and risk oversight. Despite the systematic nature of the identification process of the 
key themes, it is necessarily limiting due to the fact my personal view of finding 
significance went into this process, in line with the grounded theory approach. 
Chapter 6, which also relies on document analysis, provides an overview of 
the current understanding of the Three Lines of Defence model. When deciding how 
to approach this part of research, Stempel’s (1952) finding that a small 
sample, systematically selected, is better than a large sample of materials collected 
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conveniently (Stempel, 1952) was implemented. Due to an overwhelming supply of 
available information about it, the sample was limited to the documents produced 
by selected leading consultancy and professional bodies as examples of thinking, 
with an attempt to select those who are likely to be most influential.  
The purpose of the selected documents was to demonstrate the way 
practitioners represent their understandings about how the framework is intended to 
be operationalised in practice. The institutions to focus on were chosen based on 
their potential perceived impact on the firms under investigation. The assumption 
made was that the major consultancies would have more impact and should 
therefore be given more attention in my research. 
Specifically, consideration is given to the output of the three major strategy 
consultants – McKinsey, BCG and Bain, and the Big 4 auditing firms: PwC, 
KPMG, EY, and Deloitte. Among the professional bodies, the publications of the 
Institute of Risk Management (IRM), the Institute of International Finance (IIF), 
and the Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) are also examined. While there 
are clear methodological drawbacks to not using a wider array of institutions, the 
focus on financial services regulation is justifiable by the fact that the institutions 
observed and the interviews conducted were all in the financial sector. 
Although there is an abundance of publicly available regulatory and 
practitioner documents, field immersions via internships and interviews are 
instrumental in order to investigate the way risk oversight and information flows 
function and are conceptualised in practice. More specifically, field immersions 
allow light to be shed on these aspects of practice at a level of granularity that is just 
not possible to achieve through publicly available documents. They also improve 
the quality of interviews. Power et al (2013) warn that “it is part of the culture of 
financial services that it is typically difficult to access for external researchers” 
(Power et al., 2013). The next section expands on the two field immersions, 
followed by the description of interviews.  
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3.3. FIELD IMMERSIONS 
 
The practice of risk oversight could be superficially addressed by looking at 
the macro-level of an organisation through its corporate charts and structures (that 
are part of sense-making), but this research focuses on the operationalisation of 
oversight at the level of practice by the actors. This gives rise to the need to observe 
the practice of oversight at the level of individuals. 
In order to avoid the criticism that “Because they are at arm’s length from 
actual practice, [researchers] often fail to reflect the way business works in real life” 
(Bennis & O’Toole, 2005), following e.g. Mikes (2009), access to two organisations 
was secured, involving two extended periods in the field exploring those 
organisations in depth. These observations enabled immersion in the field with the 
aim of understanding how risk is operationalised within these two financial 
institutions in practice, as well as gaining trust of and access to interviewees. 
Spradley explains that “Participation allows you to experience activities directly” 
(Spradley, 1980), and Stake says that observations are useful because of “revealing 
actual experience” (Stake, 2013), but warns that the results of observations within 
one firm are not broadly generalisable, which is a significant limitation necessary in 
the grounded theory approach to research.  
Keeping these advantages and limitations in mind, two extended observations 
(8 and 9 week-long) were carried out in two major financial institutions: an 
investment bank in 2012 and an insurance firm in 2013. Both of these immersions 
into practice were obtained through informal methods, i.e. contacting people within 
the firms and enquiring whether it would be possible to work for them while also 
observing the way they work and conducting interviews. The lines of my research 
project were explained to them in advance. The firms concerned were content to 
grant access on this basis, and expressed interest in the resulting observations and 
findings. They imposed no conditions or controls on access of observations, except 
an expected and understandable requirement for confidentiality. 
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The immersion in the field had aspects of participant observations, but 
primarily used to build confidence in the rest of the research and discover 
interesting aspects to focus on as well as improve the quality of interview findings. 
During both immersion periods, all the necessary pre-employment checks, 
compliance training, and then job-related tasks that one would expect from a regular 
intern were carried out. Some ethnographic theorists warn that the researcher might 
be seen as an outsider (Bartunek & Louis, 1996) and face difficulties of access once 
on site (Walsh, 1998), but that has not proven to be the case in my experience, 
possibly because of my close involvement in the work process.  
 
 
3.3.1. FIRST (EXPLORATORY) FIELD IMMERSION 
 
The first immersion consisted of an eight-week work engagement that was 
conducted in August and September 2012 in the risk management function at one of 
the world’s top 5 investment banks, employing over 50,000 people globally, and 
holding over $700 billion in assets. The Risk Management function in that 
organisation (which is also quite representative of other risk management functions 
across the financial industry), was split into three silos of Market, Credit, and 
Operational Risk.  
I worked within the risk management division at the head office of the firm’s 
Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) branch as a risk management analyst in 
the ‘Portfolio Analysis’ division. The Portfolio Analysis group was created several 
months before my work there, and positioned above the three silos of risk 
organisation - it was tasked with information consolidation and processing for use 
of the top management and the board.  
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I reported into the Managing Director of the “Portfolio Analysis” group, who 
reported directly to the EMEA CRO, who in turn reported to the global CRO based 
in New York. My responsibilities included carrying out quantitative analysis of 
value at risk8 (VaR) measurements using Excel and similar internal firm tools and 
databases. The role included analysing the bank's market position by discovering 
reasons for the deviations from what might have been expected in light of historical 
data as well as coming up with forecasts after using complex modelling techniques 
related to value at risk (VAR). I presented the output of my analysis to my manager 
via emails, Word reports and PowerPoint presentations that went into the board 
management information packs for both the EMEA and Global level. I was directly 
involved in the process of creation of the group’s statements and reports that gave 
me a thorough high-level overview of a risk function within a bank. 
The first field immersion was crucial to this research in order to explore the 
risk management field in practice and formulate the direction of consequent 
research. The findings from this participant observation triggered my interest in 
“risk oversight” as a phenomenon, because even though they themselves did not use 
that term, with an analytical distance I observed that the function I worked for, the 
“Portfolio Analysis” group was designed to facilitate risk oversight between the 
three silos of risk and the top management and the board above them by providing 
them with an overview of the business’ risk management profile, which has not 
been done as methodically prior to the introduction of this function.  
  
                                                
8 Definition of VAR: “For a given time horizon t and confidence level p, the value at 
risk is the loss in market value over the time horizon t that is exceeded with 
probability 1-p. Many firms use an overnight value at risk measure for internal 
purposes, as opposed to the two-week standard that is commonly requested for 
disclosure to regulators, and the 99-percent confidence level is far from uniformly 
adopted.” (Duffie & Pan, 1997) 
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3.3.2. SECOND (OVERSIGHT) FIELD IMMERSION 
 
The second period of observations, conducted a year later, was more focused 
on observing manifestations and actors involved in risk oversight and management 
information production. It consisted of a 9-week project within a risk management 
function at a major global insurance firm in August, September and October 2013. 
The firm has over 24 million customers and £500 billion of assets under 
management. The risk management function in that firm included a separate “Risk 
Oversight” group, and I was able to interview all the employees working in that 
group among other people across the risk management department.  
My role there was more of an ‘expert’ and as such I reported directly to the 
Global Chief Risk Officer and his two vice-heads. I worked on a number of projects 
for each of them, which provided me with broad exposure to high-level strategic 
decisions, although as a trade-off it came at the price of making it harder to observe 
the micro-level interactions between the risk managers who were working in lower 
roles within the department. The reports were much more qualitative than those in 
the first institution - I did not conduct any Value at Risk calculations, and my work 
was focused on the corporate governance of the risk department and their 
management information flows.  
As the goal of both participant observations was to describe the practice of 
risk management and oversight without “imposing a priori a specific theoretical 
lens” (Anderson & Widener, 2006), I was observing as much as I could and 
attended as many meetings as was possible during the time I had, which was 
necessarily limited as this was carried alongside doing my actual job at the 
company. 
The main challenge I experienced when it came to the choice of participant 
observation as a research method in both cases was described by Delamont: 
“Ethnography is hard work: physically, emotionally and mentally exhausting” 
(Delamont, 2004), and indeed I found it very challenging to multitask between the 
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two roles: having both to work full-time for these firms, performing the tasks of a 
regular employee, and keeping some distance while observing them in my academic 
capacity. 
The findings of this thesis are therefore not strictly ethnographic, because the 
primary purpose of the field immersions and observations was two-fold: to gain 
access to people I have interviewed and to provide background knowledge from the 
field in order to make interpretations about interview material and give deeper sense 
of practice. In addition to this, participant observations were intended as a means to 
improve the quality of the interviews since by the time I conducted interviews 
within the firms I had already established rapport with the interviewees, having 
worked together with them for several weeks – and one of the key advantages of 
participant observation is that it enables “researchers to know what questions to 
ask” (Bernard, 2011). It has also improved the interviews I conducted in other 
institutions because of my deeper understanding of the field. 
 
3.4. INTERVIEWS  
 
During both observation periods, I met many people across different 
departments within the risk management, internal audit and regulatory compliance 
divisions, and I held both informal, so-called “water-cooler” interviews as well as 
others more formal in nature that were recorded and transcribed. Delamont observed 
- “Participant observation is used to cover a mixture of observation and 
interviewing” (Delamont, 2004) – I found it useful to have worked alongside the 
people I later interviewed because they were very open to speak to me because they 
already knew me by that point. I found, however, that interviews outside of the 
organisations I observed were also enhanced by my prior immersion in the industry, 
even without the benefit of knowing these people or their organisations first. Most 
quotes used in the thesis stem from formal, recorded interviews, but some of the 
questions were inspired by the topics that arose during the less formal interactions. 
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These less formal interactions and observations also fed into increased knowledge 
of the field and resulted in my ability to ask better questions. 
In addition to an immense number of informal conversations with 
practitioners both during my participant observations and at the outside events and 
conferences, I conducted 67 semi-structured interviews: each interview lasting 
between 25 and 97 minutes, 60 of them were transcribed and recorded, detailed 
notes were taken during the remaining 6 interviews. Interviewees included those 
working in risk management divisions in at the two firms where the participant 
observations were held as well as staff from other major financial institutions. In 
terms of the hierarchical levels, interviewees included: several CROs of largest 
banks and insurance firms, Managing and Executive Directors, Vice Presidents, 
Associates and Analysts, which gave me a clear view of the full spectrum of risk 
management and regulation across various levels of seniority and experience 
within the industry.  
The transcribed and recorded interviews could be divided into three 
categories: (1) 24 within the financial institution where the first participant 
observation was conducted and several from other similar institutions, (2) 21 
within the insurance firm which was the site the second field immersion, and from 
similar firms, and (3) 15 Non-executive directors from major financial institutions, 
including a senior-level regulator and a consultant who work on issues related to 
NEDs. The goal was not to compare these groups, or insurance and banks, but 
rather to discover the way risk oversight is operationalised within various financial 
institutions, without a particularly narrow focus on particular aspects of industries 
where these interviews were conducted. 
The tables below list interviewees within the firms. The first set of interviews 
– within the investment bank – were quite explorative in nature and included broad 
questions about their role and interactions with other employees. Those open-
ended interviews based on broad themes provided data that was helpful in order to 
develop further interview design (see Appendix I and II). This method has several 
advantages, as Sauder and Espeland (2009) agree: “This format provided the 
flexibility to probe responses, adapt questions to the unique experience and 
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expertise of informants, pursue emerging insights about processes for which there 
is, as yet, little systematic empirical evidence, and corroborate suspect 
information” (Sauder & Espeland, 2009). These interviews provided background 
knowledge to the functioning of risk management divisions in practice. 
TABLE 3.1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES WITHIN THE INVESTMENT BANK 
Code Position Firm Mins 
Bank_1 Executive Dir. - Credit Risk: Insurance Top Investment Bank 27 
Bank_2 Executive Dir. - Credit Risk: Commodities Top Investment Bank 28 
Bank_3 Associate Credit Risk Top Investment Bank 41 
Bank_4 Associate Credit Risk Reporting Top Investment Bank 25 
Bank_5 Executive Dir. - Portfolio Analysis Top Investment Bank 31 
Bank_6 Vice President - Market Risk reporting Top Investment Bank 55 
Bank_7 Ex-CRO of top 10 Investment Bank Top Investment Bank 98 
Bank_8 Associate Credit Risk Top Investment Bank 52 
Bank_9 Executive Dir. - Credit Risk Top Investment Bank 26 
Bank_10 Associate - Credit Risk: Commodities Top Investment Bank 44 
Bank_11 Vice President - Credit Risk: Utilities Top Investment Bank 34 
Bank_12 Executive Dir. - Credit Risk: Loans Top Investment Bank 29 
Bank_13 Executive Dir. - Market Risk Top Investment Bank 36 
Bank_14 Vice President - Credit Risk: Europe Top Investment Bank 32 
Bank_15 Vice President - Operational Risk Top Investment Bank 34 
Bank_16 Executive Dir - Credit Risk Top Investment Bank 33 
Bank_17 EMEA risk COO, S&P100 Top Investment Bank 36 
Bank_18 EMEA CRO, S&P100 Top Investment Bank 23 
Bank_19 Global CRO, S&P100 Top Investment Bank 64 
Bank_20 Vice President - Credit Risk: Eastern Europe  Top Investment Bank 25 
Bank_21 Associate - Portfolio Analysis Top Investment Bank 30 
Bank_22 Analyst - Operational Risk Top Investment Bank 20 
Bank_23 Head of Group Policy Framework Top Retail Bank 120 
Bank_24 Partner - Big 4 Risk Advisory Big 4 40 
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The second category of interviewees was mostly carried out within an 
insurance firm where the second participant observation was conducted, and other 
firms of similar size. These interviews were semi-structured and the goal was to 
discover attitudes to and understandings of the Three Lines of Defence corporate 
governance framework (which was discovered when investigating risk oversight 
within the firms – more information on that in Chapter 6), about interaction 
between the lines and Information Flows: findings from these interviews are 
primarily discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
TABLE 3.2: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES WITHIN THE INSURANCE FIRM 
Code Position Firm Mins 
Insurance_1 Head of Capital Management Top Insurance firm 48 
Insurance_2 Internal Audit Director Top Insurance firm 40 
Insurance_3 Audit Top Insurance firm 33 
Insurance_4 Analyst in ERM group Top Insurance firm 47 
Insurance_5 Head of Insurance Risk and Model Oversight Top Insurance firm 74 
Insurance_6 Head of ERM Top Insurance firm 41 
Insurance_7 ERM team Top Insurance firm 25 
Insurance_8 Variable Annuities Top Insurance firm 48 
Insurance_9 Head of Risk Oversight Top Insurance firm 26 
Insurance_10 Head of Internal Audit Finance Top Insurance firm 37 
Insurance_11 Manager of Capital Management Top Insurance firm 35 
Insurance_12 Ex-CRO, head of Investment Top Insurance firm 21 
Insurance_13 Vice-CRO Top Insurance firm 25 
Insurance_14 Head of Risk: Model side Top Insurance firm 47 
Insurance_15 Head of Internal Audit Top Insurance firm 42 
Insurance_16 Head of Risk Oversight Top Insurance firm 64 
Insurance_17 Head of Market Risk Top Insurance firm 43 
Insurance_18 CRO Top Insurance firm 34 
Insurance_19 VP Model Validation Top Insurance firm 63 
Insurance_20 Capital modelling team lead Top Insurance firm 34 
Insurance_21 Chairman of a major insurance firm Top Insurance firm 130 
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To complete the discussion of risk oversight, 15 interviews were conducted 
with the risk committee chairmen and board members of some of the largest 
financial institutions, primarily based in London, each of them lasting 47 minutes on 
average. Only one of these interviewees was on the boards of the institutions in 
which the field immersions were carried out. One CRO, strategy consultant, and 
regulator are included in this list due to the nature of topics discussed with them. 
TABLE 3.3: LIST OF NED INTERVIEWEES  
Code  Position Firm Mins 
Interviewee_1 Chair Risk Committee Top 10 Bank 23 
Interviewee_2 Chair Audit Committee FTSE100 Insurance 42 
Interviewee_3 Ex-CRO, Risk Co member FTSE200 Insurance 55 
Interviewee_4 Chairman Top 10 Insurance 51 
Interviewee_5 Chair Risk Committee FTSE100 Insurance 46 
Interviewee_6 Chair Risk Committee Top 10 Insurance 36 
Interviewee_7 CRO FTSE100 Bank 67 
Interviewee_8 Chair Risk Committee European Retail Bank 55 
Interviewee_9 Chair Risk Committee FTSE100 Bank 45 
Interviewee_10 Chair Risk Committee Top 10 UK Bank 34 
Interviewee_11 Member Risk Committee Top 10 Bank 49 
Interviewee_12 Chair Risk Committee Top 10 Bank 53 
Interviewee_13 Member Risk Committee Top 10 Bank 34 
Interviewee_14 Partner Consultancy 32 
Interviewee_15 Ex-Chairman UK Regulator 26 
 
These interviews were conducted in batches: the first in August-September 
2012, during the first field immersion in an investment bank and shortly thereafter, 
the second during the second field immersion in September-October 2013, and final 
in May-June 2014 (penultimate year of this research project). The average length of 
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an interview within the first cohort was 41 minutes (37 minutes within the 
investment bank where the first field immersion was conducted, 34 minutes 
adjusted for the outlier longest interview). Within an insurance firm, the average 
length of an interview was 45 minutes (41 excluding the outlier). 
There are two factors that might explain why the interviews were on average 8 
minutes shorter within the investment bank than the insurance firm: firstly, these 
interviews were more exploratory in nature - I was less experienced and had a less 
clear interview protocol. Secondly, the investment bank interviews were conducted 
within the scope of the “coffee-breaks” that were socially accepted within the bank, 
and typically lasted for about half an hour. Within the insurance firm, I had more 
watercooler and lunchtime conversations beforehand, which resulted in interview 
material being more rich and more directly quoted in the remainder of this thesis. 
The average interview with a NED lasted for 43 minutes, which is more than I 
expected when I started these interviews, because I was aware of seniority and busy 
schedules of these people. NED interviews were quite rich, possibly due to the fact 
that by the time that I conducted these interviews in the summer of 2014, I was able 
to contribute to the conversation in a way that these interviewees also found useful. 
While the number of NED interviews is lower than other categories of interviewees, 
it is crucial to emphasise the seniority of these people: being so senior allowed them 
to have a long experience as overseers and thus be able to answer in-depth questions 
about their sense-making of ‘performing oversight’. Additionally, these people are 
major actors who contribute to the public discourse about their role in risk oversight 
(through their interactions with regulators, participation in conferences for NEDs, 
and publications), and can therefore be seen as opinion formers. It was possible 
access these people though a personal network and later also a snowballing effect: 
indeed, all but one NEDs who were approached agreed to be interviewed and 
recorded. 
Most of them are NEDs in the FTSE100 firms, primarily from the largest 
financial institutions which are frequently discussed in the media and regulatory 
documents, thus they bring quite a unique perspective to research. Furthermore, 
most of those people have told me they have never been interviewed in an academic 
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setting before. Eisenhardt and Graebner say the best way to mitigate the possible 
data bias in interviews “is using numerous and highly knowledgeable informants 
who view the focal phenomena from diverse perspectives” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007), and the seniority as well as the fact that my interviewees come from different 
institutions all help to do that. 
The findings presented in Chapter 5 come from the NED interview material, 
based on the individual’s perceptions of his or her role. However, these findings are 
qualified by an inherent weakness of the interview methodology: since this research 
is based on what could be described as actors’ representations of themselves – the 
unit of analysis is their own representations about their jobs, not facts. I treat 
interviews as a constructed image that people portray of themselves, and therefore 
as a fact of their reality and implicitly, as I assume that what they tell me is 
trustworthy, everything they tell me about themselves does indeed become a fact in 
a performative manner.  
During the interview analysis process, I treated people’s descriptions of their 
actions as being analogous to their actions, and participant observation findings are 
complementary to the interviewees’ descriptions. I do not consider interviews from 
an overly sceptical perspective, and do not assume that interviewees framed their 
responses based on their “assumptions of what the researcher is up to” (Alvesson, 
2003). Indeed, as all interviewees were assured full anonymity, it is assumed here 
that their responses are fully representative of what they truly think they do.  
My goal was not to find “how it is really done”, or some other ultimate “truth” 
about the organisational reality, but rather to demonstrate examples of perceived 
practice and their implications for future research. It is relevant to note that in most 
cases the interviewees were answering questions of this kind for the first time, 
which in research terms is close to a ‘greenfield site’. 
Furthermore, when discussing what the Non-executive directors do, I am not 
attempting to determine what they should be doing (which is informed by the 
corporate governance codes and legal precedents), but rather what they are actually 
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doing, or more precisely what they think they are doing. The full interview protocol 
of these semi-structured interviews which I conducted can be found in Appendix 1.  
These questions were chosen in order to understand the NEDs’ perceptions 
about the nature of their role in a relatively open-ended but directed way and they 
naturally pre-determined the themes that will be discussed in Chapter 5, such as 
NEDs’ representations about their role, including the discussion of the meaning of 
their oversight role, and also their definitions of success and failure. Additionally, as 
a part of these definitions of success and failure, conversations often included 
discussions on independence and the length of terms of office.  
In line with the LSE research ethics guide (LSE, 2015), I informed each 
interviewee about complete confidentiality and anonymity. I also asked for their 
consent to use what they say in line with the Chatham House rule, namely: 
“participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor 
the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed” 
(RIIF, 1927). Using the Chatham House rule is the reason this thesis does not 
mention their names or institutions, nor the names of people or institutions they 
mentioned during the interviews. Following this rule also allowed me, during the 
debriefing part of the interviews, to share what I discovered from other 
interviewees – that in turn made the interview useful for the interviewee and made 
it easier to contact them again for clarifications or additional information. 
I transcribed several hours of interviews myself, but most other interviews 
were transcribed by professional transcription services. When analysing the themes 
occurring, I chose not to use nVivo or other interview coding software because 
while there are certain advantages to formal approaches, I decided that opting for 
reading paper print-outs of interview transcripts and highlighting them with 
different colours and notes was a more convenient method that allowed me to be 
more immersed into data, and coding it on the computer after the rounds of 
highlighting and annotations on paper seemed redundant. 
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3.5. IDENTIFYING THEMES  
 
 When It comes to data analysis, I followed the approach outlined by Dent 
(1991) during his study of organisational cultures, which involved “arranging the 
different types of data chronologically and identifying common themes and unique 
insights” (Dent, 1991). Due to the continuously developing nature of the themes I 
was investigating, analysis was done in a continuous chronological manner with 
additional data points investigated as they were added.  
The research focus here is on the actors’ sense-making, therefore “data tend to 
be eclectic, drawing in phenomena such as changing relationships, thoughts, 
feelings, and interpretations” (Langley, 1999), and grounded theory approach to 
identifying themes was chosen as the most appropriately fitting one. When it comes 
to qualitative research, “It can be argued that reliability is an impossible criterion to 
achieve in practice as different researchers will always produce different versions of 
the social world” (Bloor & Wood, 2006). While it is inevitable in semi-structured 
interviews and field observations, when it comes to document analysis I have given 
a lot of thought to the appropriate selection of the documents to review (e.g. every 
FSA document was looked at) in order to make the findings as reliable as possible. 
The document content analysis sections of this thesis are particularly replicable if 
the above-mentioned methodology was to be followed, as all the documents used 
are available in the public domain. 
 The chronological approach to collecting data in real organisational setting as 
well as looking at regulatory and consultancy documents continuously as they were 
published has many advantages in terms of relevance and timeliness, but also 
presents a number challenges. One of the difficulties identified by Langley 
regarding collecting data in the organisational context is  “they often involve 
multiple levels and units of analysis whose boundaries are ambiguous” (Langley, 
1999).  
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I departed from the grounded theory approach in that iteratively with 
developing the findings based on practice observations, interviews, and document 
reviews; I used pre-existing theories outlined in the previous sections as tools with 
explanatory value of the concepts discussed. The choice of these theories was 
necessarily subjective, but I rooted most empirical exploration of concepts in 
agency and regulation theories as the two widely used and accepted theories in 
accounting and management research. The following chapter presents an overview 
of the historic emergence of oversight that provides the background to the 
remainder of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE EMERGENCE OF RESPONSIBLE 
OVERSIGHT 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, regulators were frequently 
blamed (Davies, 2010) for their lack of involvement in the business practices that 
would allow them to prevent firms from misbehaving. These failures were 
highlighted in the UK in the Walker Review of Corporate Governance published in 
November 2009. That report also led to an increased focus by the UK regulators on 
the work of risk managers and of boards. Since then regulators have further 
increased their focus on firm-level oversight activities, where oversight is seen as a 
solution-language to the problems that were illuminated during the financial crisis. 
The practice of risk oversight in financial firms is heavily and increasingly 
influenced by the views and policies of financial regulators. 
This chapter investigates how has the regulatory attitude to risk oversight 
evolved before and after the global financial crisis, and how does regulatory 
attention regarding oversight manifest itself. The prime focus here is on the 
changing views of regulators in the UK, as they have directly influenced the 
behaviours of financial firms in London, where my research is focused. Some 
international references are provided for context, but this chapter does not attempt 
to conduct a comprehensive review of the international financial regulation 
landscape, which would be an unmanageable task within the constraints of this 
research. 
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In order to provide a background to the rest of this thesis, this chapter gives a 
document-based chronological overview of the UK regulatory statements regarding 
corporate governance generally and financial regulation more specifically, and 
tracks the way the Financial Services Authority’s discourse about risk changed over 
time. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) was the main financial regulator in 
the UK up to April 2013, and has been split into Prudential Regulation Authority 
and Financial Conduct Authority since. To demonstrate the evolution of the FSA’s 
ideas about the regulation of risk, I started at its foundation time, looked at every 
single publicly available document FSA produced, and read all the references to 
‘risk’ and ‘oversight’, as was discussed in more details in the Methods chapter. This 
chapter shows the shift of regulatory focus towards the creation of ‘responsibilised 
risk overseers’, and the tools such as risk appetite and risk culture that these 
overseers are expected to use.  
 
The chapter is organised the following way: firstly, the evolution of corporate 
governance regulation in the UK is investigated in a timeline manner. Then attitudes 
to risk in financial regulation are examined and the finding is that while they started 
off as two independent strands of regulatory space, over time they converged into 
both being interested in board-level risk oversight. This therefore leads into the next 
Chapter which is about boards.  
 
Figure 4.1 presents a topological summary of the way regulation has gravitated 
towards focusing on firm-level governance and boards. Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) focuses on corporate governance for all firms, and Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) specialises on the financial regulation, but over time both of them 
became interested in risk governance – the remainder of the chapter traces that 
evolution . 
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FIGURE 4.1: REGULATORY CONVERGENCE  
 
 
While these two regulatory strands used to be focused on different areas, over 
time they both became similarly interested in the firm-level risk oversight. The two 
points identified where that became particularly visible are the 1999 Turnbull report 
“Internal Control: Guidance for the Directors on the Combined Code” and the 2009 
Walker review “of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry 
entities”. Although Turnbull triggered the importance of explicit Board involvement 
in the internal control matters through reinforcing earlier documents suggesting a 
variation of aspects of it, Walker is a point where board-level risk oversight 
particularly expanded in financial firms. 
 
Walker also acknowledged potential overlaps between his suggestions and the 
Financial Reporting Council’s update of the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance: “Simultaneously with this Review, the Financial Reporting Council 
Board 
(Risk) 
Oversight
Corporate 
Governance 
[FRC]
Financial 
Regulation 
[FSA]
Turnbull Walker 
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(FRC) is undertaking a consultation on the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance (Combined Code) for all listed companies and, given the clear potential 
overlap, Sir Christopher Hogg (as chairman of the FRC) and I have co-operated 
closely throughout. Implementation of some of these will require specific initiative 
by the FRC or the FSA” (Walker, 2009). 
 
Table 4.1 presents a timeline overview of the corporate governance and 
financial regulation documents that will be mentioned in the remainder of this 
chapter.  
 
 TABLE 4.1: DOCUMENTS TIMELINE  
Date Reports 
Dec 1992 Cadbury Report “Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance”, on 
corporate governance generally.  
Dec 1994 The Rutteman Report: “Internal control and financial reporting - guidance 
for directors of listed companies registered in the UK” 
Jul 1995 Greenbury Report  on Directors' Remuneration,  
Jan 1998 Hampel Report “Review of corporate governance since Cadbury”  
Jun 1998 Hampel Combined Code on Corporate Governance  
Sep 1999 Turnbull Report “Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined 
Code” 
Jan 2003 Higgs Report “Independent review of non-executive directors”. 
Jan 2003 Smith Report “Audit Committees: Combined Code Guidance” 
Jan 2003 Tyson Report on the Recruitment and Development of Non-Executive 
Directors 
Jul 2003 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
Oct 2005 “Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code” (revised 
Turnbull) 
Jun 2006 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance: update 
Jun 2008 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance: update 
Oct 2008 FRC Guidance on Audit Committees (revised Smith) 
Nov 2009 Walker Review (2009) “A review of corporate governance in UK banks and 
other financial industry entities” in response to the financial crisis 
May 2010 The UK Corporate Governance Code: update of the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance 
Dec 2010 FRC Guidance on Audit Committees: update 
Feb 2011 Lord Davies Review: Women on Boards 
Mar 2011 FRC guidance on Board effectiveness 
Sep 2012 FRC Guidance on Audit Committees (revised 2008 and 2011 guidance) 
Sep 2012 FRC Corporate Governance Code 
Jun 2014 PRA: “PRA’s approach to Banking Supervision” 
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Sep 2014 FRC Risk Guidance: “Guidance on risk management, internal control and 
financial and business reporting” 
Sep 2014 FRC Corporate Governance Code 
May 2015 PRA “Corporate governance: Board responsibilities” Consultation paper 
Jul 2015 PRA “Strengthening individual accountability in banking” 
 
Source: Own summary from FRC, FSA, PRA, and FCA data bases. 
 
 
4.2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UK 
 
4.2.1. BACKGROUND  
 
 One of the foundational documents for the current corporate governance 
frameworks is the 1992 Cadbury Report: “Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance”, which was published in December 1992 in response to a series of 
financial scandals, including the Maxwell case. The failure of Maxwell 
Communications, following a series of acquisitions, partly financed by the diversion 
of funds from employees’ pension funds, highlighted the weakness of the group’s 
governance. Other failures, such as the collapse of the fraudulent bank BCCI, and of 
Polly Peck, a rapidly expanding textile company, drew further attention to the 
failures of boards to oversee company decision-making. These problems stimulated 
the establishment of the Cadbury Committee to review British corporate governance 
and propose improvements9. 
The Cadbury report was “explicitly designed to improve internal control 
mechanisms, based on the assumption of a relationship between internal control, 
financial reporting quality and corporate governance” (Spira & Page, 2003). The 
                                                
9	  For more information about these cases see “In Letter but not in Spirit: An Analysis 
of Corporate Governance in the UK” (Arcot & Bruno, 2006)	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review “adopted the view that directors’ responsibilities with regard to internal 
control should be clarified” (Spira & Page, 2010) with the intention to "strengthen 
trust in the corporate system” (Cadbury, 1992).   
Specifically, Cadbury’s main recommendations were to (1) separate the roles 
of the CEO and the Chairman of the board (which has been influential in the UK 
and Europe, but is still not normally the case in the US),  (2) introduce “a minimum 
of three non-executive directors”, which is needed in order to fulfil the 
“recommendations on the composition of sub-committees of the board” (Cadbury, 
1992), and finally (3) introduce Audit Committees in all listed companies. At the 
time, according to the report, two-thirds of the top 250 UK listed companies already 
had them in place, influenced by the fact that since 1978 the presence of the 
independent audit committee had been a requirement for all companies listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange. 
By introducing these three fundamental requirements, the Cadbury Report 
began the process of greater codification of corporate governance norms in the UK 
which apply to all listed companies. “In effect the 1992 Cadbury Report was a 
policy initiative which legitimated the widening of enterprise control practices to 
encompass risk management and corporate governance issues” (Bhimani, 2009), a 
development that has been continuous since.  
Since 1992, the UK has been implementing developments of Cadbury’s 
recommendations at regular intervals and has progressively introduced a system of 
both hard and soft law to strengthen its corporate governance framework. For 
example, in July 1995 the Greenbury report (Greenbury, 1995) on the remuneration 
of directors was published by the Confederation of British Industry. This report 
followed the public anger over executive pay, specifically the case of British Gas, 
when the chief executive’s 75% pay increase in 1994 sparked what was known as 
the 'fat cat' controversy. The Greenbury report introduced the requirement for a 
remuneration committee of the Board and also encouraged changes in pay to 
incentivise long-term behaviour. 
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The Hampel Report (Hampel, 1998) followed in January 1998. It clarified and 
combined recommendations of the Cadbury and Greenbury reports, and later 
became known as the “Combined Code”. One of the key messages of the 
“Combined Code” was that: “Companies should be ready to explain their 
governance policies, including any circumstances justifying departure from best 
practice”, (Hampel, 1998), which introduced the UK’s “comply or explain” 
regulatory approach based on principles rather than rules. This approach “has been 
widely admired and imitated internationally” (FRC, 2014b). 
Following the 1998 “Combined Code”, the Turnbull “Internal Control: 
Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code” was published in 1999 (and updated 
in 2005). The main contribution of the Turnbull report was that it made the 
“Combined Code” more practical and understandable to firms and provided 
implementation guidance on internal controls reporting. It gave a detailed overview 
of the directors’ responsibilities for best practice regarding internal controls and risk 
management, and explained that boards need to continuously review and approve 
them. Indeed, some critics explained that the Turnbull report “epitomised” the 
convergence of thinking about “corporate governance, risk management, and 
regulation” (Hutter & Power, 2000), and idealised the idea of a “top-down, 
integrated risk management policy”. 
Additionally, according to Power,  
“Combined Code on corporate governance represents a new style of regulating 
the organisation. For such a style to succeed, the inside of organisations and 
their internal control systems must be reconceptualised as a potential 
‘regulatory space’. However, the point is not to control the corporation with 
more regulation from the outside, but to encourage the development of a 
transparent inner space for self-regulatory capacity” (Power, 2000). 
This observation contributes to explaining the way increased self-regulation 
lead to the creation of boards as internal control ‘pseudo-regulators’. 
The Higgs review (Higgs, 2003): “Review of the role and effectiveness of 
non-executive directors”, recommended several improvements to the Combined 
Code, and directed the focus of the Code towards “behaviours and relationships and 
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the need for the best people, which are essential for an effective board”. The report 
was produced as a response to the ENRON and WorldCom scandals in the US, and 
while still supporting the “comply or explain” approach to regulation, it also 
outlined a number of provisions that made the requirements regarding board 
composition stricter. For example, it suggested that at least a half of the board has to 
be made up of independent NEDs, introduced annual evaluations of the directors’ 
performance and the concept of term limits. After nine years of service a board 
member may be deemed no longer independent. 
All these corporate governance codes apply to UK listed companies generally. 
A further set of requirements had been imposed specifically on regulated firms in 
the financial sector. The next section discusses these financial regulation 
requirements. 
 
4.2.2. FINANCIAL REGULATION: FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY 
 
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) was the main UK financial regulator 
from June 1997, when “responsibility for banking supervision was transferred to the 
FSA from the Bank of England” (FSA, 1997b) up to April 2013. FSA was founded 
as the combination of nine earlier regulators, and was sometimes nick-named “The 
City's super-watchdog” (BBC, 2001) because of its wide mandate. “As they 
merged, it was apparent that not only did their practices and culture differ, they also 
had a completely different language for describing risk, and indeed that there was 
no commonly understood meaning of the terms ‘regulation’, ‘supervision’ or 
‘enforcement’” (Black, 2004). Due to the diversity of these previous bodies, it was 
important to create a universal framework which would make the FSA a coherent 
organisation with clear objectives and clear ways of achieving these objectives.  
 From the very beginning of its existence, the FSA declared its commitment to 
a ‘risk based approach’ to regulation and supervision as the first point in the “style 
and process of regulation” section (FSA, 1997a) of the first document they 
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produced. The FSA’s risk-based approach provided a solution in that it, according 
to the analysis of its objectives, was intended to “concentrate regulatory attention 
where problems are most likely to occur, and would focus on themes rather than 
structures” (Economist, 2000). When the FSA spoke about this approach to 
regulation during these initial stages, it did not intend “risk” to be interpreted as risk 
within the firms themselves, but rather risk to the objectives of the financial 
regulator (Black, 2004).  
In 1998, soon after its foundation, the FSA formulated the RATE (Risk 
Assessment, Tools, and Evaluation) framework. The FSA inherited the RATE 
framework from the Bank of England where it has been under development since 
1996. Within the Bank of England, RATE evolved under the supervision of deputy 
governor Howard Davies (Black, 2004) who became the first chairman of the FSA 
in 1997. “The Bank of England approach emphasized the common interests of 
management and supervisor. The intensity of external supervision and of audit 
could be varied depending on the control culture in the target bank” (Power, 2007) 
This approach of focusing on common interests of management and supervisor 
transferred from the Bank of England into the FSA’s approach to RATE. 
The Risk Assessment, Tools, and Evaluation (RATE) framework was 
discussed (FSA, 1998) as the introductory model of the FSA’s approach to 
regulation. “In developing RATE, a significant driver was the need to defend itself 
against critics of its supervisory abilities” (Black, 2004), which is alluding to the 
fact that at that stage the FSA was only interested in risk within firms if this risk 
endangered its objectives as a regulator.  
As a part of implementing the RATE framework, the FSA conducted on-site 
assessment visits to the firms it was supervising in order to “improve the FSA’s 
understanding of the business and control risks run by the bank” (FSA, 1998). 
During this period, the FSA became more explicit about its own “oversight” role 
and how it would assess and monitor risks within the businesses. The fact that the 
FSA spoke about “controlling” risks run by the bank, instead of just observing or 
monitoring, is also a new development at that time. The exhibit below demonstrates 
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a depiction of the RATE model according to the FSA’s (1998) “Risk Based 
Approach to Supervision of Banks” statement. 
RATE documents identified three sources of risk: “the external environment, 
consumer and industry wide developments (CIW) and regulated institutions” 
(Black, 2004). To demonstrate the originally narrow and regulator-focused attitudes 
to oversight, it should be observed that the word “oversight” in 1998 and 1999 was 
only mentioned in the RATE framework documents in the context of regulatory 
oversight of the firms’ actions.  
 The FSA’s four statutory objectives were defined by the 2000 Financial 
Services and Markets Act (FSMA, 2000) as: market confidence, financial stability, 
securing the appropriate degree of protection for consumers, and the reduction of 
financial crime.  
 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 marks an important turning 
point in government policy towards regulation - in fact, according to my interview 
with the first chairman of the FSA (Interviewee_15, 2014), regulators before the 
FSA demonstrated little interest in the risks firms were taking, as long as these were 
not disruptive for market confidence or apparently harmful for consumers; the 
regulator’s risk appetite encouraged a relatively open approach to risk, with an 
underlying belief that good risk management within firms would promote regulatory 
objectives (Baldwin, Hood, Rothstein, Hutter, & Power, 2000). At the same time the 
Bank of England was given a parallel objective on financial stability, and Treasury 
responsibility for the overall institutional structure of financial regulation in a 
Memorandum of Understanding, signed between the FSA, the Bank of England, and 
the Treasury (Bank of England, FSA, & Treasury, 2000). 
 In addition to its role in aligning the objectives of nine earlier regulatory 
bodies that went into the formation of the FSA, RATE also served as a stepping-
stone towards ARROW (Advanced risk responsive operating framework). The FSA 
launched the ARROW regulatory model in 2003, which was aimed at, in their 
words, making “risk-based regulation operational” (FSA, 2006). Discussing 
ARROW Power says: “The approach has been internalized and interactions between 
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FSA and regulated entities are structured by an assessment of the risks they pose to 
the statutory objectives of the regulator” (Power, 2007). This is important to note, 
because at this stage of its development, FSA was still primarily interested in risk to 
its own objectives, not internal risks within the banks, which were still considered to 
be fully the responsibility of the management and boards of banks themselves, or 
the macro-prudential risks of interactions between individual banks that became an 
issue of interest even later.  
For example the FSA’s 2008/09 Annual report mentions (but does not define) 
oversight 13 times, but in all cases the focus is on the FSA’s role in financial 
regulation, for example: “We […] have significantly increased the intensity of our 
oversight of major firms” (FSA, 2008). During this period, the FSA first became 
more explicit and clear about its own oversight role, identifying the major firms and 
increasing intensity of oversight over them. The intensification of oversight was 
also triggered by the fact that the FSA’s style of regulation was evolving during that 
time.  
The Turner review “A regulatory response to the global banking crisis” (FSA, 
2009b) published in March 2009 “has committed the FSA to more intervention […] 
significantly less reliance on market discipline, and more intrusive supervision. 
Although it does not focus directly on principles-based regulation10 (for more on the 
theoretical meaning of the principles-based regulation see Chapter 2), the Review is 
associated with a withdrawal from principles-based regulation” (Baldwin et al., 
2010). The Global Financial Crisis was an influential event that set the tone for a lot 
of the financial regulation since. The following section discusses some of the 
relevant issues that were brought into light as a result of the crisis.  
  
                                                
10 For more information about FSA’s attitudes to principles based regulation, please 
see – “Principles Based Regulation: Focusing on the outcomes that matter” (FSA, 
2007) 
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4.3. GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
Prior to the Global Financial Crisis, it was assumed that firms themselves had 
a powerful incentive to manage their own risks, because if they did not do so they 
would incur losses and destroy shareholder value. Consistent with that view, the 
financial regulators in all major financial centres including London took a laissez-
faire approach to overseeing the financial sector, often described as a ‘light-touch 
approach’ (Alford, 2010). In light of the financial crisis light-touch regulation has 
been questioned in the UK and elsewhere: Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve, said during his testimony in Congress in October 2008 “I made a 
mistake in presuming that the self-interests of organisations, specifically banks and 
others, were such as that they were best capable of protecting their own 
shareholders and their equity in the firms” (Barwell, 2013).  
The fact that the banks were not able to manage risks fully could have been 
caused by: [1] them not understanding these risks well enough, and [2] tension 
between the profit-generating front office and the risk management function being 
amplified by the pursuit of short-term profits and [3] incentive structures which 
encouraged risky behaviour in pursuit of short-term profit (Davies, 2010) – indeed, 
“the focus on short-term rewards without considering long-term consequences 
played the critical role in fomenting the crisis as well as being the driving force 
behind its ultimate severity” (Prager, 2013). Risk Management, where it existed, 
was not robust enough, or sufficiently strongly supported by top management (Ellul 
& Yerramilli, 2013), to offset the powerful incentives for personal enrichment 
through taking risks, especially by taking on additional debt.  
Perceived cultural problems, such as short-termism and reckless risk taking 
behaviour, were retrospectively highlighted as some of the key reasons for the 
problems that banks faced in the late 2000s. However, these problems did not 
develop overnight. Specifically, one possible explanation of these “cultural 
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challenges” the banks are facing could be seen as having “their roots spreading back 
well over 20 years and can be linked, from a UK perspective, to the ‘Big Bang’ 
deregulation of the financial services industry in 1986” (Salz, 2013). This so-called 
‘Big Bang’ de-regulation was triggered by political demands to increase the 
competitiveness of the City of London as a Global Financial Centre and to break 
open cartels which were thought to operate against public interest. As the rest of this 
thesis is looking at primarily investment banks and insurance firms, it is worth 
noting here that ‘Big Bang’ essentially affected investment banking and security 
trading, and did not have a direct effect on retail or commercial banks, or on 
insurance firms, while the more recent regulatory changes explained later in this 
chapter have affected all types of firms.  
The ‘Big Bang’ de-regulation reform successfully achieved its aim of making 
London more competitive, and led to an increase in market activity, which in turn 
has put London at or the very near the top of the world’s financial centre rankings – 
top in 2013, and second after New York since (ZYen, 2015). Some, however, 
including Nigel Lawson, who was the Chancellor of the Exchequer at that time, 
now argue that the global financial crisis of the late 2000s was an “unintended 
consequence” of the ‘Big Bang’ (BBC, 2010).  
The Financial Crisis has demonstrated that the “self-interests” of the financial 
institutions themselves were not powerful enough, according to many observers, to 
reinforce sufficient incentives to self-regulate, and individuals within them were 
able to circumvent controls on risk-taking in their personal interests. It also appears 
that financial firms significantly underestimated the risk of extreme market 
movements, and failed to understand the deepening linkages between firms and 
markets and the resulting contagion risks.  
Despite the apparent failure of firm-level risk oversight during the crisis, there 
has been an increased demand for more of it – both in the UK and internationally. 
The Walker review (discussed later) has been particularly influential in shaping the 
response to the failure of oversight in the UK, but there have also been some 
international developments affecting major banks in all countries. Regulators have 
eventually pursued a two-track agenda, strengthening their own direct regulation of 
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financial firms, on the one hand, and seeking to make internal control mechanisms 
more robust, on the other. 
The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, the main influential standard-
setter in global financial regulation, comprising of current prudential supervisors 
from member central banks and financial regulators, produced a “Principles for 
enhancing corporate governance” (BIS, 2010a) consultative document in March 
2010, which later resulted in a final document in October 2010 (BIS, 2010b). The 
report highlighted principles of board governance, risk management, and internal 
controls. It explained that the board needs to be “supported by competent, robust 
and independent risk and control functions, for which the board provides effective 
oversight” (BIS, 2010b). It also suggested that the board’s remit includes approval 
and oversight of “the implementation of the bank’s overall risk strategy, including 
its risk tolerance/appetite” (BIS, 2010b).  
The European Commission published an accompanying working document 
entitled “Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions: Lessons to be drawn from 
the current financial crisis: best practices” (Commission, 2010)  that discusses the 
significance of the role of the boards in risk oversight and also brings further focus 
on the non-executive directors as playing a crucial role in the risk oversight process.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
produced their “Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis”11 (OECD, 2010) 
report in February 2010. The report analysed weaknesses of corporate governance 
in “risk management, board practices and the exercise of shareholder rights” and 
issued recommendations about these topics.  
                                                
11	  “The basis for this framework is found in the OECD 1999 Principles of Corporate 
Governance revised in 2004, the Basel 1999 guidelines on "Enhancing corporate 
governance for banking organisations" revised in February 2006, the OECD 2002 
Corporate Governance Guidelines for Pension Funds, the IAIS and OECD 2005 
Guidelines for Insurers’	  Governance”	  (OECD, 2010)	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Across the Atlantic, according to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
risk oversight by the board should happen “through the whole board, or through a 
separate risk committee or the audit committee, for example” (SEC, 2010). Pre-
crisis, where risk oversight was identified as a Board role (which was infrequent) 
the task was usually assigned to the audit committee. The tasks are now typically 
split between the Risk Committee (which theoretically has a forward looking, 
predictive nature) and the Audit Committee (which is more traditionally focused on 
the reporting of past events).  
The Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Tredway Commission 
(COSO), as a part of their Thought Leadership program, produced guidance for risk 
oversight for non-executive directors called “Board Risk Oversight – a progress 
report” published in December 2010. They say “Risk oversight is a high priority on 
the agenda of most boards of directors” and use the term “risk oversight” to describe 
the board’s overview and monitoring of the firm’s risk management practices, 
“including policies, processes, people and reporting” (COSO, 2010). But US 
regulators have not so far involved themselves in more detailed prescription of the 
roles and processes of risk committees, as has been the case in the UK. 
 
4.4. WALKER REVIEW 
 
 In the UK, the Financial Services Authority commissioned the Walker Review 
of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other financial industry entities as a 
consequence of the Global Financial Crisis and collapse of Northern Rock. The 
Walker Review was published in November 2009 and was very critical of the 
FSA’s role in the run-up to the crisis and its failures to oversee corporate 
governance within the banks.  
 The main contribution of the Walker Review was to encourage the full 
institutionalisation of board-level risk committees as separate from audit 
committees. According to the Walker review, “serious deficiencies in prudential 
oversight and financial regulation in the period before the crisis were accompanied 
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by major governance failures within banks.” Sir David Walker emphasised both the 
lack of sufficient prudential oversight and the lack of attention paid by regulators to 
corporate governance weaknesses.  
Building on the aforementioned corporate governance regulation that was 
already in place, the Walker review investigated governance in the UK banking 
industry and focused attention on risk management and specifically on the 
contribution made by risk committees. More concretely, Sir David spoke about risk 
oversight in an unprecedented way. The Walker review, to illustrate a simple point 
about emergent importance of oversight, uses the word “oversight” 61 times in 174 
pages. And it is also evident that he develops new expectations of those who carry 
out the role of overseeing risk managers within a firm. 
Walker suggests, for example, that a risk committee should be created in order 
to advise the board on the current risk exposures of the entity and its future risk 
strategy. In order to do that, “a dedicated NED [non-executive director] focus on 
high-level risk issues in addition to and separately from the executive risk 
committee process” is needed (Walker, 2009). This is one of the most fundamental 
contributions of the report that had serious repercussions for those major financial 
institutions that did not have board risk committees at the time. Walker’s suggestion 
made the separation between risk oversight and risk management explicit because 
non-executives, who oversee from above, by definition cannot be managing.  
According to the International Corporate Governance Network, “Risk oversight 
is deﬁned as the board’s supervision of the risk management framework and risk 
management process. Risk management is distinct from risk oversight, as it is a 
responsibility of a company’s management team” (International Corporate 
Governance Network, 2010). This distinction between risk management and risk 
oversight is more explicit than any definitions given by the FSA where it is assumed 
that the meaning is known.  
Walker further recommends that risk committees should be supported by a CRO 
“with clear enterprise-wide authority and independence” (Walker, 2009). This 
observation appears to have been consequential on how risk oversight is done in 
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practice because it suggested that non-executives should be more directly involved 
in the risk management process, thus bringing non-executive directors closer to the 
business and giving them more responsibility for business processes. Indeed, a 
number of organisations (e.g. HSBC and Lloyds Banking Group in banking and 
Prudential and Zurich in the insurance sector) have gone further and included the 
CRO on the board of directors which has given CROs more visible power than had 
been the case previously. 
Additionally, Walker explained that a “materially increased” involvement of 
board directors in risk oversight is required, and an increased time commitment 
from NEDs. The suggestion to “materially increase” risk oversight implies that 
engagement in risk oversight is something that can be measured and changed. 
Moreover, Walker recommended that responsibility should be allocated for 
oversight, which implies that not only is oversight measurable, but also that there 
are thresholds of what constitutes success and failure; the board risk committee is to 
blame if it is not succeeding. The fact that the board risk committee has 
responsibility over risk oversight also allocates ownership of the process to them, 
because they are now accountable for it. The Walker review narrative also implies 
that oversight is a good thing and that more of it is better. One could argue, 
however, that without a clear explanation of what oversight means, and how it is 
expected to enhance risk management, it is not obvious that increasing it will 
improve firms or make boards more efficient.  
 Walker also noted in his review that ‘ideally, corporate governance and 
regulation of a financial entity should be mutually reinforcing’ (Walker, 2009). This 
observation suggests that regulators and agents of corporate governance should 
support each other, thus it brings regulators closer to the business process itself as 
they oversee the internal overseers more tightly. The FSA responded that “review of 
governance will now involve more intensive work”, including more thorough 
oversight of the “effectiveness of governance and risk management” (FSA, 2010b). 
In the FSA’s response, when discussing the responsibilities of the Chief Risk 
Officer (CRO) and the Board Risk Committee, the Authority mentions “oversight” 
in three out of ten points for the description of the CRO’s role and six out of seven 
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points in the description of the Board Risk Committee. This demonstrates an 
increased regulatory interest in oversight in corporate governance. The practice 
implications of that enhanced focus are explored later. 
 
4.4.1. POST-WALKER 
 
After the Walker review (and also possibly affected by Turnbull), the FSA’s 
discourse changed significantly and it began to discuss oversight in terms of more 
in-depth firm-level corporate governance: “Regulators and legislators have focused 
on internal control issues as a policy response to crises, […] The monitoring role of 
the board of directors, which forms the apex of the internal control system of an 
organisation, has been emphasised” (Spira & Page, 2010). The FSA responded to 
Walker’s suggestions in a consultation paper “Effective corporate governance: 
Significant influence controlled functions and the Walker review” in January 2010 
and agreed with Walker that that “the board risk committee should have 
responsibility for oversight” (FSA, 2010b).  
The FSA’s guidance also enhanced the importance of the role of the CRO 
within the organisation, i.e.: “Alongside an internal reporting line to the CEO or 
CFO, the CRO should report to the board risk committee, with direct access to the 
chairman of the committee in the event of need” (FSA, 2010b).  
Another relevant institution with a role in developing regulatory practice in 
corporate governance is the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) - the “UK’s 
independent regulator responsible for promoting high quality corporate governance 
and reporting” (FRC, 2015). The “Combined Code” of 1998 was updated by the 
FRC into the “UK Corporate Governance Code” (FRC, 2010b) in June 2010 (and 
the following years). The FRC’s responsibilities cover the whole of the public 
companies sector, but 2010 update could be interpreted as a response to the 
explosion in attention that corporate governance and risk oversight gained as a 
result of the financial crisis and the failures that Walker observed in November 
2009. 
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Following the implementation of the FRC’s “The UK Corporate Governance 
Code” published in June 2010, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) began to 
publish annual updates (FRC, 2011b) on developments in the UK’s corporate 
governance and the effect the code has on it. In October 2010, the FRC produced a 
thorough explanation of the reasons for improving the corporate governance codes, 
pointing out that “Regulation should begin with strong corporate governance” 
(FRC, 2010a).  
In the policy statement that the FSA produced in September 2010 after taking 
into account feedback to their January 2010 consultation paper, the FSA suggests 
that “even where no risk committee exists, the firm should consider appointing 
someone to be accountable for risk at the firm, with the governing body retaining 
responsibility for risk oversight” (FSA, 2010a). Here, once again, the fact that 
someone is responsible and accountable for risk oversight implies that oversight can 
be measured against some objective criteria, although such criteria would be 
challenging to codify and are not explicitly specified in any of the FSA’s publicly 
available documents.  
Compensating for the fact that corporate governance shortcomings were a 
commonly agreed significantly contributing cause of the global financial crisis, this 
area became the focus of the FSA’s work in the following years. In the initial 
consultation paper of January 2010, the FSA lists a number of criteria for good 
corporate governance and the Board’s “evidence of active oversight through the 
regular scrutiny and challenge of management information” (FSA, 2010b) is one of 
them. The fact that the FSA now requires oversight to be “active” and “evident” 
demonstrates the development of the concept of oversight towards becoming 
something real and tangible because firms should be able to record it and 
demonstrate how active it is in an auditable way. As a consequence, this also leads 
to an increased demand for people who are seen as responsible for overseeing risks 
and for demonstrating the evidence of oversight.  
In January 2011, the FSA shifted focus of attention from broader issues of risk 
governance towards the narrower field of operational risk, and published a guidance 
note titled “Enhancing frameworks in the standardized approach to operational risk” 
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(FSA, 2011), which says that “the board of directors could approve policies 
developed by senior management” thus stating that is it the board’s role actively to 
oversee management’s actions in that area. 
 
 Following that, the Financial Reporting Council conducted research into board-
level risk oversight by interviewing a number of financial institutions, and published 
a report “Boards and risk” in September 2011. One of the conclusions in the report 
was that “there has been a step change in the Board’s focus on risk in the last few 
years […] This conforms to the emphasis in the revised Code on the Board’s 
responsibility for strategic risk decision-making” (FRC, 2011a). In addition the 
report also explains “the ownership and day-to-day oversight and management of 
individual risks were rightly the responsibility of executive and line management, 
rather than the Board” (FRC, 2011a). This explanation emphasises the difference 
between the functions of executive and non-executive management – while the 
Board’s role is important in ensuring management is successfully managing risks, 
the Board is not expected to get involved in daily operations and the running of the 
business on a granular level. FRC thus defies oversight in terms of what it is not 
(not granular involvement) rather than in terms of what it actually is.  
 
4.5. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILISATION 
 
“The corporate governance of large banks was characterised by the creation of 
Potemkin villages to give the appearance of effective control and oversight, 
without the reality” (UK_Parliament, 2013). 
 
As the above quote shows, the UK Parliamentary Commission report on 
banking standards, published in June 2013, was highly critical of the failures of 
corporate governance in the financial sector, explaining that “both the financial 
crisis and conduct failures have exposed very serious flaws in the system of board 
oversight of bank executives and senior management” (Parliament, 2013), with the 
underlying notion that focusing on boards will improve the rest of the organisation. 
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The Parliamentary Commission also noted that while the composition of bank 
boards had changed since the crisis, no disciplinary actions had been brought 
against individual directors whose actions (or inactions) had been a prime cause of 
losses to shareholders and, in the case of banks rescued by the government, 
taxpayers. 
 There are many reasons why boards might eventually fail, as indeed there are 
many definitions of failure, and whilst the goal of this chapter is not to make a 
normative judgement on the success of bank boards in the crisis, it is useful to 
explain as a matter of reference the common perceived problems of corporate 
governance in general and of risk committees in particular.  
Roberts et al observe that “Through successive rounds of governance failure, 
the non-executive has been the target of both blame and reform”, and explain that 
agency theory has been influential as when NEDs are “a target of blame, agency 
theory assumptions suggest the dangers of too close a relationship between 
executive and non-executive directors and the capture and collusion that this might 
imply” (Roberts et al., 2005). 
While the distance between board oversight and executive management was 
emphasised throughout the regulatory documents at that time, over time there has 
been a shift in tone when it comes to making the board more accountable for their 
oversight responsibilities, including individual accountability. For example: 
“The behaviour and culture within banks played a major role in the 2008-09 
financial crisis and in conduct scandals such as Payment Protection Insurance 
(PPI) mis-selling and the attempted manipulation of LIBOR. However, under 
the statutory and regulatory framework in place at the time, individual 
accountability was often unclear or confused. This undermined public trust in 
both the banking system and in the regulatory response” (PRA, 2014). 
The phenomenon of focusing on individual accountability, exemplified by the 
quote above, could be seen as the regulator delegating responsibility for good 
regulation to the regulated, similar to the classic agency relationship where 
principals have to delegate to agents in order to be able to perform their principal 
duties. One of the ways in which this individual ‘responsibilisation’ is manifested is 
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the regulatory “Approved Persons Regime”, which makes NEDs ‘Controlled 
functions’. I am borrowing Power’s term ‘responsibilisation’ of directors that he 
explains is “intended to activate them as corporate agents of self-organisation, 
through which new variants of financial auditing and assurance services can 
operate” (Power, 2000). 
The FSA finalised the Approved Persons regime in March 2001, but prior to 
the global financial crisis it was primarily oriented at ‘responsibilities of senior 
management’ and those interacting with customers. After the crisis, the focus 
shifted towards deeper control of non-executive directors who exercise an external 
oversight role over the internal business practices. Power, speaking about audit, 
explained “audits generally act indirectly upon systems of control rather than 
directly upon first order activities” (Power, 2000). Regulatory control over NEDs 
can be seen here as a similar mechanism, as regulators focus on the ‘enforced self-
regulation’ systems of governance and on the overseers rather than on the business 
itself. 
In 2009, the FSA explained regarding the “focus on senior management 
responsibility and oversight”, that they expected “to see more cases where 
individuals, especially those holding significant influence functions, are subject to 
enforcement action” (FSA, 2009a). In fact it has proved difficult to mount cases 
against individuals, and very few have been held accountable for their failings, a 
point which has been regularly made by politicians and in the media. That has 
caused regulators to try different approach to accountability, and to sharpen the 
definition of individual responsibility. One major shift was that post-crisis, the FSA 
started focusing on ‘fitness’ and ‘competence’ of people in “Significant Influence 
Functions”, not just their ‘propriety’, and “between October 2008 and January 2010 
had conducted 332 interviews, rejecting 25 applicants” (Black, 2010).  
 In April 2013, FSA was split into the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) 
and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). Banks, insurers and major investment 
firms are thus now dual regulated. In July 2014, PRA issued a consultation 
“Strengthening accountability in banking: a new regulatory framework for 
individuals”, as a part of the response to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
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Standards (PCBS). The “Strengthening accountability in banking” policy statement 
was finalised in July 2015, and implemented new ‘Senior Manager and Certification 
Regimes’ that are intended to “require firms to allocate a range of responsibilities to 
these individuals and to regularly assess their fitness and propriety” (PRA, 2015d), 
and ultimately aim at a “change in culture at all levels in relevant authorised 
persons” (PRA, 2015d). Regulators also carry out the so-called ‘governance 
reviews’, and are able to implement additional capital requirements (PRA, 2015a) if 
governance is deemed to be deficient. 
The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, also likely influenced 
by the lack of regulatory discipline over individual board members who have failed 
to exercise due oversight, also suggested a reversal of the burden of proof: 
“The proposal to reverse the burden of proof for imposing regulatory penalties 
on Senior Persons in certain circumstances would make sure that those who 
should have prevented serious prudential and conduct failures would no longer 
be able to walk away simply because of the difficulty of proving individual 
culpability in the context of complex organisations” (UK_Parliament, 2013). 
The Walker Review had made a similar suggestion:  
“Regulators should have greater capability to reverse the burden of proof and 
say that a senior executive who had been involved in a palpable failure would 
be struck off unless he could show that he had been effective, diligent and 
challenging in seeking to avert that failure” (Walker, 2009). 
In response to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, the 
government legislated to allow the regulators to apply a new senior management 
regime which incorporated the idea of a reversal of the burden of proof. In other 
words, in future Directors and senior managers may be held personally responsible for 
regulatory breaches if they could not demonstrate that they took adequate steps in 
advance to guard against such breaches. The new regime was announced in March 
2015:  
“The policies announced today are significant and will make it easier for firms 
and regulators to hold individuals to account” (FCA, 2015). 
  
 81	  
 
Financial Conduct Authority goes on to explain that: 
“Under the Presumption of Responsibility, when a relevant/authorised firm 
contravenes a relevant requirement then the Senior Manager with 
responsibility for the management of any of the firm’s activities in relation to 
which the contravention occurred is guilty of misconduct” (FCA, 2015). 
While it is not obvious that a ‘reversal of proof’ case could succeed in court, it 
is evident that the level of accountability is increasing, and that at the time of 
writing the regulators are still working on defining responsibilities of the board: e.g. 
in May 2015, the PRA published a “Corporate governance: Board responsibilities” 
consultation paper. The consultation process is due to finish in September 2015. In 
the draft statement, PRA demonstrates its expectations relating to 12 items, 
including, in this order:  
• Setting strategy  
• Culture  
• Risk appetite and risk management  
 
In order to demonstrate the regulatory priorities, it might be worth noting that 
culture came higher on the list than did risk appetite and risk management. This 
could be seen as part of the ‘compliance-oriented approach to regulation’ described 
by Power as relying “increasingly on the self-organising capacities of 
organisations”, where the directors have emerged as “regulatory agents” (Power, 
2000), forced to “acquire responsibility for internal control and risk management” 
(Power, 1999). In a similar way that audits were described by Power (1994) as 
shifting power as they enhance “the transparency of individual and corporate 
actions to those parties who have an interest in the nature and effects of those 
actions” (Power, 1994), regulatory demands shift responsibility for regulation from 
the regulators to the boards, who are thus held accountable for failures of 
compliance. 
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The regulatory focus on governance and on NED oversight more specifically 
manifests itself through boards being responsible for Risk Appetite and Risk 
Culture – the ‘objects’ of governance. On culture, the document explains that “The 
board should articulate and maintain a culture of risk awareness […]. The non-
executives have a key role to play in holding management to account for embedding 
and maintaining this culture” (PRA, 2015c) – this allocates the responsibility over 
risk culture to the Board. Additionally, the board is given responsibility over risk 
appetite:  
“The business strategy should be supported by a well-articulated and 
measurable statement of risk appetite […] which is clearly owned by the 
board. The PRA will expect to see evidence of this active oversight of risks 
according to the risk appetite” (PRA, 2015c). 
These terms will be used throughout the thesis, and are also the objects 
through which regulatory responsibilisation of the board manifests itself, therefore 
the following section provides an explanation of both, including current regulatory 
and academic views about them.  
 
4.5.1. RISK APPETITE 
 
Defining and controlling the firm’s risk appetite could be seen as an important 
object of oversight: “Risk appetite linked to strategic planning is part of the board’s 
risk-taking oversight” (Andersen et al., 2014), and is in theory at the core of 
business practice in financial institutions (IRM, 2015) because it is needed to 
allocate capital (KPMG, 2013a), which is fundamental to the whole functioning of 
the institution. Power explains that the prescriptive way to look at it is that, in 
theory, “Organizations should seek to identify all material risks to their objectives 
and sub-objectives, design controls and mitigations which produce a residual risk 
consistent with a target risk appetite, and monitor this entire process, making 
feedback adjustments as necessary. The model is that of a thermostat which adjusts 
to changes in environment subject to pre-given target temperature” (Power, 2009). 
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According to the Financial Reporting Council’s Corporate Governance Code, 
the Board “has responsibility for an organisation’s overall approach to risk 
management and internal control”, which includes “determining the nature and 
extent of the principal risks faced and those risks which the organisation is willing 
to take in achieving its strategic objectives (determining its ‘risk appetite’)” (FRC, 
2014a). While the idea is that NEDs set risk appetite, in practice to do so they 
require information from within the firm, together with suggestions from 
management about what they should focus on. 
In order to set and monitor risk appetite, the Board (Chapter 5), according to 
the interviewees, receives a vast amount of information (Chapter 7) from within the 
business (Chapter 6). The production of the Risk Appetite statement is an 
interactive process that happens across different layers of organisation, all the way 
up to the NEDs who approve the final statement. Difficulty arises at once, however, 
as there is an inherent ambiguity in the manifestation of Risk Appetite - while Risk 
Appetite is the purest outcome of information production, serving as a conclusion to 
a laborious process of gathering and analysing strategic priorities and risks, and is 
the condensed goal of information, at the same time the risk appetite statements are 
in theory meant to determine the priorities with the organisation and thus influence 
what the information flows will be like. It is not possible to assert, therefore, that 
there is a ‘pure’ process uncorrupted by the potentially conflicting interests of 
principals and agents who are competing for capital between different parts of the 
firm.  
 
4.5.1.a. History 
 
The origins of risk appetite, as a focus of regulation and oversight, are not 
clear. Financial firms have traditionally controlled credit allocation (Bernanke, 
1983), or business volumes generally, but the terminology of ‘risk appetite’ is 
relatively new. The earliest mentioning of risk appetite indemnified was in the 1989 
Global Capital Markets KPMG report that said a number of institutions “have 
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embarked on fundamental reviews – starting with a re-assessment of their risk 
appetite” (Peat, 1989), which by its tone implies its prior existence. And according 
to a library search, “Risk Appetite” was not in the title of any publications until the 
2000 Journal of Finance article “Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial 
Risk Appetite?” (Carpenter, 2000). Andersen et al (2014) observe, vaguely, that 
“Relatively recently, that is, around 2008, the extended corporate governance 
communities taken up the use of the term ‘risk appetite’, encouraging and 
mandating boards to formally approve their firm’s ‘Risk Appetite Statement’” 
(Andersen et al., 2014). 
Arguably, one might link its existence to the concept of Enterprise Risk 
Management, because risk appetite is a way of assessing how much risk the firm is 
willing to take, which is later monitored through the theoretically broadly-
encompassing ERM framework. ERM, in turn, emerged “in the late 1980s as an 
extension of hazard risk management” (Hampton, 2009). One of the reasons risk 
appetite frameworks are used widely across organisations, is their characteristic of 
being a common discussion point for conversations within business, similarly to 
Hall’s (2010) observation about the role accounting information plays in 
organisations: “the strengths of accounting information vis-à-vis other information 
at a manager’s disposal […] include its aggregation properties and its role as a 
common language to facilitate communication among managers with different 
backgrounds, experience and knowledge” (Hall, 2010).  
 
4.5.1.b. Definition 
 
While risk appetite is intended to operate throughout an organisation, the role 
it takes on varies. At the board level, risk appetite is the language of strategy and 
oversight of its implementation, where the board is intended to set the culture for 
how risk appetite is treated. At lower hierarchical levels risk appetite becomes 
manifested through individual risk tolerances and operational limits. Risk appetite, 
even within one firm, could thus be seen as having multiple meanings, which are in 
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theory ideally complementary to each other in ensuring complete risk coverage 
throughout the ERM framework. Figure 4.1, prepared by one of the risk 
consultancies, describes a typical approach that in theory is taken to risk appetite in 
a bank, and also demonstrates one of the numerous representations of risk appetite 
by consultants. 
FIGURE 4.2: RISK APPETITE FRAMEWORK 
 
  (RiskDynamics, 2014) 
 
It can be seen from the depiction above that the appetite may take on different 
roles at different strategic levels, and may also contain both quantitative and 
qualitative elements. The quantitative elements can be measured, by definition. 
Table 4.2 shows that a set of data can be produced within a bank to support the 
quantitative component, but that process involves critical judgements, which may be 
made by management; and NEDs may find it difficult to assure the quality and 
relevance of such data without independent support. It is also clear that the data will 
vary over time. Credit quality will deteriorate in an economic downturn, so ex ante 
and ex post risk appetite may well differ. The information assembly process must 
therefore be dynamic and timely to allow adjustments to be made.  
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TABLE 4.2: MAIN CATEGORIES OF RISK IN A TYPICAL BANK AND THEIR 
MEASURABILITY 
Risk Measurability Measures 
Market High Volatility experience 
Credit High Default history, loan losses, non-performing loans 
Operational Medium Error rates, IT system checks 
Reputational Medium Staff/customer surveys, hiring patterns, turnover 
Regulatory Medium/Low Incidence of fines/penalties 
Legal Medium/Low Case records, other similar litigations 
 
Qualitative risk appetite definitions are even more problematic, as was 
frequently mentioned by interviewees at various organisational levels. As Power 
describes, “Although, COSO (2004) envisages the possibility of ‘qualitative’ 
understandings of risk appetite, the dominant conception is that of a quantitative 
benchmark such as a target level of financial capital to be maintained [..] as a kind 
of self-insurance against shocks and adverse events” (Power, 2009). 
“[Boards] are beginning to break free from regarding appetite solely as a 
‘thing’ to be measured and to recognise it as a dynamic construction involving 
values and the situational experience of a multitude of organizational agents” 
(Power, 2009) – the currently common Three Lines of Defence governance 
structure (that separates the risk accountabilities between functions within the 
business units, risk management, and internal audit) might be seen as an answer to 
that, as it creates a slightly more clear and visible distribution of roles and 
‘ownership’ of risk. 
The NEDs interviewed (see Chapter 5) were all members of risk committees, 
and are likely therefore to largely rely on judgements made by the second line of 
defence (see Chapter 6). While the second line of defence (independent risk 
managers) are supposedly ‘independent’ of business unit management, the Risk 
Management function still ultimately reports to the CEO. NEDs, as some of them 
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have explained during the interviews, lack a fully independent source of judgement 
which would allow them to challenge a second line assessment, unless they 
commission an external evaluation, which reports directly to them, a practice which 
is currently very rare.  
 
4.5.2. RISK CULTURE 
 
The 2014 UK Corporate Governance Code defined Corporate Governance as 
“what the board of a company does and how it sets the values of the company” 
(FRC, 2014b). 
The first prominent mentioning of culture within the context of oversight is in 
November 2004, when Kari Hale, FSA director of finance strategy and risk, said 
that “management of operational risk is […] in its infancy, and management of them 
is – to a large extent – about culture and appropriate management oversight” (FSA, 
2004). The fact that Hale said in 2004 that risk management is “about culture and 
appropriate management oversight” is notable because using the word “appropriate” 
implies that there are some objective criteria and thresholds of what constitutes 
appropriateness and what does not. However, these criteria might be difficult to 
evaluate or even categorise, because of how imprecise the ideas are. The regulation 
has not published a clear definition of the meaning of ‘appropriate’ in this context. 
A statement about appropriateness without any explicit mentioning of the 
requirements leaves a lot of space for interpretation and thus also creates a potential 
domain of interest for management and risk consultants who fill in this gap between 
regulatory suggestions and practical implementation.  
Ashby et al consider risk culture a challenging topic to research because 
“many, though not all, of these habits and routines are not readily visible, even to 
organisational participants themselves” (Ashby et al., 2012). This might explain 
why the regulatory concept of “appropriateness” of risk culture is so vague - it is not 
just difficult to monitor from outside, but even problematic for actors internal to the 
organisation to see and understand.  
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Despite this inherent vagueness, the link between oversight and organisational 
culture is a recurring theme in a number of later discussions about risk oversight. 
Ashby et al find that unlike a lot of emphasis on “values and the need to change 
mindsets, we learned of risk culture work streams with more of an emphasis on 
improving oversight structures and information flows, including performance 
metrics for risk and good compliance” (Ashby et al., 2012). One could argue that 
just as culture is at the heart of oversight, effective oversight structures and 
information flows are at the heart of operationalising risk culture. 
According to a chairman of one of the UK’s largest banks:  
“Regulators are constantly asking about risk culture, and emphasising that it’s 
the Board’s responsibility to set the tone from the top. But it’s hard to know 
how to measure culture, and to work out what interventions by the Board 
would make a difference” (Interviewee_12, 2014).  
Indeed, probably as a response to both the internal problems and potentially 
the regulatory pressures, culture became absorbed into the conduct risk agenda that 
is now discussed and controlled. Some boards even have dedicated board 
committees explicitly responsible for it. - for example, HSBC’s “Conduct & Values 
Committee” established in January 2014 is given responsibilities including “[doing] 
business with the right clients and in the right way, is a responsible employer, acts 
responsibly towards the communities” (HSBC, 2015). 
The process of responsibilisation that regulators are now articulating could be 
seen as is transforming the nature of boards by recruiting their members in support 
of regulators and their objectives. Board risk committees then become responsible 
for the firm’s risk appetite and risk culture. In order to be able to perform their role, 
they need support structures and information suppliers within the firms to give them 
the information. This wide scope of responsibility, and risk tolerance close to zero 
(Davies & Zhivitskaya, 2014) on the part of the regulators, poses additional 
challenges in executing the NED role.   
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4.6. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has traced the convergence of corporate governance and financial 
regulation, and demonstrated the increased overlaps and increased attention to risk 
from both sides. The financial regulators have in particular increased their focus on 
corporate governance within firms over the last several years: the financial crisis has 
been widely interpreted as showing that the “self-regulation” of financial institutions 
without close regulatory oversight has failed. That may in part be the result of 
inadequate time spent by NEDs, and in part by a deficient understanding of the 
nature of risk in modern financial markets (shared by firms and their regulators). 
Moral hazard may also have played a role - large firms were considered ‘too big to 
fail’ and their funding costs were lower as a result, giving them cheap money with 
which to speculate. Whatever the reason, financial stability was not protected 
strongly enough, resulting in a financial crash and severe costs imposed on 
taxpayers who, in the UK and elsewhere, were obliged to rescue a range of banks 
deemed crucial to the functioning of the economy.  
 
Looking at it from the agency perspective, financial institutions have two 
major categories of principals – regulators and shareholders. Regulators are 
principals because public authorities might need to bail the firms out should 
something go wrong, and that will cost money to taxpayers (who are thus the 
principals of the Prudential Regulators), and might also cause inconvenience to 
customers (who are the principals of the Financial Conduct Authority). 
Shareholders are the owners, and thus they are principals in the classical definition 
of the term. Traditionally boards are supposed to represent the shareholders’ 
interests. However, in the changing regulatory environment, boards also have to pay 
a lot of attention to the regulators due to the process of responsibilisation.  
 
Reacting to the governance failures in the financial crisis, the Walker review in 
the UK, and other reviews internationally, focused on non-executive directors and 
their role. Sir David Walker criticised the way the boards treated risk management 
before the crisis and suggests that it should be different in the future: “In the past, 
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some bank boards may have seen risk oversight as a compliance function essentially 
designed to meet regulatory capital requirements with minimum constraint on 
leveraged utilisation of the balance sheet […] Such attitudes should have no place in 
the proper governance of risk in future” (Walker, 2009). In the final report, Walker 
outlines several suggestions of what needs to be done in order to increase board-
level engagement in the risk oversight process.  
As a response to the financial crisis and the Walker review, regulators started 
looking more closely risks within financial institutions as a part of a tightening of 
regulation (higher capital standards were the most costly response), and created a 
new concept of risk in FSA’s discourse compared to that in the earlier years. When 
the FSA started monitoring risk-taking within the firms, they focused primarily on 
risk governance and risk management structures. 
 
To summarise, there has been a significant change in the way regulators speak 
about oversight and frame their interest in risk. First, their focus was on risk to their 
own objectives. Only later did they begin to talk about risk to firms themselves. 
Now it is multi-faceted, and involves at least three components: 
- risk to regulators’ objectives 
- risk to individual firms 
- risk to the system as a whole. 
Possibly due to the level of complexity of the term, in most of the publications 
mentioned above “oversight” is not defined explicitly, even though it can carry 
several meanings and, as has been shown, is used within somewhat different 
contexts. While oversight is difficult to explain, there is no doubt that in theory 
assigning ownership of oversight to different actors within financial networks is 
meant to empower them to interface with various aspects of risk management within 
the firms and perform supervisory roles. In this sense, efforts by the regulator to 
measure and improve the effectiveness of oversight without providing clear criteria 
about what exactly it means, could be explained by the regulator delegating the task 
of determining ‘good practice’ to the boards themselves as they perform their role. 
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Overseers are not management, and they are by definition outside the activity 
that is overseen. Risk oversight does not contradict, but rather complements the 
concept of risk management because risk management continues to be done within 
firms, with oversight being put above it in the governance structure. The focus in 
recent years has been on overseeing the overseers – specifically, the regulators 
oversee the non-executives’ oversight of the financial institutions. The regulators’ 
focus on non-executives led to a change in the governance paradigm from NEDs 
being remote from the business to them actively participating in the risk oversight 
process. The lack of clarity about where risk management stops and risk oversight 
begins, is one of the defining features of this field. 
These regulatory developments demonstrate a very distinctive path of 
regulating firms through the regulation of their governance; however they could 
also have chosen to focus on other things such as e.g. making the firms smaller. 
Instead, regulators have been closely involved with the way firms organise 
themselves to manage risk, specifying committees and particular responsibilities for 
specified individuals, as well as ways of organising risk oversight. They have 
required the adoption of: 
- Board Risk Committees, where they also now require particular ways of 
working (more in Chapter 5) 
- Three Lines of Defence (more in Chapter 6) 
As we shall see in the following chapters, firms are finding it challenging to 
deliver this agenda and meet regulators’ enhanced expectations, which are 
threatening the traditional approach to corporate governance, in which NEDs and 
executives are part of a collegiate board collectively responsible for promoting 
shareholder value. A new tension between executives, and non-executives strongly 
influenced by regulatory expectations, has been introduced into the corporate 
governance of financial firms.   
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CHAPTER 5: Board RISK OVERSIGHT 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Increased regulatory interest in the boards of directors has been discussed 
above. This chapter investigates how do risk committee members understand and 
operationalise their risk oversight roles? “While the details vary, there is wide 
consensus that the directors’ role is one of oversight, not to undertake operational 
duties” (Andersen et al., 2014).  Regulators now expect Boards to oversee the lines 
of corporate defence, and in order to do so they receive information from those lines 
with the help of information intermediaries, as we will see in the following two 
chapters.  
The Walker review in November 2009 discussed the need for risk committees 
in the UK financial institutions. Six years later, regulators are still attempting to 
define board responsibilities, as evidenced by the PRA’s current call for responses 
on the consultation paper “Corporate governance: Board responsibilities” (PRA, 
2015b) that is due to close in September 2015. In this consultation document, an 
effective board is defined as one which “understands the business, establishes a 
clear strategy, articulates a clear risk appetite to support that strategy, oversees an 
effective risk control framework, and collectively has the skills, the experience and 
the confidence to hold executive management rigorously to account for delivering 
that strategy and managing within that risk appetite” (PRA, 2015b). Even though 
the document is about the board as a whole, not specifically about risk committees, 
a substantial part of the definition of an effective board has to do with risk. This 
might be interpreted as a way of prioritising the Risk Committee which is usually 
tasked with these jobs.  
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The increased focus on risk committee responsibilities is hardly surprising: it 
has been observed that corporate governance change is often pre-empted by 
exogenous shocks (Fligstein, 1993; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010) - the trigger for 
many changes related to risk committees can be traced to the financial crisis. The 
emergence of board risk committees can be interpreted as an additional indicator of 
the increased significance of risk management in the sphere of corporate 
governance, in line with the overall responsibilisation of boards and increased 
emphasis on risk. This chapter discusses the role of board members, and, 
specifically, of NEDs in the risk oversight process with the help of qualitative 
research methods (primarily interviews conducted in the summer of 2014).  
 
As mentioned in the introduction and the methodology chapter, the primary 
research objective when approaching the NEDs was a general one: to understand 
how NEDs make sense and define their role in risk committees, and what they see 
as the key challenges in that process. Risk oversight, unlike risk management, might 
not necessarily be about making decisions, but instead about observing the way 
these decisions are made. After desk research and a number of informal 
conversations with NEDs, an interview protocol was created (see Appendix II) that 
focused around sense-making in terms of the role definitions, accountabilities and 
interactions with other stakeholders, such as managers who can be seen as agents 
and regulators who can be seen as principals.  
 
Focusing on the financial sector Andersen et al explain that: “The trouble at 
firms that were previously lionized as corporate exemplars, such as Citibank, 
Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland and UBS, revealed widespread weaknesses 
in how boards undertook the oversight of risk in their enterprises” (Andersen et al., 
2014). Part of the diagnosis of the reasons for the global financial crisis points to 
inadequacies in risk oversight, primarily caused by two factors, namely (a) the 
limited time boards spent on risk, and (b) the lack of relevant expertise on the part 
of the board members involved. Regulators then responded to these failures by 
requiring special, focused Risk Committees in addition to the already existing Audit 
Committees and by insisting on the presence of individuals with relevant experience 
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and expertise. This in turn led to the problematisation of the relations between risk 
committees and the rest of the board, as the risk committees are now responsible 
both to the board and the regulator.  
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: first, an overview of the 
historical evolution of the NED role is discussed, followed by an overview of the 
main points of criticism of Board-level risk oversight, primarily based on the 
academic reference points. It is followed by a discussion of the way audit and risk 
committees differ from each other. Role ambiguity and the key relationships are 
then presented based on the interview findings, followed by a discussion of those 
findings. These themes arose based on the reading of interview transcripts, partially 
pre-disposed by the questions asked and partially by the thematic grouping of the 
answers. The overarching arising themes include the contrast between aspired and 
actual oversight practices, as well as observations about how NEDs make sense of 
the vagueness of oversight. 
 
5.1.1. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION 
 
“Boards have been a subject of interest in many disciplines beyond economics 
and finance, including accounting, law, management, psychology, and 
sociology” (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2008) 
Studies of the nature of the NED role are primarily survey-based, and the 
outcomes vary significantly based on the sample size and particular questions 
asked; to demonstrate the variety of responses across different years – i.e. a survey 
by Mace as early as 1971 found that NEDs see their role as “advice and counsel” 
(Mace, 1971), while Demb and Neubauer found that 45% of NEDs think their job is 
to “oversee and monitor top management” (Demb & Neubauer, 1992), and 26% of 
their survey respondents said their role primarily involves succession and top 
management hiring and firing. The variation of survey responses about the nature of 
the NED role indicates inherent role ambiguity, and also shows that it has changed 
over time. 
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While corporate governance phenomena (including the role of NEDs) are 
researched by different disciplines, there is not much academic work on risk 
committees specifically, due to the fact that they are a relatively new addition to the 
corporate governance world. However, parallels with the literature on the longer 
established audit committees can be drawn and many of the general issues that 
boards face are also directly relevant to Board Risk Committees. 
Theorising about corporate governance goes as far back as Adam Smith, who 
wrote that “The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of 
other people’s money than of their own [...] Negligence and profusion, therefore, 
must always prevail” (Smith, 1776). The goal of this section, however, is not to 
trace the historical evolution of corporate governance in general or the NED role in 
particular, but rather selectively to highlight the parts of recent history that led to the 
creation of Board Risk Committees as they are now. Bhimani observed that 
“Adherence to financial reporting standards is regulated by audits which provide a 
mechanism for assuring compliance. Standards of compliance in respect of 
corporate responsibility and governance have more recently also been the subject of 
legislation” (Bhimani, 2008) - board risk committees present a case of such a 
governance mechanism. 
In the l970s, Mace discussed the decoupling of board responsibility and actual 
activity, and found that boards neither “ask discerning questions” nor “select the 
CEO” (Mace, 1971). One of the first reports that reacted to the several corporate 
governance scandals was the 1987 Treadway report on fraudulent financial 
reporting in the US sponsored by COSO12: in order to do so, it identified “attributes 
of corporate structure that may contribute to acts of fraudulent reporting” 
                                                
12 COSO - The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
– is a commission composed of five industry bodies and includes Institute of 
Management Accountants (IMA), the American Accounting Association (AAA), the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA), and Financial Executives International (FEI) – and is “dedicated to 
providing thought leadership to executive management and governance entities” 
(COSO, 2014) 
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(Treadway, 1987) and issued good practice guidelines for Management reports and 
for Audit Committees. 
Millstein and MacAvoy trace the history of the corporate boards in the US and 
find that “The evolution of boards from managerial rubber-stamps to active and 
independent monitors has been in large part the result of efforts to address or avoid 
serious performance problems associated with managerial entrenchment”, and that 
since the 1990s boards have become more closely aligned with the shareholder 
interests, which in turn has allowed them to “enhance value to shareholders” 
(Millstein & MacAvoy, 1998).  
Caldwell emphasises that when it comes to the responsibilities, “Boards of 
directors are not expected to unilaterally identify, analyse, mitigate and monitor 
enterprise risk. Rather, boards must oversee the risk management systems and 
processes and continuously review the associated outcomes and planning” 
(Caldwell, 2012). The role is thus primarily monitoring and control, rather than 
implementation of corrective actions, which is instead done by the management, 
and these two roles should be “clearly delineated” (Caldwell, 2012). Similarly, 
according to Deloitte’s “Assessing Enterprise Risk Management” report published 
in May 2009, “management has the primary responsibility for assessing enterprise 
risk, the audit committee and the board may have an active role in overseeing the 
process and in understanding management's response to the identified risks” 
(Deloitte, 2009). This distinction is critical because while management assesses and 
manages risks, the oversight role is in place in order to confirm the reasonableness 
of these actions, and this very specific role of the audit committee or the board risk 
committee became institutionalised through regulatory requirements. 
Before the crisis regulators focused little attention on board composition, and 
the checks they did on board members were limited to “fitness and propriety”, 
which amounted to checking court records for evidence of criminal activity, fraud, 
and bankruptcy. Since the crisis, regulators have been shifting their focus so as to 
add consideration of competence for the particular roles that the board members will 
perform. This focus is expressed in different ways in different places. The US 
regulators have long had a requirement for at least one “financial expert” in the 
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audit committee, for example, but do not interview directors in advance of 
appointment as the UK regulators do. 
The UK now goes further and defines a number of Significant Influence 
Functions (SIFs): for example, the Chair of the Risk Committee is viewed by the 
regulators as a person exercising significant influence over the firm and is thus 
required to be approved as a part of the role, which involves being subject to formal 
interviews under the system of ‘close and continuous’ supervision. Regulators are 
holding boards to account for their effectiveness, and indeed the new ‘reversal of 
the burden of proof’13 regime for bank boards in the UK further emphasises the 
responsibilities Boards now have for risk oversight, as was discussed in Chapter 4. 
The ‘close and continuous’ interviews include detailed questions about the board’s 
competence to perform these particular roles. Some candidates are rejected, but 
while there is anecdotal evidence of that fact, no statistics are published. There 
stricter requirements on board composition have meant that, according to Grant 
Thornton’s annual corporate governance report, “Board structure and composition 
continues to be the most common reason for non-compliance” (GrantThornton, 
2011). Other common criticisms of the board-level risk oversight are discussed in 
the following section. 
 
5.1.2. FAILURE OF RISK OVERSIGHT 
 
During the last two decades there has been an increased emphasis in both the 
regulatory sphere and in academic thinking on directors’ independence (Clarke, 
                                                
13 “Senior bankers will be presumed guilty until proven innocent under strict new 
rules proposed by British regulators seeking to hold individuals accountable for bank 
failures”, which is a result of the ‘presumption of responsibility’ rule by the Financial 
Conduct Authority which requires senior managers to demonstrate that where a firm 
is guilty of misconduct they "took such steps as a person in their position could 
reasonably be expected to take" to avoid it happening” (Schuffham, 2015).  
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2007; Eisenberg, 1999; Lin, 1995). This increased emphasis on independence has, 
over time, led to a growing proportion of independent directors on boards (Gordon, 
2007), and it is notable that “most directors today are very part-time” (Carter & 
Lorsch, 2013) due to the fact that the role was designed to be part time and 
independent in order to avoid a close alignment of financial interests which would 
create a bias in their judgements. There is, as it is commonly acknowledged, a 
limited pool of potential candidates for those high-level jobs, who are typically 
involved in other boards and/or executive managerial (or sometimes academic) 
positions alongside being on boards. 
In addition to the part-time nature of the job, Bainbridge & Henderson 
mention that “the reasons boards continue to struggle include inadequate time, 
misspent time, inadequate information, improper skill sets and insufficient 
incentives” (Bainbridge & Henderson, 2014) and yet there are now regulatory 
requirements addressing each of the these reasons listed by Bainbridge and 
Henderson: for example, regarding time commitment, board members need to 
demonstrate to regulators that their other activities leave them adequate time for the 
role. As of July 2014, they cannot be involved in more than one executive 
directorship and two NEDs or four NEDs at the same time (according to the EU 
Capital Requirements Directive IV). Noting this, the goal of this chapter is not to 
provide an in-depth assessment of regulatory developments, which were touched 
upon in the previous chapter, but to focus instead on the NED perspective, which is 
relevant because NEDs are key actors in shaping oversight, but are also a group that 
is difficult to research due to the limitations of access. As some argue that increased 
regulatory demands lead to boards being “more focused on compliance with 
standards and regulations than they are on obtaining a competitive advantage” (EY, 
2013a), this, in turn, might mean that boards risk having less time to spend on 
strategic decisions and supporting management. 
 
The limited time spent on the work of an individual board due to other 
commitments of their members might be further amplified by an inherent 
information asymmetry – citing Bainbridge and Henderson once again, 
“independent directors are […] by definition outsiders”, which means that 
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regardless of their best efforts, they  “do not have the time or the mandate to 
challenge management’s judgments except as to a discrete number of issues” 
(Bainbridge & Henderson, 2014). Thus, the question of cause and effect might 
remain unanswered, since it is possible to argue both that the inherent information 
asymmetry (of which they are aware) makes NEDs less engaged and thus causes 
board members to spend less time trying to bridge their knowledge gaps or, as the 
inverse of that, that the fact that they spend less time being involved means that the 
information asymmetry remains an issue. These problems of information 
asymmetry will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 7, but it is useful to note for 
now that the challenges of information and information flows are related not only to 
this asymmetry, but also to its amount, since both receiving too little and too much 
information can be problematic. The use of the terms “too little” and “too much” is 
inherently simplistic and does not take into account whose appetite towards the 
depth of information counts. 
 
The problem of “improper skill sets” noted by Bainbridge and Henderson can 
be linked to the other two issues discussed earlier – that the NEDs are outsiders to 
the business and thus do not possess deep firm-specific knowledge and also that 
they might not be getting sufficient information from within the business to learn 
about its functioning and its vulnerability. Since February 2014 the US Federal 
Reserve requires all risk committees in major financial US institutions to include at 
least one “risk management expert”, who is defined as someone having “experience 
in identifying, assessing and managing risk exposures in large, complex financial 
firms” (FED, 2014). Comparatively few people have such qualifications, and firms 
are finding it hard to meet this requirement given the relative immaturity of risk 
management as a specific discipline. The Institute of Risk Managers (IRM), The 
Professional Risk Managers' International Association (PRIMA), and Global 
Association of Risk Professionals (GARP) are three of the major international 
organisations that provide numerous qualifications: Project Risk Manager, Financial 
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Risk Manager, and Energy Risk Professional among others14. Financial Risk 
Manager Qualification, for example, was established by GARP in 1997, and 
currently has over 30,000 practitioners worldwide (GARP, 2015). 
 
An additional difficulty arises when one takes into account that tasks of risk 
committees go beyond financial risk management, and involve a wider skill set such 
as for example PR, politics, IT resilience and others that might require other 
qualifications. The problem of improper skill sets related to the complexity of risks 
in financial institutions was observed by de Larosière: “Many boards and senior 
managements of financial firms neither understood the characteristics of the new, 
highly complex financial products they were dealing with, nor were they aware of 
the aggregate exposure of their companies” (de Larosière, 2009). 
 
Even though the tangible impact of boards is difficult to observe, when things 
go wrong board members are in theory held accountable: “The directors of Enron 
and WorldCom, in particular, were held liable for the fraud that occurred:  Enron 
directors had to pay $168 million to investor plaintiffs, of which  $13 million was 
out of pocket  (not covered by insurance); and WorldCom directors had to pay $36 
million, of which $18 million was out of pocket” (Adams et al., 2008; Klausner, 
Munger, Munger, Black, & Cheffins, 2005). Lehman Brothers directors, however, 
have not so far paid anything, and regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have 
found it difficult to attach responsibility for failures in the financial crisis to 
individual board members, as evidenced for example by the FSA reports on the 
failures of the Royal Bank of Scotland, which states e.g. “the fact that a bank failed 
does not make its management or Board automatically liable to sanctions. A 
successful case needs clear evidence of actions by particular people that were 
incompetent, dishonest or demonstrated a lack of integrity. […] Errors of 
commercial judgment are not in themselves sanctionable unless either the processes 
                                                
14	  For	  more	  information,	  please	  see:	  https://www.theirm.org/training/all-­‐
courses.aspx	  and	  https://www.garp.org/frm/	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and controls which governed how these judgments were reached were clearly 
deficient, or the judgments were clearly outside the bounds of what might be 
considered reasonable” (House of Commons, 2012). That complexity in 
responsibility attribution has, as has been discussed earlier, led to legislative change 
in the UK which tightens the responsibilities of NEDs. 
 
Another frequent criticism is that NEDs devote too little time to their 
responsibilities, but the main way that NEDs are intended to add value is, by 
definition, precisely by being distant from the main business process and by 
introducing an external perspective to it. So it is not self-evident that regulators can 
expect that spending more time within the business will lead to a better outcome. 
Additionally, there is very limited empirical evidence about whether the somewhat 
normative ideas discussed above hold true in the case of board-level risk oversight. 
 
Additional problem which is not clear is whether the issue is too little time 
spent, or time spent looking at inadequate information. According to The Walker 
Report, “if performance systems do not assure an adequate information flow to the 
NEDs, no amount of financial industry experience among the NEDs will right the 
situation” (Walker, 2009). 
 
With audit committees pre-dating the establishment of risk committees, and 
having formal responsibility over risk until recently, it makes sense to explore risk 
committees with reference to the audit committees. In July 2015 audit committees’ 
role in risk oversight, especially in non-financial firms, is still crucial: 
“Most boards delegate oversight of risk management to the audit committee, 
which is consistent with the NYSE rule that requires the audit committee to 
discuss policies with respect to risk assessment and risk management. 
Financial companies covered by Dodd-Frank must have dedicated risk 
management committees” (Wachtell, 2015).  
An example of audit committee taking responsibility over risk oversight prior 
to the crisis (and it being common practice) could be demonstrated by this 
explanation of the failures of RBS during the financial crisis by the FSA: 
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 “Although, in the pre-crisis period, RBS did not have a formal Board Risk 
Committee (as subsequently recommended by Sir David Walker’s report), risk 
issues were the responsibility of the Group Audit Committee (GAC). This was 
not out of line with standard practice at the time” (House of Commons, 2012). 
 
5.2. AUDIT VS RISK COMMITTEES 
 
When audit committees were first widely introduced in the UK as a result of 
the Cadbury report published in December 1992, these committees were already 
mandatory in all firms based in the US, which is why many multinational firms 
based in the UK already had them; thus, the publication of the Cadbury report, when 
all stock exchange listed firms were effectively required to have these audit 
committees in place, did not create a seismic change. In 2009, the Walker review 
led to a more dramatic trajectory of change: many firms had risk committees in 
place before they were formally required. In firms outside the financial sector, it is 
still common practice to have one single committee responsible for both audit and 
risk. The Walker review suggested: “The audit committee’s terms of reference 
should be expanded to include oversight of the risk appetite and control framework 
of the company; in complex groups where this would overload the audit committee, 
it may be more practical to establish a separate Risk Committee dedicated to this 
function” (Walker, 2009). 
 
Within the governance framework of financial institutions, audit committees 
were typically also responsible for risk, though the term did not always appear in 
their charters. One likely reason why Audit committees used to be responsible for 
risk is that following the ENRON scandal in 2001, the core of which was serious 
accounting misconduct, the audit committee took over the oversight of similar 
issues; furthermore, “some governance experts, sensitive to the need for risk 
management in non-accounting areas as well, defined audit committee 
responsibility with enough breadth that non-accounting risks tended to get swept in” 
(Young, 2010). In the UK, audit committees were thus used to be responsible both 
for audit and risk issues up to November 2009, when the regulators’ response to 
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Walker review changed the rules at financial institutions: these institutions have had 
to separate the two functions and, although executive risk committees were often in 
place before, oversight of risk has been elevated to the highest level of board 
governance since the Walker Review. 
 
A relevant observation is that “Although the board’s emphasis on risk is 
expanding, the audit committee’s focus, with regard to specific areas of risk, seems 
to be narrowing” (Steffee, 2011). Caldwell compares the role of the board in risk 
oversight to the role of the audit committee: “The audit committee does not prepare 
financial statements, draft disclosures, or maintain the system of internal control. 
Rather, the audit committee bears responsibility for overseeing” (Caldwell, 2012). 
 
Corporate governance operates through committee structures, and bank boards 
nowadays typically set up all of the following committees: Audit, Risk, Nomination 
and Remuneration. Some banks now also have their Risk Committee sub-divided 
into further NED committees (e.g. reputational and compliance risks might be 
separated from financial risks) which are then even more focused, and add yet 
another level of complexity to the corporate governance regime. While the work of 
Nomination and Remuneration committees is often closely linked with the work of 
Audit and Risk committees, it falls outside the primary focus of this thesis so will 
only be mentioned in relation to their relevance to the Audit and Risk committees.  
 
There is a theoretical overlap between the roles of the Risk committees and 
Audit committees, but their tasks differ substantially: according to the Walker 
review, in the simplified form, the role of the risk committee is forward looking 
while audit committees are typically more institutionalised and are seen as 
backward-looking. This makes the risk committee more ambiguous, since 
Management Information that the boards receive is primarily based on backward 
looking data, but one of the challenging roles for a Risk Function within the firm is 
to aid the forward looking process, e.g. through stress testing, scenario planning, 
emerging risk assessment etc. rather than purely reporting on past compliance with 
risk appetite, past credit defaults or operational losses. The data behind such 
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exercises is inevitably based on assumptions and judgments, and therefore has a 
substantial subjective element. 
 
The overlap between risk and audit committees became even more significant 
with the introduction of risk-based audit in “Effective Internal Audit in the Financial 
Services Sector” published by the UK Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors in 
July 2013: this report encourages audit committees to become more future-oriented, 
thus blurring the line between the roles of risk and audit further. During my 
interviews, the overlap was not raised as a problem and it was not mentioned at all 
when the committees’ responsibilities were discussed. However, the previous 
general distinction of audit as backwards looking and risk as forward-looking not 
only still remains but also appears frequently when these committees are spoken 
about, both in literature and by the committee members themselves. The forward-
looking focus also means more advanced calculations in order to aid judgment, 
which also means, in turn, that arguably the responsibilities and boundaries of the 
risk committees are less clear and less defined than those of audit committees. For 
example, practice differs on the types of risk that should be covered by the Risk 
Committee. Operational risk is sometimes included, or may be handled by a 
separate Operations and Technology Committee, as is the case in the investment 
bank I observed. 
 
DeZoort discusses the paradox that the audit committees faced in the 1990s as 
they were “a monitoring mechanism expected to assume expanded oversight 
responsibilities in an environment where its credibility and effectiveness are 
increasingly in question” (DeZoort, 1998). This observation is similar to the 
development of the risk committees’ ability to perform their oversight role, as 
shown in the earlier section on criticism of board risk committees. 
 
Abbott et al studied the audit committee oversight of internal audit and found 
a strong positive association between the audit committee’s oversight of internal 
audit and internal audit’s “internal-controls-based activities” (Abbott, Parker, & 
Peters, 2010). Rephrased, their finding means that a stronger and more involved 
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audit committee directs the attention of internal auditors towards internal oversight 
– assuming these findings would also hold for risk oversight, Abbott et al make a 
strong case for more active risk committees. However, as noted above, internal 
audit is a small part of the audit committees’ agenda, given that audit committees 
must also approve the annual reports as well as public statements regarding 
performance forecasts.  
 
The UK Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards summarises the 
role neatly: “the audit committee has clear responsibility for oversight and reporting 
to the board on the financial accounts and adoption of appropriate accounting 
policies, internal control, compliance and other related matters. […] This vital 
responsibility is essentially, though not exclusively, backward-looking” 
(UK_Parliament, 2013). Regarding the scope of the audit committee 
responsibilities, it includes approving the statement of accounts and confirming that 
everything is as described in accordance to the rules; additionally, Audit committees 
interact with external auditors and receive their reports on the firm’s accounting 
practices and indeed external auditors may raise concerns about financial 
management directly with the Audit committee, without management present.  The 
Internal Audit function has a direct reporting line into the Audit committee, but 
NEDs do not ‘head’ Internal Audit, as that is the role of Chief Internal Auditor: 
according to one Chair of Audit Committee, only 15% of their agenda is driven by 
the work of internal auditors.  
Keizer warns about “the false sense of security […] that risk oversight is 
“under control” simply because it has been assigned to a designated risk committee” 
(Keizer, 2010). That ‘sense of security’ inevitably varies from firm to firm, as does 
the division of the roles of risk and audit committees. An illustrative example, Table 
5.1 demonstrates the division of responsibilities in Morgan Stanley (chosen at 
random as one of the top investment banks): 
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TABLE 5.1: RISK AND AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARTERS 
Risk Committee15: 
Oversight of - 
Both Audit Committee16: 
 Oversight of - 
Risk Tolerance Risk Management Relationship w/ Independent 
Auditor 
Capital, Liquidity, 
Funding 
Coordination with 
Management 
Internal Audit Department and 
Internal Controls 
Chief Risk Officer Coordination with Other 
Board Committees 
Financial Statements, Audit and 
Disclosure 
  Compliance with Legal and 
Regulatory Requirements 
 
Looking at terms of reference of a risk vs. audit committee above, it is clear 
that while there is an overlap on overseeing risk management, the rest of the 
responsibilities are distinctive. When overseeing risk management, both committees 
“Review or discuss, as and when appropriate, with the Chief Risk Officer, the head 
of the internal audit department and other members of management, the Company's 
guidelines and policies that govern the process for risk assessment and risk 
management” (Morgan_Stanley, 2014a, 2014b), but the Audit committee is required 
also to “Review the major legal and compliance risk exposures of the Company and 
the steps management has taken to monitor and control such exposures” 
(Morgan_Stanley, 2014a) while the risk committee should “Review at least 
quarterly the major risk exposures of the Company and its business units, including 
market, credit, operational, liquidity, funding, reputational and franchise risk […]” 
                                                
15 Source: Risk Committee Charter (as amended May 13, 2014) - 
https://www.morganstanley.com/about/company/governance/pdf/rcchart.pdf?v=2014
0513 
16 Source: Audit Committee Charter (as amended October 31, 2014) - 
http://www.morganstanley.com/about/company/governance/auditcc.html 
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(Morgan_Stanley, 2014c). The Risk committee also receives reports “from the Head 
of the Internal Audit Department regarding the results of risk management reviews 
and assessments” (Morgan_Stanley, 2014c). 
 
When it comes to the fundamental different responsibilities of typical Risk 
Committees compared to those of Audit Committees, the former involve overseeing 
capital soundness (regulatory requirements, e.g. Basel for banks), overseeing stress 
tests, and ensuring that the firm has sufficient liquidity to cover increased demands 
in stressed conditions. In recent years, Recovery and Resolution Plans (colloquially 
known as living wills) have also become a major area of responsibility; living wills 
are highly technical forecast documents that explain how the financial institution 
would expect to wind down its assets and liabilities (without causing distress to the 
rest of the financial system) in the event of it no longer fully meeting regulatory 
requirements, while still trading. Risk Committees also oversee the pillars within 
the risk divisions, which typically are credit, market, and operational risk17.  
Some NEDs serve as members on both committees, and when it comes to 
granular issues within how to oversee risk management, for example, Chairs of risk 
and audit committee need to decide on the division of labour, and also typically, the 
Chair of Risk Committee sits on the Audit Committee and vice versa. Terms of 
reference create the official story about the operationalisation of risk and audit 
committees – they could be seen as a part of the ritual, in line with one NED who 
observed “I’ve been chair of risk committee for several years and I don’t look at the 
                                                
17 The role of the Risk Committees does, as expected, differ between financial 
institutions. For example, the 2013 Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 
report observed that: “In HSBC, the Group Risk Committee is responsible for 
'advising the Board on high level risk-related matters and risk governance and for 
non-executive oversight of risk management and internal controls (other than 
financial reporting). In Barclays, there are three different risk committees responsible 
for different aspects of risk: the Board Conduct, Reputation and Operational Risk 
committee; the Board Financial Risk Committee; and the Board Enterprise Wide Risk 
Committee”. (UK_Parliament, 2013) 
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terms of reference” (Interviewee_02, 2014), while another NED amplified that point 
further by explaining that communication with regulators and others in the field are 
much more useful than the terms of reference. 
It would appear that, internationally, UK corporate governance practice has 
led the way in this area, but risk Committees conceived on similar lines are now 
common in other jurisdictions: in December 2009 in the US, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) issued enhanced proxy disclosure rules in which it 
was emphasised that boards are responsible for risk oversight and “additional 
disclosure would improve shareholders’ understanding of boards’ roles in risk-
related practices” (Deloitte, 2010). The aim of these increased disclosure 
requirements is to “require companies to explain how the board administers its risk 
oversight function, […] and how employees responsible for risk management report 
to the board” (Deloitte, 2010). Partly as a consequence of this rule, and partly due to 
enhanced interest in risk oversight shown by other regulators, most US banks have 
now also introduced separate risk committees, which operate along similar lines to 
those in the UK. In the Eurozone, practice varies, but the larger banks (e.g. 
Deutsche Bank and Credit Suisse) also operate risk committees of a similar kind, as 
they are now deemed to be best practice. 
 
For Audit Committee members, the expertise requirement in the US has been 
defined as “past employment experience in ﬁnance or accounting, requisite 
professional certiﬁcation in accounting, or any other comparable experience or 
background which results in the individual's ﬁnancial sophistication, including 
being or having been a CEO or other senior officer with ﬁnancial oversight 
responsibilities’’ (BRC & NYSE, 2002). The Federal Reserve requirement for 
expertise of risk committees is “borrowed heavily from Securities and Exchange 
Commission and national securities exchange requirements applicable to Audit 
Committees” (Dentons, 2012). 
 
Indeed, the forward-looking approach could be seen as one of the reasons why 
risk committees are now seen by the board members as the most challenging 
committee to be a member of, which is demonstrated in a survey carried out by the 
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Per Ardua recruitment consultancy (Per-Ardua, 2014), in which 80 per cent of 
respondents said the Risk Committee was now the one committee which worried 
them most. The concerns expressed by the surveyed NEDs referred to the high 
degree of responsibility needed in order to understand the business and to the 
difficulty of forward-looking judgment based on what remains primarily internal 
information. An additional challenge could be that it might not always be clear what 
these different bits of required information are.  
The internal audit function does in theory provide an independent support for 
Risk Committee in their oversight role of the risk management function; however, 
there is no Risk Committee equivalent to the external audit function, which is 
intended to act as a source of independent information and, to a degree, of assurance 
to the Audit Committee. The independent information and assurance aspect of the 
external auditors’ work also means that the Audit Committee receives good practice 
feedback about how other firms are organised, while similar information is not yet a 
routine part of the Risk Committee’s world. The insurance company observed as a 
part of this research has now, however, commissioned an external report on the 
organisation and staffing of risk function in competitor firms. 
Risk committee members are an important part of the fabric of oversight that 
this research attempts to examine: so their views of, as well as their approach to, 
their role are significant. However, since Risk Committees in their current form are 
a relatively recent creation, there is little ‘off the shelf’ data on the subject. The 
difficulty of research access to boards is commonly recognised (Daily et al., 2003; 
Roberts et al., 2005), however whilst regulatory and corporate governance guidance 
leaves much to be defined, the semi-structured interviews were carried out in order 
to discover more about the live experience of the Non-Executives.  
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5.3. ROLE AMBIGUITY AND CONFLICT 
 
Based on the discussion of the historic evolution in the previous section, it is 
evident that the nature of the non-executive role has changed since the financial 
crisis and the Walker Review. As an example of this, according to a NED in a risk 
committee in a major retail bank: 
 
“After the financial crisis, it was much more on the question of safeguarding 
the future of the organisation, […] what would it take to make sure the 
organisation survived and could then emerge from the financial crisis? You 
know, that was not the focus beforehand.” (Interviewee_01, 2014) 
 
When describing his NED role, a chairman of the risk committee of a major 
insurance firm explained:  
 
“It’s a bit like flying a plane; it’s 95% boredom and 5% sheer terror”.  
 (Interviewee_06, 2014 on being a Non-Executive director) 
 
This interviewee continued to explain that while he has no actual management 
power, she does still have an important steering role: 
“I have no management role. As a Board Risk Committee you have no 
management role. You cannot take a decision […] everything is governance 
and oversight. And you use influence and respect I guess and the positional 
power to get management to do stuff” (Interviewee_06, 2014). 
 
Acknowledging that risk committees receive information from the risk 
management function, and also that many of them have held executive managing 
positions earlier in their careers, the Board-level interviewees were asked about 
balancing the management and oversight roles. 
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5.3.1. DISTANCE BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT 
 
Even though in theory, and indeed by definition, NEDs have no management 
role; in practice, due to their knowledge and experience, as well as the increasing 
expectations placed on them by regulators and shareholders, it can be difficult for 
NEDs to remain entirely separate from the management process. Their role is to 
oversee management, but the fuzzy borderline in the spectrum between oversight 
and execution is not always clear, and is affected both by dynamics within the firm 
and by regulators. As one interviewee explained this struggle:  
“The regulators now expect you to be far more closely involved in the 
business than you were before. So the line itself between accountability and 
the traditional role of the non-exec on the board and the management has 
shifted and finding your place in that is very difficult” (Interviewee_12, 2014). 
And, indeed, when asked about their role, interviewees’ answers fell along a 
spectrum, ranging from absolutely no intervention in managerial tasks to stepping in 
and managing when needed, although one particular interviewee advocated a very 
critically separate view, i.e.: 
“One of the phrases I rather like is kind of “nose in, fingers out” type of 
concept of the NED” (Interviewee_02, 2014). 
Therefore, interaction with management was frequently explained as more 
than merely getting management to “do stuff”, but actually involved non-executive 
support and certain encouragement of managerial actions as well: 
“A good board is one that challenges and does all of that sort of stuff but also 
is supportive and helpful when you want them to be, provided what you’re 
doing is sensible” (Interviewee_05, 2014). 
Together with encouragement and support, challenge while remaining distant 
from the executive decisions is another aspect of the NED role: 
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“One of the biggest challenges is to be challenging, understand the business, 
understand the people, stand back but then not get involved in the execution” 
(Interviewee_08, 2014). 
 
 One interviewee, who was a CRO in one firm before taking on the role within 
the Risk Committee in another, also pointed to the inherent difficulty of 
transitioning from a high-level management role into a Non-executive oversight 
role: 
“If you step back from being a hands-on manager and you simply just want to 
step in and say being prescriptive, you have to be very careful not to be 
prescriptive in areas - that’s management responsibility. You can suggest, you 
can encourage” (Interviewee_09, 2014). 
This polarity indicates that oversight could be defined negatively as ‘not 
management’, as the role of the NEDs according to the above quote is not 
management. Yet countering the prior point, another interviewee explained the 
value of providing hands-on interventions: 
“You would only intervene and manage if there was an absolute crisis and 
something was going wrong. And what you really have to do if the executive 
are not managing the organisation effectively, you have to decide whether 
with appropriate advice and coaching and whatever it might take, you can get 
them to manage the place effectively. If you can’t, you have to change them. I 
mean that’s ultimately what you have to do as a non-executive” 
(Interviewee_08, 2014). 
Regardless of which strategy a NED chooses to follow, one interviewee 
acknowledged that the act of ‘standing back’, even if she wants to, might not always 
be easy due to the external pressures: 
“There’s a little bit of a drift in financial services for the non-execs almost to 
be given executive responsibilities. There are times when you’re almost as 
though you are an executive. You can’t be an executive, you cannot be an 
executive” (Interviewee_04, 2014). 
A less expected theme that arose during the interviews was a clear need for 
balance as part of the dual nature (colleagues vs. overseers) of the Non-Executive 
role in a unitary board structure (which is the case in the UK, where a single board 
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of directors includes both executives and non-executives). In the US, where 
typically the only executive on the Board is the CEO who is often also the 
Chairman, the Board has more clearly an oversight role distinct from management 
than is the case in the UK. Non-executives in London are, based on the interviews, 
seen as colleagues of the executives, with shared responsibility for both the strategic 
decision and the success of the company, but they are also a part of the oversight of 
management – and very explicitly so in case of regulated firms.  
They are conscious of the need to balance the contradictory aspects within the 
role of being close enough to management in order to fulfil a role of a colleague, 
while distant enough to oversee, and generalist enough to identify broader issues 
while remaining enough of a specialist to understand issues at the required depth. 
This double dichotomy might make it seem an ‘impossible job’. Interviewees were 
particularly conscious of the need to be both critical and supportive:  
 “It’s very important not to try to second-guess the executive […] you have to 
go there, you’re there to operate governance which means challenge and it 
means sometimes criticism. But it’s also about encouragement and 
development” (Interviewee_05, 2014). 
To summarise, no ‘standard’ definition of the oversight role emerged from the 
interviews, mainly due to the fact that the definitions were full of contradictions and 
drew a complex multifaceted picture of the role. Respondents were preoccupied by 
the difficulty of defining a role which provided a useful check and balance on 
management without crossing the line into executive action, the main elements of 
such a role seemingly including a) an ability to stand back from day-to-day 
pressures, b) a longer-term frame of reference, and c) a focus on shareholder and 
regulatory interests, which may differ from those of management incentivised by 
near-term revenue and profit targets. But the borderline between risk oversight and 
management is clearly problematic for some NEDs at this point in the evolution of 
Board Risk committees. 
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5.3.2. WHAT IS SUCCESS? 
 
With an unclear definition of the role, and a complicated balancing act on the 
managing and oversight spectrum, a question about what constitutes success was 
asked. Criteria for success is a particularly complicated theme for NEDs, especially 
in cases of risk committees, where success might mean the lack of bad things 
happening and is therefore less easily auditable than in case of a profit-generating 
functions. This ambiguity in how to measure success makes the process of reaching 
decisions a regulatory and practitioner focus. Interviewees often defined success as 
an outcome of the group as a collegiate process, not at an individual level. The 
factors that were frequently identified by the NEDs as leading to success were: 
 
(1) Experience  
(2) Diversity 
(3) Group decision making 
 
From the interviews conducted it is evident that NEDs believe there is certain 
value in introducing a perspective on the business not informed by direct day-to-day 
involvement in management, but one perhaps influenced instead by experience 
gained in different types of financial firms or in non-related industries.  
 
“You need to have people that have been experienced […], that have 
worked in industries and have a depth of knowledge in at least one or two 
businesses, so not superficial knowledge but a depth and have very senior 
level jobs in one or two different businesses/industries” (Interviewee_09, 
2014). 
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Whilst appreciating background and experience, diversity is seen as a 
requirement in ensuring that the group dynamic results in the best possible outcome. 
Most UK boards have now formally committed to at least 25% female 
representation, following a 2011 review by Lord Davies (Davies, 2011). NEDs also 
see added value in group decision-making on risk, which is inherent in the 
introduction of a committee responsible for such wide array of tasks: 
 
“Good non-executives hunt in packs […] it’s groups of them rather than 
individuals is when they’re most successful” (Interviewee_06, 2014). 
 
The value of collegial decision-making is also manifested through the ability 
to interact effectively outside the boardroom in support of the formal interactions: 
 
“So you have to be able to not quite build alliances, that implies too formal 
a situation, but you have to be able to work with people effectively to test 
whether what you’re believing is right” (Interviewee_06, 2014). 
 
And yet, though they identify these potentially positive elements of non-
executive involvement in risk oversight, NEDs also acknowledge the difficulty of 
proving that the quality of decision-making, and that of risk management itself, has 
been materially enhanced as a result. Moreover, it have been suggested that NEDs 
are conscious of the need to show evidence of their own success and performance in 
addition to overseeing others: 
 
“You’re never quite sure what contribution you make because risk 
management’s kind of the dog that doesn’t bark […] if you do your job 
well, fewer bad things happen. But who’s to say whether they would or 
they wouldn’t have? It’s quite difficult to attribute success, it’s difficult to 
measure success” (Interviewee_03, 2014). 
 
In the absence of solid evidence applicable to their own roles, NEDs tend to 
emphasise their personal experience and the importance of judgment by the people 
who directly manage risks in the business, implicitly accepting the limitations of 
oversight as opposed to management; therefore, this interpretation attempts to show 
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that oversight actively influences the quality of management, rather than merely 
passively observing or second-guessing it. Counter-factual evidence is difficult and 
it requires time, since much of the success of risk management lies in the nature of 
problems avoided – things not happening – rather than in identifiable positive 
actions, although over time it may be possible to calibrate the influence of risk 
committees. When it comes to studying the way risk committees influence the 
businesses they are involved in, a parallel could be drawn to the way risk officers in 
Hall et al. (2015) gain influence. Hall et al. demonstrate two separate aspects of 
gaining influence: (1) interpersonal connections, and (2) toolmaking - the way risk 
managers “adopt, adjust, and reconfigure tools that embody their expertise”(Hall, 
Mikes, & Millo, 2015). The remainder of this chapter focuses on the connections – 
both interpersonal and formal - that NEDs described to be crucial to their role, and 
the following two chapters look at the organisational structures in place to ensure 
NEDs are able to successfully exercise their oversight role. This thesis does not 
specifically analyse the tools. 
On the opposite side of this argument, while there was a variety of definitions 
of success, which implies that success is a rather vague category, definitions of 
failure (and examples of difficult experiences they had to face) always turned out to 
be rather more specific and narrower, and these examples of difficult situations 
were always related either to changing and appointing people (usually management, 
but also other board members) or to events that happened as a consequence of the 
financial crisis, or of control failures within firms, or both.  
 
With all this in mind, it is safe to say that one provisional conclusion, albeit a 
broad one, from the interviews is that risk committees are still ‘feeling their way’ 
towards a stable definition of their roles and functions. It can also be argued that this 
stability will never come and indeed that risk committees might be an inherently 
ambiguous and unstable practice that is built on competing tensions. Some of these 
tensions might also still be present in audit committees and the board as a whole. 
Within the risk committees particularly, although they are now a fixed feature of the 
corporate landscape, at least in the financial sector where regulators mandate their 
existence, the practical outcomes of their work remain unclear and their impact on 
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the effectiveness of risk management has not yet been demonstrated.  The following 
sections examine how NEDs define their role, starting with a discussion of how they 
perceive their accountability and key relationships. 
 
5.3.3. LENGTH OF TENURE 
 
Another current issue within the area of corporate governance that is directly 
related to success (and independene) is the length of tenure that may be deemed 
appropriate for NEDs.  On the one hand, having recruited a successful risk 
committee member the firm might be interested in retaining that person for as long 
as possible, but, on the other hand, there is a risk that NEDs who are close to the 
business for too long may actually also become dangerously close to the executives 
and therefore lose their independence, in this case understood as their ability to 
bring an external perspective to decision-making18. Yet knowing the business well 
and understanding the people within the business are important in order to be a 
successful non-executive, and requiring people to move on after a few years could 
mean that the depth of interaction and business-specific knowledge will eventually 
be lacking. This tension between the need for independence and what is necessary 
in order to succeed in being a non-executive is a sensitive issue.  
Currently, in the UK, NED tenure is effectively limited to 9 years, typically 
divided into three three-year terms, with the requirement for a special review after 6 
years to justify a third term. Companies are entitled, under the ‘comply or explain’ 
provisions, to implement longer terms if they can produce a clear justification for it, 
but very few do so. Therefore, this bias towards rotation gives firms an easy option 
to remove people, but at the same time it introduces an element of difficulty for 
these companies to keep the people whose ongoing contribution would be most 
                                                
18 The issue of independence vs. tenure also is similar to the debates commonly 
discussed in relation to external auditors. 
 118	  
valued – this is, in effect, an asymmetrical option. Other comparable countries, 
notably the US, do not impose such arbitrary limits on tenure and, as a result, NEDs 
tend to stay longer in their posts, albeit as Risk Committees are a relatively recent 
introduction it is not yet clear how practice will evolve in this area. NEDs are also 
aware of this tension, and take diverse positions on the advisability of term limits:  
“Nine years is quite a long time […] six years is probably a bit better but 
then nine years is an absolute maximum. But I don’t think it’s just about 
the nine years, I think it’s about the whole dynamic of the board. So it’s 
not just how long each individual person sits there, it’s that the board is 
regularly refreshed and it only takes one new person […] the whole 
dynamic of the board can change” (Interviewee_08, 2014). 
 
While others explicitly link length of tenure to success and disagree with the 
currently imposed nine-year limit saying that: 
 
“I would define [success] as acquiring the respect of the business you 
know, the top team and other people. And really feeling you’ve acquired 
that. Really feeling you know the business. Unfortunately when you really 
do that they chuck you out because it’s the nine-year rule” 
(Interviewee_02, 2014). 
 
Term limits apply to directors of any given age, but the age of directors has 
also become a controversial point since the financial crisis and the failure of firms 
with some very elderly directors. A study of the 25 largest European banks by 
Nestor Advisers which compared the banks that failed and survived after the crisis 
shows, for example, that “there seems to be a discernible relationship between age 
and failure: the departed board directors were on average 66.5 years old while those 
of the survivors are 61” (Nestor, 2009), and while this study does not make any 
causal claims, this correlation might be worth noting and exploring further with a 
larger sample longitudinal study. In the UK, There is no mandated retirement age, 
but most companies include a cut-off in their own policies, often at age 72. 
 
A difficulty companies face is that the increasing time commitment required 
of NEDs works against the appointment of senior executives from other companies, 
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which is pushing firms towards the appointment of retired executives. On the other 
hand, the nature of the financial system is changing rapidly, making the experience 
of retired executives less relevant. The only proposed solutions to this dilemma are 
(1) the development of a cadre of ‘mid-career’ non-executives, but they remain rare, 
or (2) continuous education requirements on NEDs. In practice, regulators are 
promoting the second option. In the UK they now interview NEDs to assess their 
knowledge of new regulatory developments, for example, and require companies to 
develop training programmes for their NEDs, which are designed in particular to 
ensure that they remain aware of regulatory developments. 
 
5.4. ACCOUNTABILITY AND KEY RELATIONSHIPS  
 
A Wachtell Lipton19 memo on Risk Management and the Board of published 
in July 2015 observes: “2014 Annual Corporate Directors Survey reported that 84% 
of directors believe there is a clear allocation of risk oversight responsibilities 
among the board and its committees, which represents a modest increase from the 
prior year, but over half of these directors suggested the clarity of the allocation of 
these responsibilities could still be improved”  (Wachtell, 2015). This shows there is 
still some uncertainty about the role they play and about how the various 
committees position themselves on the boundary between oversight and 
management. Admittedly, this uncertainty might be inherent in the nature of the 
NED job, and is also partially the case for audit committees, but it is more extreme. 
That uncertainty about the nature of the Risk Committee’s work is particularly 
evident in the case of answers to questions about accountability, as well as about the 
relationships within and outside the firm between the Risk Committees and other 
sources of power and decision-making. 
                                                
19	  Wachtell Lipton is a New York law firm which is one of the leading corporate 
governance advisors to major US companies.	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The lack of clear definition regarding the expectations, success criteria and 
accountability of risk committee NEDs imply that they are, in a way, part of the 
phenomenon of experts competing “for visibility and voice in the competitive 
landscape of management practices and ideas”, because they need to establish both 
their role and usefulness (Guadalupe, Li, & Wulf, 2013; Hall, Mikes, & Millo, 
2013), while also establishing the scope and depth. Furthermore, this need to 
balance the scope and depth of the role is manifested through the expectation that 
they will “provide public demonstrations of performance through objective 
measures” (Gendron & Bédard, 2006). Overall, drawing parallels to the 1990’s 
audit quality discussion, risk management today could similarly still be 
characterised by “elusive epistemological character” (Power, 1999), implying that 
further clarification of the meaning and expectations of the roles could be needed. 
 
While there is no lack of vague information about the role of risk committees, 
when it comes to the particular points about the nature of the role, the guidance is 
often rather weak. Moreover, role ambiguity is manifested through the question of 
scope (what falls under the realm of the Risk Committee – if too many things do it 
might become unmanageable) and also depth (how deep are NEDs expected to go 
before they depart from their oversight role into a management role). Successful 
performance of NEDs is difficult to account for, so the notion of expertise is a hinge 
that can be seen as holding the system together. 
 
Roberts et al explore the roles of NEDs and suggest three linked sets of 
characteristics that NEDs should embrace. Specifically they state that NEDs should 
be: “‘engaged but non-executive’, ‘challenging but supportive’ and ‘independent 
but involved’” (Roberts et al., 2005). This taxonomy is helpful, up to a point, but the 
interviews suggest that NEDs find it difficult to achieve these three balancing acts. 
Balancing these various aspects of the role could be seen as one of the defining 
features of oversight, and the variety of the interview responses to the questions 
about what it means to be a successful NED demonstrates that the intrinsic nature of 
the role can be quite ambiguous.   
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 So, it is perhaps not surprising, against that complex and shifting background, 
that questions about accountability and relationships, within and outside the firm, 
elicit differing and in some cases hesitant answers, many of which are difficult to 
interpret. The three key relationships that risk committee needs to manage are 
discussed further in this chapter include those between the Risk committee and the 
top management, shareholders, and regulators respectively.  
 
5.4.1. CRO AND MANAGEMENT 
 
Although in practice there are many types and levels of interaction between 
Directors and management, both within and outside the Boardroom, the centrality of 
the relationship between Non-Executives on the Risk Committee and the CRO is 
nonetheless well understood.  
To give a few examples of how interactions between the boards and other 
corporate governance actors can be conceptualised: Roberts et al, in their study of 
board members based on 40 interviews within the UK firms, distinguish between 
‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ board members. Minimalist ones do not get heavily 
involved in the firm outside the board meetings while maximalist board members 
“build their organizational awareness and influence through contacts with executive 
directors, managers and other non-executives beyond the boardroom” (Roberts, 
McNulty & Stiles, 2005). Roberts and Stiles explain that “The most often cited 
description of the division of labour between chairman and chief executive is that 
the former runs the board and the latter the business”, and show the interaction 
styles between board and the management team in terms of competitive vs. 
complementary modes (Roberts & Stiles, 1999). While they acknowledge that while 
the separation between board and executives is crucial, they advocate an importance 
of a strong relationship between two.  
 122	  
During the conducted interviews, there was an identifiable sense of 
dependency on the CRO in order to be a successful Chair of a risk committee20; this 
is explained by the fact that the information flows towards the risk committee come 
primarily from within the organisation. Therefore, it is not surprising that almost 
every interviewee emphasised that it is crucial to maintain a close link with the 
CRO, as well as the importance of establishing mutual respect and trust  
“Formally I would see him one-on-one at least once a month. In reality I 
would see him probably once a fortnight/once a week. I’d certainly speak to 
him at least once a week. […] A good chair of the risk committee has a great 
relationship with the chief risk officer. You have to build a relationship of 
trust” (Interviewee_06, 2014). 
This important factor – keeping deep and open channels of communication 
between the CRO and the Committee – is always seen as a crucial one, with trust 
and interpersonal relationships at the core of it. To add to this, non-executives also 
tend to be particularly conscious of the danger of being kept in the dark and 
uninformed about problems and disputes within management and they see the CRO 
as their ‘eyes and ears’ within the company structure: 
 “I don’t think I could imagine myself sitting on a board in a company where 
there was any sort of mistrust or secrets going on between the executives and 
the board” (Interviewee_05, 2014). 
 
This is the reason why, the importance and intensity of the relationship with 
the CRO was repeatedly mentioned during the interviews, as manifested through 
frequent meetings and interactions which go beyond those related to formal risk 
committee meetings. It is worth noting that this relationship (with the CRO) was 
explained as a multi-faceted relationship as well as one which included a number of 
different ways of interacting. Here, these interactions are summarised in the 
                                                
20 For example, one of the interviewees said that in order to be successful, a chair of 
risk committee needs “a good chief risk officer who can present them with the 
information.” (Interviewee_03, 2014) 
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following categories which arose during the interviews, and were later organised in 
the chronological order: pre-approving board risk committee discussion points; de-
briefing after the meetings and agreeing action points; challenging and monitoring; 
and encouraging and motivating management.   
 
5.4.1.a. Pre-approval and Debriefing 
 
As shown earlier in this chapter during the discussion of the boundaries of the 
role, in terms of more direct involvement, NEDs are generally resistant to the idea 
that they might play a management role of any kind within the organisation; 
however, at the same time some NEDs do point to the important role they play in 
guiding and supporting management in general and the CRO and the senior risk 
management team in particular. 
 
“I chair the committee and I have a very intensive relationship with the chief 
risk officer, so I will meet with him twice a month […] Not always just him 
but his team as well. Either we’ll be going through what we want to present at 
the next risk committee or we’ll be going through a particular area of risk that 
we’re trying to develop” (Interviewee_09, 2014). 
Some of these meetings outside the boardroom are of a formal nature, such as 
the agenda approval process mentioned by this risk committee Chair in a major 
investment bank: 
“Before each meeting there is a formal session on the phone about the agenda 
where the CRO, the CFO, the Company Secretary, etc, talk through the 
agenda … and ask me for my views on the agenda points as well” 
(Interviewee_12, 2014). 
But some interactions and meetings seem to be less formal and part of the 
process of supporting management and providing feedback: 
 “I meet them before every meeting for a preparation for the meeting. […] 
And then I meet them after the meeting as a debrief to say what went well and 
what didn’t go well, what actions we’d taken away and how we prioritised 
those actions” (Interviewee_10, 2014). 
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In this context there is an evident sensitivity to the risk of generating 
potentially dysfunctional disputes between different elements of management, while 
recognising that the TLD model, and the challenge role of Risk Management, may 
make this inevitable at times. Chairs of Risk Committees typically see it as their 
role to attempt to head off disputes, which might otherwise surface at the 
Committee or at the Board: 
 “You don’t want to embarrass the executives if there are mistakes or you 
don’t want to show off, so there are some things I would just ring up the CEO 
and ask a question or say something’s wrong, you just don’t do that in a 
meeting. You want the meetings to be productive” (Interviewee_02, 2014). 
The desire for productive interactions also included the need to balance the 
monitoring and motivating aspects of the role, as shown in the following section. 
My sample included more references to monitoring and challenging rather than to 
motivating and encouraging.  
 
5.4.1.b. Monitoring vs. Motivating 
 
“I have a good relationship with the chief risk officer; it’s horses for courses. 
[…] I work together with him and his team very closely indeed. I have 
separate meetings with them and I’m kind of chief coach but also chief 
challenger. […] I think they would trust me to come and tell me about a 
problem, which is very, very important”  (Interviewee_08, 2014). 
 
Despite the great significance of the relationship between the Chair of the Risk 
Committee and the CRO, it is also understood that reliance solely on one individual, 
or indeed just on formal channels of communication, is unlikely to give a board 
member the full picture he or she might need. So, since tensions between the risk 
function and others within management are bound to surface, Board members 
frequently mentioned the importance of cultivating relationships with other 
executives, both inside and outside Risk Management. 
 
“I interact with the CRO and I interact with the people who work for him, the 
risk team. […] It’s always helpful to have informal contacts with other 
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members of the executive because I think when you have conversations with 
them about how they’re reacting to what the CRO is doing or what the risk 
department is doing, you can get a much better more-rounded view of how 
things are working out. […] It’s not about spying on the chief risk officer but 
it’s about just getting another perspective” (Interviewee_05, 2014). 
This interaction, with people in other functions as well as below the CRO, 
which is carried on in order to get confirmation about the CRO and the sufficiency 
of information provided, although seen as a challenge, is also perceived as a 
necessary condition of performing the NED role successfully:  
“There are a number of challenges; one is to develop good working 
relationships with the executives and also people at the next level down. 
Absolutely critical is the Chief Risk Officer and his staff […] the whole 
purpose of those relationships is not just for their sake and to have friends, but 
to make the passage of information to you, both formal and informal, much 
better. It’s essentially to form an opinion as to whether you can trust 
management because I think if you can’t trust the senior executives then 
probably nothing else you do really matters” (Interviewee_02, 2014). 
In addition, Non-Executives recognise that the Risk Committee is likely to be 
kept informed more fully – and respected more – if 1) it is seen as performing a 
useful function and 2) it is not trying to duplicate or replace management process.  
 “Trying in a sense to make the discussion more strategic than procedural, 
which is really difficult. It’s really difficult because you will be drawn into, 
especially in a regulated industry, a lot of talk about our compliance processes 
and our documentation processes. That’s an inevitable part of that world. And 
you know, that will crowd out the strategic discussion. So it’s a real balancing 
act” (Interviewee_02, 2014). 
This could be summarised in two key points. Firstly the Committee should 
perform a useful strategic function that does not in principle conflict with the 
management role, but rather supports it. That entails trying to ensure that the 
Committee continues focusing on a strategic oversight role (though that language 
was not always used by the Board members themselves). Secondly the Committee 
should provide a forum for accountability in order to make sure that risk managers 
have a space in which their concerns, when they have them, can be registered at the 
highest level within the company’s governance.  
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The fact that the CRO can raise his or her concerns at Board level strengthens 
the risk management function in its debates with line management. The CRO is not 
obliged to raise concerns, and may choose to conceal them, but the recommended 
governance procedures require the committee to conduct regular private sessions in 
which the CRO is asked to raise any concerns: a CRO who makes a conscious 
decision not to do so would then be left exposed to severe criticism if an 
undisclosed risk were to crystallise in the future. 
When it came to motivating and encouraging, this chair of a risk committee 
explained: 
“There’s numbers but in the end organisations are bundles of human beings. 
And if you don’t get the right human beings and you don’t motivate them in 
the right way, you’re not going to get the right outcomes. You can have sexy 
models coming out of your ears but in the end human beings are very, very 
clever and they will get round them. So if you’re not motivating people 
properly, if you haven’t got them engaged in the sort of vision then all these 
models eventually will be circumnavigated” (Interviewee_08, 2014). 
 
As described above, the CRO reports to the Risk Committee, but it is clear 
that her career prospects, and the day-to-day effectiveness of her work, are more 
dependent on the relationship with the CEO than that with the Committee, as the 
former is of a more continuous and granular nature. Therefore, were the CEO to be 
dismissive of the risk function or non-executives in particular, or to be uninterested 
in open debate, the task would become significantly more difficult to carry out – 
and perhaps even impossible.  
 
5.4.2. SHAREHOLDERS 
 
Although most respondents were very careful to point out that they are 
ultimately accountable to shareholders – in accordance with company law – for the 
most part that accountability is indirect: Chairs and members of risk committees 
rarely meet shareholders directly. Chairmen of Boards do so, however, and it is also 
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now general practice for Chairs of Remuneration Committees to meet the 
governance experts of institutional shareholders. But, in addition, some companies 
nowadays hold “governance days” in which all the main Committee chairs, as well 
as the Chairman, explain the work they do on behalf of the shareholders. Yet 
although this may one day evolve into common practice, it is so far experimental, 
and shareholders have shown little interest in engaging directly with Risk 
Committees.  
Potentially accentuated by the fact that most of the NEDs in the interview 
sample were involved in major global financial institutions, the practical distance 
between risk committees and shareholders might have been one of the core reasons 
why, while most interviewees mentioned the shareholders, they usually did so 
usually quite briefly and within the context of other categories of stakeholders; in 
fact, none of the interviewees pointed to any instances where their work had in 
practice been influenced by the views of shareholders.  
“Well the glib answer and probably the answer I would have given six years 
ago is the shareholders, we’re shareholder representatives. I think it’s a bit 
broader than that now in reality. I mean you know, I think you’ve got to take a 
slightly broader view of the key stakeholders, certainly the regulators want to 
co-opt us. I’m a bit uneasy about the extent to which they want us to be their 
eyes and ears” (Interviewee_11, 2014). 
Possibly as a reaction to the dispersed ownership, there are now also ‘proxy 
shareholders’, e.g. ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services is a firm that describes 
itself as a “provider of corporate governance solutions for asset owners, hedge 
funds, and asset service providers. ISS’ solutions include objective governance 
research and recommendations, end-to-end proxy voting and distribution 
solutions”). These firms in practice perform elements of the typical shareholder role 
for many institutional investors, and e.g. ‘police’ corporate governance compliance 
on behalf of the shareholders. When discussing shareholders, interviewees have not 
spoken about such firms. However, they did explain that their accountability to 
shareholders manifests itself in two ways: through management and through the 
regulators. 
  
 128	  
 
5.4.2.a. Manifested through management 
 
When it comes to understanding NED accountability towards the 
shareholders, a possible argument would be to view the responsibility to 
shareholders as manifested through interactions with management; and, indeed, 
while the NEDs are ultimately trying to maintain and enhance the value of 
shareholders’ equity, the active route to doing so passes through management, who 
make the practical day-to-day decisions. Therefore, shareholder accountability must 
also involve ensuring that management does make the right decisions.  
Acknowledging that ultimate responsibility of a NED to the shareholders, one 
interviewee explained:  
“I think it’s about the way one interacts with the management. The assumption 
is that the non-executive directors have a special role to play in terms of the 
future of the company as a whole, the long-term value of the company” 
(Interviewee_01, 2014). 
 
NEDs see that their main contribution to the maintenance of shareholder value 
lies in ensuring that there is a strong management team in place, and in this context 
specifically one which is able to navigate around life-threatening risks to the 
business. But regulators have also begun to discuss the threat of imposing a 
supplementary capital requirement (Bank of England, 2014) on firms whose 
governance they regard as weak, the so called ‘governance add-on’. Since such a 
requirement would have a real cost, it is intended to shape the focus on strong board 
governance processes, and the risk committee is a big part of that. 
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5.4.2.b. Manifested through regulators 
 
Another fact that was frequently acknowledged during the interviews is that 
for regulated financial firms the shareholder focus must increasingly be tempered by 
an awareness of the interests and views of regulators acting in the public interest: 
 “In order to survive as a bank after the financial crisis it was necessary to 
meet a whole new set of pressures […]. So the primary role of the bank 
remains to its shareholders but with very much a change in the focus and the 
intensity of the regulatory framework” (Interviewee_01, 2014). 
That theoretical relationship of accountability to the shareholders was indeed 
frequently seen as running through the regulators: 
“You can only discharge your responsibility to shareholders by having a good 
and compliant … not compliant in the sense of agreeing with everything that 
they say but compliant in the sense of obeying rules, relationship with the 
regulator. So one follows naturally from the other.” (Interviewee_04, 2014) 
Overall, while shareholders as a category were always acknowledged, it was 
also noted that they are abstract and remote: in most cases too remote to be 
influential. It is possible to interpret the fact that shareholder interests are 
manifested through two different proxies - in a way, creating an image of 
shareholders makes the NED role possible.  
In case of remuneration committees the accountability to shareholders has 
been formalised through the requirement to submit remuneration policies, and the 
remuneration reports, to an explicit shareholder vote. In a few cases, chairs of risk 
committees have invited shareholders to discuss their work, but there is no such 
formal nexus of responsibility, even though it is arguable that the activity of the 
Risk Committee is as, if not more, important from the perspective of maintaining 
shareholder value.  
 130	  
It seems possible that shareholders are taking some time to come to terms with 
the importance of the stewardship role of Risk Committees: so far they have 
devoted much more attention to audit and remuneration committees. One cause 
might be that it is harder to evaluate how well as Risk Committee has performed – 
business ideas not pursued due to a Risk challenge are by definition not visible 
externally, nor are risk mitigation measures.  Audit and Remuneration Committees, 
on the other hand, both typically have tangible annual outputs for shareholders – an 
external audit and a published set of directors’ pay and policies.  So it is not yet 
clear how the shareholders could become more engaged with the risk committees, 
even though they arguably have a more decisive impact on shareholder value: a 
malfunctioning system of risk management and oversight can be fatal for a bank, as 
the financial crisis vividly demonstrated. 
 
5.4.3. REGULATORS 
Responsibilisation from the regulatory perspective was discussed in the 
previous chapter. The following section aims to understand the NED side of that 
process, particularly when it comes to defining the NED roles. 
Interviewer: How often do you meet with the PRA21? 
Interviewee: As often as they want.  
The influence of regulators on Non-executive directors, and especially on risk 
committees, is now substantial. This relationship is, as the response shown above 
indicates, of an expectedly submissive nature. It is also the one area in which the 
views of respondents were at their most diverse and consensus is hard to find. This 
diversity of opinions might be attributable to the fact that risk committees are a 
comparatively new category of corporate governance and are thus still developing, 
                                                
21 PRA = Prudential Regulatory Authority. See Chapter 3 for more about the UK 
financial regulation. 
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but all interviewees agreed that the new approach taken by regulators since the start 
of the crisis had changed the nature of their role in a very fundamental manner. So, 
a typical response to a question about whether the interaction between NEDs and 
regulators had changed was: 
“Hugely! Until the financial crisis the regulator was an element, one among 
many elements. They were clearly there, everybody respected the role of the 
regulator but there were not … I’m trying to find the right word … The word 
omnipresent comes to mind” (Interviewee_01, 2014). 
This increased regulatory attention also means that there are heightened 
expectations and pressures on the NEDs, e.g. one interviewee pointed out that: 
 
“I think there’s a danger of expectations that you know, the regulators are full-
time, the non-execs are part-time but in a way that interaction will generate 
more and more expectation on the non-execs as agents of the regulators to do 
more and more” (Interviewee_02, 2014). 
Though all NEDs saw evidence of the same phenomenon of extended 
regulatory presence they were divided on whether this was a positive or negative 
development from the point of view of the effectiveness of their influence on risk 
management. So, when assessing the regulatory influence on board risk committees, 
one of the interviewees observed:  
“It is easy to emphasise what is difficult about the new system, and to be 
frustrated by the demands of regulators. But, overall, the introduction of a risk 
committee has sharpened the Board’s focus on what is going on in the 
business, and improved its understanding of how vulnerable the bank is to 
outside events. So it must be seen as a net positive, in spite of everything” 
(Interviewee_12, 2014). 
Interaction with regulators was also seen as a multi-dimensional issue that 
resulted in varied responses: some were quite positive and appreciated the value of 
information sharing and support that regulators give, while others were pensive 
about the confrontational nature of interaction within the boards which is 
accentuated by the separation between the NEDs and executives which in turn leads 
to possible unitary board concerns. Further, attitudes towards a newly formalised 
approach by regulators to assess the effectiveness of NEDs – the so-called ‘evidence 
of challenge’ – are discussed. 
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5.4.3.a. Support and information sharing 
 
Some interviewees leaned towards a positive view of the extended regulatory 
presence, focusing on the ability of regulators to provide an external and potentially 
useful perspective on the firm, which should allow the NEDs to carry out their role 
more effectively. Indeed, regulators have visibility of the strategies, governance and 
management practices of a number of firms, and should be able therefore, in 
principle, to compare, contrast and identify good practice. One respondent in 
particular saw this as a strong positive: 
 “They’re a great source of information. And fundamentally, you are on the 
same side as the regulator” (Interviewee_06, 2014). 
 
The same respondent also saw value in the more active approach now taken by 
regulators in the UK, and explained that this approach helps both communication 
and discussion between the NEDs and regulators: 
“The regulators have got more assertive which I think is a good thing. […] 
Because they should have the courage of their convictions and they should be 
willing to have a discussion with you […] they should be willing to say this is 
what we think” (Interviewee_06, 2014). 
 
Another view was to emphasise the way in which regulators are now using 
NEDs as a means to achieve their own objectives. Regulatory objectives are not 
necessarily always the same as those of the Board and shareholders, since 
regulators’ objectives, and their categorisation of risks to those objectives, are more 
naturally concerned with consumer protection and financial stability rather than 
with shareholder value – which is by definition the main concern of individual 
boards, and especially of the executive members who are incentivised to deliver 
profit and share price appreciation. 
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5.4.3.b. Confrontation and Unitary Board concerns 
 
Others were more concerned by the effects and implications of a closer 
engagement with regulators on both their traditional accountability relationships and 
on the nature of interactions on the Board between executives and non-executives. 
To demonstrate this point, one interviewee thought that the quasi-reporting line to 
regulators increased the ambiguity of their role and indeed created suspicion 
between the two categories of director, which might lead to the disintegration of the 
unitary board: 
“And then it’s inevitable that you feel you have a sort of kind of duty to the 
regulator as well because you’re almost like a mini regulator inside the 
organisation and yet you’re kind of a colleague of the execs, so you’re sort of 
in and out as it were” (Interviewee_02, 2014). 
 
In fact, this particular interviewee went further, arguing that a direct link 
between NEDs and regulators could be fatal to the traditional unitary board model 
operated in the UK: 
“It’s like putting a nail into the unitary board idea. So the non-execs, if they 
had more contact with the regulators they’d be increasingly perceived as part 
of that world by the execs. And that would be not good for kind of board 
unity” (Interviewee_02, 2014). 
 
In the last five years, regulators have moved from a “fit and proper test” for 
NEDs (which involved checking whether there is any negative reason related to past 
conduct not to accept an individual’s appointment) to a “competence test” (i.e. 
formulating a question along the lines of: is this individual competent to perform the 
particular role expected of him or her on the Board?).  
 “The regulators […] interview you and ask you questions about the detail of 
the business which in the past the chair of a risk committee or a board member 
would not have been expected to make” (Interviewee_12, 2014). 
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Another interviewee expressed a perception of an increasingly confrontational 
nature in the relationship between regulators and NEDs and, to demonstrate, 
mentioned the fit and proper and competence tests, which apply most explicitly on 
appointment but also influence the questioning of NEDs as part of their routine 
interaction with the regulators.  This was seen as a negative sign in one case – and 
one generating suspicion: 
“The regulators have definitely moved from trusting you to the not trusting 
you. They’re much more judgmental about individuals. They’re requiring 
much higher levels of technical, financial competence” (Interviewee_03, 
2014). 
 
The most frequently expressed concern relates to the way in which this new 
“reporting line” affects interactions between executives and non-executives within 
the unitary board framework. A regular line of questioning from regulators to NEDs 
now includes NEDs being requested to provide evidence of the Risk Committee 
having a direct impact on the business though effective control systems. While 
NEDs accept that it should be possible to show that they have performed a useful 
function, regulators tend to seek examples of differences of view between the NEDs 
and the executive as proof that the control system is working. This in turn tends to 
emphasise the distance between the two groups, which is uncomfortable in a unitary 
board framework, and also risks changing the dynamics of the role: 
“But there’s a slight tendency for the regulators to pit the executives and the 
non-executives almost against each other. So it’s as though you’re sitting on 
opposite sides of the table. And I think that’s an unhealthy thing” 
(Interviewee_04, 2014). 
 
The new and sharper focus on the nexus between regulators and individual 
NEDs has cut across the concept of the unitary board and the doctrine of collective 
responsibility. Boards are struggling towards a resolution of this conflict, in the 
absence of clear guidance from the regulators.  
  
 135	  
 
 
In the summer of 2015, recognising this guidance gap, the PRA organised a 
day-long seminar with NEDs built around a series of case studies designed to 
highlight uncertainties and disagreements about the role and responsibilities of 
NEDs generally, and Risk Committees specifically. Prior to this seminar, Chairs of 
Risk and Audit Committees and some other NEDs of major financial institutions 
received a multiple choice exam-style questionnaire with examples of case studies 
to be discussed. The cases were drawn from real-life examples of control failures 
and invited directors to assess degrees of responsibility in each case, as between the 
Chairman of the Board, the Chairs of Board Committees, and the executives. The 
regulators subsequently gave their view. This elaborate exercise is intended to lead 
in due course to the issuance of clearer regulatory guidance. 
 
5.4.3.c. Evidence of challenge 
 
A particular type of question, which appears to be common currency in 
financial firms today, involves the regulator asking for examples of circumstances 
in which the NEDs may have ‘challenged’ the views of Executives and either 
rejected or significantly altered those views. This so-called “evidence of challenge” 
is observed by the regulators through the minutes of board meetings as well as by 
sitting in on meetings and observing NEDs, and is done in a further attempt to 
resolve the agency problem between the regulators and NEDs. In some cases they 
have required skilled persons reviews (under Section 166 of the FSMA 2000) 
specifically focused on examining the effectiveness of risk management and board 
oversight. Those reviews involve extensive interactions between the reviewers and 
NEDs, under the guidance of either the Prudential Regulation Authority or the 
Financial Conduct Authority.  
Due to the fact that what happens within the boardroom produces limited audit 
trails, and estimating boards’ effectiveness can be seen as an example of “black 
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boxing” (Gendron & Bédard, 2006), regulators in the UK have introduced a 
requirement for boards to demonstrate “evidence of challenge” via “minutes and 
sitting in and observing Board and Committee meetings” (Deloitte, 2013b). Board 
minutes, however, do not necessarily provide evidence of challenge. While practice 
varies, and according to my observations within the firms as well as conversations 
with people on both types of boards, board minutes are more descriptive in the UK 
than in the US, even in the UK the minutes often do not incorporate difference of 
particular opinions discussed, as the primary function of the minutes within the firm 
is to provide clear direction to the executives by highlighting clear conclusions, 
rather than differences of view. 
According to the interviewees, regulatory interviews are now therefore 
peppered with the language of challenge, because regulators see this as an easy 
proof of NED effectiveness or otherwise; while the NEDs themselves, however, 
tend to see this as the reflection of a misunderstanding on the regulators’ part 
regarding the way in which a Board and its committees function: 
“The moment you make an outcome into a target you get some perverse 
effects. So what that has led to people being very concerned about questions 
they asked in board meetings that are actually minuted. I can perfectly 
understand where they’re coming from, boards should be very challenging and 
therefore they want evidence of it. But the very evidence process is something 
which can distort phenomenon” (Interviewee_02, 2014). 
 
Another interviewee was even more forthright and linked evidence of 
challenge as envisaged by regulators to failure: 
“The problem is that the regulators equate challenge as being a row. And 
actually that’s rubbish: if you get to having a stand-up row in the boardroom 
you’ve failed, almost certainly” (Interviewee_06, 2014).  
 
A third interviewee explained why the questioning reflected a poor 
understanding of the dynamics of coexisting within a collective governance 
framework. Indeed, it was evident from the interviews that demonstration of the 
evidence of challenge as an indicator of success was considered a deeply simplistic 
interpretation of the dynamics between NEDs and management, because it suggest 
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that management propose things unplanned and it is up to NEDs to reject them. In 
practice, however, a lot of negotiation happens outside these meetings. According to 
Interviewee 4, if that is how the problems were resolved it would not be a board that 
she would consider to be mature: 
“[FSA] once they asked me in an interview, ‘How often do you turn back the 
proposal from the management and ask them to go away and redo it?’ And I 
said ‘Well I would regard that as a failure, that’s not how boards should work. 
I shouldn’t be sitting one side of the table and the executive sitting the other 
and interviewing the management and receiving a paper by surprise and 
saying well you know, this isn’t good enough, go away and redo it. That’s not 
the way mature, adult stuff happens’” (Interviewee_04, 2014). 
This quote also demonstrates the earlier point that CRO and Risk Chair typically 
say they talk frequently formally and informally outside of the Risk Committee, 
therefore the challenge comes in those interactions rather than minuted in Board or 
Committee meetings. 
While a fourth respondent took a more nuanced view, accepting the fact that 
although it is not entirely unreasonable for the regulators to look for evidence of 
challenge, cultural factors made this more problematic in the UK context than 
elsewhere, perhaps given the polite and consensual way in which Board meetings 
are conducted. The question of whether this was a better or worse way of reaching 
tough decisions was left open: 
“You can easily write notes full of meetings full of biff-baff. What do they 
mean by challenge? Having a big row with somebody is not helpful, it’s not 
constructive, it’s not going to get their confidence in you. […] Challenge is 
really asking somebody the one question they hadn’t thought about and doing 
it in a way that they then go away and think about it and come back with 
something constructive. There’s also a stylistic thing, there’s a cultural thing 
as well; I mean we have incredibly forthright conversations in [another 
country] that I really don’t think you would have in a UK board, it’s just the 
culture there” (Interviewee_08, 2014). 
 
Not every NED agreed with the idea of evidence of challenge as perceived by 
the regulators, but NEDs do acknowledge that regulators are right to require the 
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boards to be challenging, because, as anecdotal evidence by a chair of a risk 
committee in an insurance firm suggests: 
“A lot of boards and board chairmen still don’t really want people on their 
boards who are going to be challenging. I mean they really don’t. On two of 
the boards I was hired on, the chairman said ‘I’m hiring you despite that I’ve 
been told you’re very challenging’ (Interviewee_08, 2014). 
 
While, at the same time, another interviewee also observed that evidence of 
challenge is not a perfect tool and trust is, ultimately, at the core of the relationship: 
 
“I don’t think you’ve got much alternative than to trust that the non-execs who 
were appointed [have] very independent personalities and will challenge” 
(Interviewee_02, 2014). 
 
To conclude, while it is evident that regulators have affected, and, as the 
interviewees have indicated, to some extent disturbed the balance between NEDs 
and executives – and perhaps also between them and shareholders – it is not yet 
clear whether this will over time produce a better functioning risk oversight and 
management system. Based on the evidence of these interviews, it would seem that 
NEDs are unsure, and on balance negative, about the recent changes they have 
witnessed.  The benefit of more engaged and diligent NEDs, conscious of their 
duties to regulators, may be at least partially offset by the creation of a more 
complicated decision making process. This is an area where further qualitative 
research, after the new arrangements have been in place for a few years, would be 
valuable. 
 
5.4.4. ACCOUNTABILITY AMBIGUITY 
 
Roberts et al. “suggest the merits of a focus, both theoretical and empirical, on 
the practical challenges that non-executives and boards face in creating and 
sustaining accountability” (Roberts et al., 2005) and warn that “The emphasis on 
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narrow, formal accountability within governance research presents an impoverished 
view of the diﬀerent forms that accountability can take” – which was one of the 
reasons that the core questions asked during the interviews were related to the 
NEDs’ sense of accountability. 
This chapter suggests Accountability Ambiguity, as a term to incorporate both 
the role ambiguity inherent in the NED role itself and the difficulty NEDs 
experience when trying to describe their accountability to others. Accountability is 
seen as a foundation stone of modern institutions (Douglas, 1986). Roberts et al. 
draw attention to the “very different potentials of remote accountability to investors 
and face-to-face accountability within the board between executive and non-
executive directors” (Roberts et al., 2005) – this was indeed indicated throughout 
the interviews, though unlike Roberts et al., interviewees in my sample paid 
particular attention to the regulators as important players in the accountability 
regime.  
While role ambiguity can be seen as being primarily intrinsic to the people 
experiencing it, accountability ambiguity implies uncertainty in external power 
relations, and is motivated by the question of to whom one is responsible. Roberts et 
al explain that within the governance research tradition, accountability “has 
normally been used synonymously with monitoring or, in some cases, compliance. 
This narrow approach suggests a hierarchical view of relationships, with executives 
scrutinised by the non-executives who determine and decide appropriate categories 
of conformance”, and instead they use ‘accountability’ with “a wider scope, and is 
intended to signal the potential for lateral processes of learning” (Roberts et al., 
2005). When studying public administration governance, Salamon shows that 
accountability is a “multifaceted concept fraught with ambiguity” (Salamon, 2002). 
Ambiguous networks of accountability, where NEDs need more clearly to define 
and balance their accountability to the rest of the board, regulators, and 
shareholders, lead to fuzziness in the boundaries of the NED role. 
Koppell describes the phenomenon of needing to be accountable to various 
parties “multiple accountabilities disorder” and explains that “conflicting 
expectations borne of disparate conceptions of accountability undermine 
 140	  
organizational effectiveness” (Koppell, 2005). In order to cure this “conceptual 
fuzziness”, Koppell proposes a separation between five distinct dimensions of 
accountability: “transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility, and 
responsiveness” (Koppell, 2005). According to Huse, more simply, “accountability 
is about balancing various board role expectations” (Huse, 2005). Accountability is 
a widely-researched subject in the social sciences and according to Williams and 
Taylor it “is known for its complexity, context dependence, and ambiguity” 
(Williams & Taylor, 2013), and speak about accountability ambiguity in the 
nonprofit sector. Here, however, I use ‘accountability ambiguity’ to demonstrate the 
conflicting accountability demands that NEDs face.  
At this point it is not clear whether these are transitional issues, related to the 
novelty of the role and structure, or, rather, fundamental tensions across a number of 
dimensions which point to the limitations of non-executive risk oversight and 
indicate a space within which the NED role is defined. 
The overall conclusions from the interview findings can be summarised in the 
following table, in three categories of contribution: when it comes to relationships, 
accountability, and boundaries of the role. Each of the rows could be interpreted as 
a spectrum, and also as a direction of change from more traditional to the emerging 
aspects of the NED role within the risk oversight. Additionally, there is also a 
tension between the two columns and NEDs are struggling to balance this tension. 
 
Table 5.2 rationalises somewhat beyond the review of interview findings, but 
is based on them. It presents an extrapolation based on other practitioner sources 
and conversations, and is therefore aimed to be a conceptual contribution to a 
discussion of the main areas of difference that the boards experience as compared to 
what they were like before the financial crisis. However, due to the fact that this is 
not a study that systematically compares evolution of the NED role across time, it is 
not possible to show each of these developments based on empirical evidence. 
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TABLE 5.2: STRANDS OF CHANGE 
Category Traditional Emerging Struggles 
 
Relationships 
  
Primary Role Friend of management Police/quasi-regulator 
Interactions Hierarchical, through CEO Web of interactions 
Regulators Support, info sharing Direct involvement/Unitary board 
concerns 
Decision-making Unitary Board Two classes of directors 
CRO interaction Motivation, 
Encouragement  
Monitoring, evaluating, 
challenging 
 
Accountability 
  
Accountability Main board Regulators/shareholders directly 
Shareholder 
responsibility 
Through management Also through regulators 
Success  Group decision making Individual expertise 
Effectiveness Process focused Strategic decisions (e.g. risk 
appetite) 
 
Boundaries 
  
Role Ambiguity Broad scope Deeper dives /customised focus 
Involvement Oversight Active guidance/management 
Board focus Risk a shared concern Delegated and compartmentalised 
Info methods and 
flows 
Internal/informal 
relationships 
Formal Management Info, 
external validation/check 
Time Commitment Intermittent/occasional Continuous 
 
This research explores how actors operationalise risk oversight, with a specific 
focus on the boundary issues created by TLD, risk committees and other oversight 
mechanisms: the issues that different actors face in negotiating the boundary 
between and oversight and management are discussed.  Chapter 5 has specifically 
focused on the role of the risk committee as seen by the risk committee members, 
and the boundary between the executive and non-executive roles. Oversight and 
management are set up as binary in formal prescription, while in order to 
operationalise it in practice, NEDs need to balance a number of struggles that were 
identified above. 
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5.5. CONCLUSION 
 
The overall picture that emerges from the findings of Chapter 5 is one of 
complexity and ambiguity, specifically in relation to the ideal compared to practical 
implementations of risk oversight. The findings also show, however, that there are 
important areas of agreement – i.e. those areas where all the interviewees are 
broadly consistent in their responses. Oversight is not a clean, clear-cut category, 
and one does need to take on varying roles in order to be able to perform effectively 
as a NED: role ambiguity and conflict are inherent in the role. Katz and Kahn 
conceptualise organisations as being “roles or clusters of activities expected of 
individuals” (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Indeed, NEDs are balancing many potential 
tensions that can’t be distilled into a simple framework. The nature of risk oversight 
is that it is very relationship-focused, and could be better characterised as a “web of 
governance” rather than as a traditional hierarchical representations. Roberts et al 
suggest that board effectiveness depends on the “behavioural dynamics of a board, 
and how the web of interpersonal and group relationships between executive and 
non-executives is developed in a particular company context” (Roberts et al., 2005).   
Risk Committee members are uncertain about aspects of their roles e.g. 
accountability and success criteria - talking variously of being responsible to the rest 
of the Board, shareholders and regulators. This might be exacerbated by the 
comparative lack of guidance on what a Risk Committee should do, as compared to 
an Audit or Remuneration Committee.  
 
Interviewees were broadly consistent in maintaining that NEDs should stay at 
the level of oversight and not involve themselves in management, except to change 
management when they are dissatisfied with management’s work. They were also 
consistent that in spite of being removed from decision-making, non-executive 
oversight can nonetheless add value. Thirdly, they all see themselves, at least to a 
certain extent, as proxies for external regulators, focused on compliance with 
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regulatory requirements. The final area of agreement is their acknowledgement that, 
regardless of formal reporting lines, close personal relationships with key staff are 
still essential, in order to allow the free flow of information that enables NEDs to 
make a balanced assessment of the effectiveness of risk management in the 
business. 
 
There are also other areas where their views diverge, and where the definition 
of the NEDs’ role is still not clearly stabilised, with considerable uncertainty about 
the eventual outcome. The PRA’s case study exercise, when different NEDs (and 
regulators) gave various arguments to questions about their responsibilities, 
confirmed that uncertainty while seeking to resolve it. Out of all these areas of 
disagreement, the nature of accountability is the most vivid example: while some 
NEDs see the risk committee as nothing more than a special group within the 
Board, which reports to the Board alone, others are however more conscious of their 
direct links with regulators and, in some cases, with investors. As this shows, 
consensus on the accountability framework is most definitely lacking. 
 
Another area of uncertainty relates to indicators of effectiveness, especially in 
the absence of external sources of information as well as of external measures of 
success. NEDs are uncertain about how to measure their success, and some of them 
fear that an excessive focus on process may cause them to lose sight of the big 
strategic questions which, according to their view, should remain the Board’s main 
focus. 
 
The next chapter shows how the central problem of boundary definition 
between oversight and management is played out in different areas within the 
businesses themselves - e.g. how involved the central risk management line should 
get with the activities of the first line.  
 
Board Risk committees and how they work is now the central issue in risk 
oversight in financial firms. That is why I spent a lot of time interviewing NEDs to 
discover: 
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-­‐ whether they are aware of the crucial role they play 
-­‐ whether they believe it is possible to deliver on the regulators’ expectations, 
and therefore 
-­‐ whether it is reasonable to place heavy reliance on this oversight mechanism. 
 
The conclusions are that NEDs are part-time and often not experts in risk 
management, but have been treated as a core control mechanism. They are 
uncomfortable with the new role definition and are struggling to meet it: indeed, 
there is confusion about their responsibilities and accountability and they see the 
new regulatory focus as cutting across the role of the unitary board. Information is 
easy to talk about conceptually but harder to operationalise, which is discussed in 
more depth in Chapter 7. It was also made clear that they see their effectiveness as 
heavily depending on personal relationships, which is not captured in the models of 
how oversight works. In particular, they depend very heavily on being given timely 
and accurate information. Yet that information comes almost exclusively from 
within the firm, and therefore information intermediaries, who process that 
information, play a crucial role. The following chapter discusses risk management 
functions within the firm, and the last empirical chapter after that looks at the 
information flows involved in the interaction between NEDs and the risk 
governance within the firms. 
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CHAPTER 6: RISK OVERSIGHT IN MANAGEMENT  
6.1. THE THREE LINES OF DEFENCE (TLD) 
 
Both risk governance and internal risk management systems within the firms 
themselves are widely perceived to have failed in the years leading up to the global 
financial crisis in 2007 (UK_Parliament, 2013). This chapter follows the discussion 
of the board risk committees because boards need the systems within the firms in 
order to empower them to perform their role. It uses document analysis of 
regulatory and consultancy documents, as well as interviews and field observations 
in order to understand the nature of the risk management and risk oversight systems 
within firms: how is risk oversight operationalised at the organisational level in 
financial institutions? 
To answer that question, the specific focus of this chapter is on the Three 
Lines of Defence (TLD) model, which is treated by both regulators and consultants 
as “an embedded feature of a corporate governance framework” (FOO, 2012). As 
throughout the rest of the thesis, agency is used as an underlying perspective to 
understand the relationships that emerge when the TLD is implemented in practice.  
The exact numbers for the whole financial services industry are difficult to 
compile, but according to EY’s risk survey of asset management firms in 2012: 
“83% of firms have already formalized their three lines of defence” (Ernst&Young, 
2012), and according to KPMG, “the vast majority of UK ﬁnancial services ﬁrms 
employ the traditional22 ‘3-Lines of Defence’ model, with clear demarcations 
between each line in the management of risk” (KPMG, 2012). An annual report by 
                                                
22	  It is noteworthy that in 2012 KPMG speaks about the ‘traditional’ TLD model, 
without giving an explanation of when it became a tradition or entered the lexicon. 
This is demonstrative of the way it has been used by many consultancies over time.	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PwC observed that “A governance structure based on a “three lines of defense” 
model is emerging as a leading practice in the [insurance] industry” (PwC, 2013), 
and according to the 2015 EY CRO survey, 74% of insurance institutions have 
formally adopted the Three Lines of Defence model (EY, 2015).   
As a visual representation of the idealised Three Lines of Defence model, 
Table 6.1 demonstrates the three lines of defence as defined by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision’s report under the title “The internal audit function in 
banks”, published in June 2012. According to this report, the first line of defence is 
risk management within the Front Office, which is the primary source of income in 
banks; the second line of defence includes support functions, such as Compliance, 
Legal, Human Resources, and Risk Management and the third line of defence is 
Internal Audit, which focuses on the observation and evaluation of the effectiveness 
of Risk Management as well as other conduct within the business. 
TABLE 6.1: THREE LINES OF DEFENCE EXAMPLES AND APPROACH 
 
Source: (Bank for International Settlements, 2012) 
 
Both risk management and internal audit are performing an oversight role over 
the first line. However, a clear separation between risk management and internal 
audit has crystallised in recent years – nowadays, as is shown below, and despite 
some disagreement on precisely which functions go into which line of defence, 
there is unanimous agreement across firms that risk management and internal audit 
must remain separate from each other and belong respectively to the second and the 
third lines of defence in the TLD model. 
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The board of directors, including the audit and risk committees of the board, is 
not a defence line by itself, but a part of the reporting structure, which is usually 
mentioned in the charts describing the organisation of the business: second line 
reports into the board risk committee and third to the audit committee. The 
supervision of risk internal to the business areas, conducted within these fields, is 
what came to be known as “the first line of defence”, while the other two lines are 
normally found in an explicitly separate, independent risk management function at 
corporate or group level and in the internal audit department, respectively.  
Early descriptions of the Risk Management framework for banks, articulated 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, considered risk management and 
audit together: e.g. its 1999  “Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking 
Organisations”, in discussion of oversight argues that “there are four important 
forms of oversight that should be included in the organisational structure of any 
bank in order to ensure the appropriate checks and balances: (1) oversight by the 
board of directors or supervisory board; (2) oversight by individuals not involved in 
the day-to-day running of the various business areas; (3) direct line supervision of 
different business areas; and (4) independent risk management and audit functions” 
(Bank for International Settlements, 1999); which, although not an explicit 
reference to the three lines of defence model, is very similar to the TLD approach. 
As nowadays the Three Lines of Defence is “widely used within firms” (Bank 
of England, 2015), it is often taken for granted, as is evidenced by e.g. the most 
recent Financial Stability Report published by the Bank of England in July 2015 
stating as one of the root causes of misconduct in the financial markets: “Systems of 
internal governance and control that placed greater reliance on second and third 
lines of defence than on trading or desk heads”. Indeed, this report assumes 
common understanding about the meaning of second and third lines, and is also 
treating them as an organisational fact.  
In order to understand how the TLD fits into the hierarchy of oversight within 
the financial institutions, this chapter first investigates its origins and emergence in 
regulation. It then demonstrates the variety of ways different practitioners 
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understand it. Finally, the chapter looks at the practical operational challenges 
involved in its implementation.  
 
6.1.1. HISTORY  
 
The TLD language was used in all organisations I have observed or otherwise 
interacted with throughout this research. The Chief Risk Officer of Aviva Europe, a 
major insurance firm, wrote: “It needs to be stressed that risk management is not 
only carried out by the risk management function, but by the whole organisation. 
The organisation can be split into the so called three lines of defence” (Koller, 
2011). 
Historically, although there is no consensus on how the three lines of defence 
concept entered the risk domain, there are some sources (Bonisch, 2013) which 
observe that it might have originated from either the military or from the field of 
sports. Search results obtained on Google Scholar23 included studies from journals 
as diverse as Parasitology, Veterinary Studies, and Petroleum Engineering, while 
the entries about risk management focused primarily on operational risk. When 
using the American English spelling of the word (defense instead of defence), the 
search24 resulted in entries from journals on Nutrition, Medicine, and Terrorism. On 
Google, the search outputs prior to 2003 were primarily about immunology and 
warfare. There are also defence lines in American football and basketball (though 
not normally three), but it is unclear how the idea transferred into the language and 
practice of corporate governance and risk management. 
                                                
23 Scholar.google.co.uk Exact search term: “3 lines of defence”. Date: June 5, 2013. 
14:16GMT 	  
24 Scholar.google.co.uk Exact search term: “3 lines of defense”. Date: June 5, 2013. 
14:52GMT 	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The first reference related specifically to the financial sector that I identified is 
by Roman Kräussl, from the Center for Financial Studies at the Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt in 2003, who speaks about the “lines of defense 
against systemic risk in international financial markets”, by this meaning “market 
discipline, prudential supervision and regulation, and macro-prudential 
surveillance” (Kräussl, 2003). The focus of this thesis, however, lies on the more 
recent use of the three lines of defence model within organisations, rather than a part 
of regulatory landscape. The following section examines the emergence of the firm-
level TLD concept within the UK regulation. 
 
6.1.2. EMERGENCE IN REGULATION  
 
The first reference to the ‘Three Lines of Defence’ in the FSA’s publicly 
available documents dates from 2003: "A number of firms had adopted a ‘three 
lines of defence’ approach, where business line management provided the first line, 
risk functions the second line, and internal audit a third line (each of which reported 
into different executive management)" (FSA, 2003). It would appear from this 
statement that firms had adopted the three lines of defence model without the FSA 
requiring them to, though it is not clear what the driver for this adoption was. And 
while according to some consultants (Burden, 2008) the FSA required firms to take 
the three lines of defence approach to risk management in their 2003 ARROW 
(Advanced risk responsive operating framework) review, I was not able to observe 
this practice or confirm it from the documentation (FRC, 2010a). 
One Chairman of a risk committee in a major financial institution confirmed 
during the interview that the TLD terminology emerged quite late in the day to day 
vocabulary of risk management in banks:  
“I didn’t actually hear much about it until 2007 or 2008. At that point I’d been 
in banking for 12/13 years and I don’t even remember it being said” 
 (Interviewee_07, 2014) 
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In the UK, the codes of practice in the corporate governance area have been 
articulated by a series of reviews commissioned by the Bank of England, HM 
Treasury and other bodies; their reviews typically have received significant input 
from the practitioners during their production and they are implemented on a 
“comply or explain” basis. So risk management is covered by a complex mixture of 
black letter regulatory requirements and softer, practitioner-driven guidance 
embedded in codes of practice, sometimes ‘adopted’ by regulators as appendices to 
their rulebooks. Chapter 3 covered different regulatory practices in more depth. It is 
important to point out that the two most relevant events regarding the three lines of 
defence framework were the Cadbury review which in this context focused on audit 
committees, and the Walker review (Walker, 2009), which institutionalised board 
risk committees.  
The Cadbury review, discussed in Chapter 4, does not mention the “three lines 
of defence” model explicitly, but some of the points discussed are fundamental to 
three lines of defence. Specifically, Cadbury suggested division of responsibilities, 
such that no one individual has complete powers of decision, and at least three 
independent Non-Executive directors should be present on the audit committee in 
order to oversee the financial reporting. This narrative of separation of 
responsibilities and independence of oversight has a strong resemblance to the way 
TLD is spoken about. The Walker review of Corporate Governance also does not 
contain an explicit reference to the TLD, but it takes audit committees for granted 
and explains why risk committees are necessary, thus assuming the third line as 
being in place and suggesting board-level oversight of the separate second line. 
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6.1.3. POST - CRISIS 
 
As was demonstrated in Chapter 4, in 2010, as a consequence of the global 
financial crisis and the Walker review, the UK financial regulator became far more 
interested in risk within the businesses themselves and with the way these risks are 
managed internally. The FSA no longer limited itself to external oversight of 
prudential soundness and business conduct, but instead became increasingly 
involved in the way firms should organise risk oversight internally. While the Three 
Lines of Defence framework has been institutionalised into a common practice in 
most financial institutions in the UK, it is unclear whether this is a mere 
repackaging of the structures which had been in place before or is indeed a 
significant alteration of the substance of risk management practice – one might 
argue incorporates elements of both, but further is needed to confirm that 
hypothesis.  
The FSA’s consultation paper on “Effective corporate governance: Significant 
influence controlled functions and the Walker review” published in 2010 included 
the first mention of the term “Risk Oversight” identified in any publicly available 
documents. The FSA also stated, in the same paper, that “we have long stressed the 
importance to regulated firms of an effective and independent risk oversight 
function (‘second line of defence’)” (FSA, 2010b). So, here, the FSA treated the 
independent risk oversight function as something which had always been required 
and which had been discussed before; additionally, the wording of this sentence 
implies that risk oversight is also something that has always been done, but I have 
not found any evidence of earlier mentions in their publicly available documents. 
The sudden emergence of the Three Lines of Defence framework could be seen as 
symptomatic of the increased emphasis of the regulatory focus on risks within firms 
which was tracked in Chapter 4. 
 152	  
The impact of these new regulatory requirements, particularly the increased 
role of the risk function, as recommended by Walker, was very evident at the firm 
where I conducted a participant observation in 2012 – i.e. the role of the CRO had 
indeed changed after the financial crisis and now he reports directly both to the 
CEO and Chairman of the Board (the same person in the US context). There now 
also is an added parallel reporting line to the Risk Committee, who must also be 
consulted on the CRO’s remuneration, while previously, the CRO only reported to a 
business head. This demonstrates that the role of the CRO and the risk committee 
has become more important and the risk profile became a starting point for 
discussion instead of looking at transactions purely in terms of expected returns.  
Non-executive directors now generally accept that TLD is the standard 
structure for the effective risk management framework, one risk committee chair 
characterised it as “as good a model as any to be honest and probably the least 
worst” (Interviewee_05, 2014). Another described it as a “well-tested model for risk 
management and control” (Interviewee_07, 2014). But they are not uncritical. One 
suggested that the model could downplay the importance of strong risk management 
in the business areas themselves: “not enough emphasis is placed on the first line of 
defence which is management […] the first line of defence is the most important 
line” (Interviewee_07, 2014). Another underlined the point more firmly “my 
problem with it is when fundamentally the responsibility for the risk gets taken 
away from the business because ultimately it’s the business that manages the risk. 
[…] the three lines of defence is useful but cannot take away the responsibility and 
accountability from the firm” (Interviewee_06, 2014).  
A related concern is that TLD might result in an excessively bureaucratic, 
costly, and demotivating approach to risk management. One interviewee suggested 
that: 
“You can be quite good at managing your business, your risk, your strategy, 
but the other key part is about doing it efficiently. You could have a very well 
controlled business by having somebody sitting next to everyone checking 
everything that they do. Everything front to back from the minute a client’s 
account is opened or an order is taken, you could have a risk person or a 
compliance or an audit person shadowing everything; that would be kind of 
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safe. It would also be kind of expensive and not a very nice place to work 
probably” (Interviewee_07, 2014). 
This explanation clearly demonstrates that while adding layers of oversight 
might make the processes safer, firms have to be cautious to do so without getting 
into unreasonable detail as Interviewee 7 explained. The request to add more 
oversight whenever things go wrong is an easy one to make, but questions about 
efficiency remain to be answered.  
Additionally, despite being universally accepted as something that is done, 
and also appearing so clear, with each line being separate and distinct in writing, 
there is still some significant disagreement about particular aspects of the model, 
and considerable divergence in the manner of its operationalisation within firms. 
The regulators’ and consultants’ theories must be translated into the reality of 
oversight and management from day to day: that can be a messy process, as the 
following section demonstrates. 
 
6.2. AMBIGUITY IN DEFINITIONS 
 
Since in the spirit of its principles-based regulation, the FSA did not offer an 
explicit explanation about how the three lines of defence model could be introduced 
into organisational practice, as a result there are a number of different 
representations created by consultants of what the idea of the three lines of defence 
might look like in reality. 
Three Lines of Defence in practice, while it is common use, has varying 
interpretations. Below is a sample of four different representations by the major 
audit firms of the three lines of defence model. As a side note, these representations 
are not typical of every existing consultancy report and they are shown to illustrate 
the range of models described rather than to attempt providing an elaborate 
understanding of what the variation is like. 
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The depictions by PricewaterhouseCoopers, KMPG, Deloitte and EY were 
chosen, as these are the so-called “Big 4” audit firms, which advise the major 
financial institutions like those where field immersions and interviews were 
conducted. They each give prominence to the internal audit function in their models, 
which is perhaps not surprising given the source. 
While a common pattern amongst all these representations is the fact that each 
line is separate and distinct from the others, in practice when analysing 
organisational charts it became evident that these separations might be much more 
difficult to achieve due to the complexity of the organisation and also to the fact that 
people might have overlapping roles or might have to work together in the long-
term and might, as a result, have different incentives. Therefore, the TLD model 
provides an idealised view of how these functions should interact with each other 
and with management above them. 
One interviewee, a Risk Committee chair, while regarding TLD as “absolutely 
appropriate” in theory, drew attention to the practical complexity of determining 
appropriate reporting lines: “they should have clear and independent reporting lines 
[…] you should separate the three lines at the highest level [but] one of the biggest 
problems I’ve seen is actually a second line of defence that is not separate from the 
business […] and it’s not separate far enough up. […] think risk and control 
functions should be independent as far up the chain as they can” (Interviewee_07, 
2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 155	  
FIGURE 6.1: PWC TLD FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Source: “Effective Internal Audit” (Pwc, 2015) 
 
FIGURE 6.2: KPMG TLD FRAMEWORK 
 
Source: “The Three Lines of Defence” (KPMG, 2013b) 
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FIGURE 6.3: EY TLD FRAMEWORK 
 
Source: “The Three Lines of Defense in Effective Risk Management and Control” 
(EY, 2013b) 
FIGURE 6.4: DELOITTE TLD FRAMEWORK 
 
Source: “Internal Audit in Financial Services” (Deloitte, 2013a) 
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The table below provides a summary of the exhibits above from the Big Four: 
TABLE 6.2: SUMMARY OF BIG FOUR REPRESENTATIONS 
 1st line 2nd line 3rd line 
PwC Controls: IT, HR Risk 
Management/Compliance 
Internal Audit 
KMPG Business 
Operations 
Oversight Functions, HR Internal & External 
Audit 
EY BU Processes Compliance/RM Internal Audit 
Deloitte Management 
Controls/Internal 
Controls 
Compliance/Risk Control Internal Audit 
 
Although the first line includes the business units in all cases, PwC also 
include Information Technology, governance, and Human Resources (HR); and 
although the second line always includes risk management and compliance, KPMG 
adds HR to the second line. The fact that KPMG is the only one of the four that 
places HR above the business unit risk management is surprising, since risk culture 
stems from the people hired and, thus, HR plays a crucial role. However as HR is 
not involved in direct business decisions regarding transactions and limits, it would 
also make sense not to include it into the framework. 
McKinsey’s definition is completely epistemologically different in “Getting 
risk ownership right” is demonstrated in Figure 6.5 – since Mckinsey is a leading 
management consultancy, it could be seen as surprising that their conceptualisation 
deliberately diverges so much from those of the Big 4. It emphasises the qualities 
needed in a firm to ensure satisfactory risk oversight and management, rather than 
the organisational structures and checks and balances between the lines. This might 
suggest that TLD is heavily driven by the idealised work of auditing (and risk 
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management) professions, potentially attempting to define and give themselves a 
role.  
The standard definitions of TLD as those by the big 4 suggest separate 
processes working in sequence, with each following line capturing any issues that 
might have been missed by the previous one. In case of McKinsey’s representation 
the sequence is not obvious, and TLD is conceived not as organisational layers of 
oversight, but rather as a way of slicing business into the range of activities within 
the firm, based on how macro-or micro they are: with “categories” ranging from 
individual, to business unit, to portfolio – level. 
 
FIGURE 6.5: THREE LINES OF DEFENCE ACCORDING TO MCKINSEY  
 
Source: Getting risk ownership right (McKinsey, 2010) 
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In 2012, however, in a paper on “Enterprise risk management: What’s 
different in the corporate world and why”, McKinsey defined TLD as  
“A common framework for risk management, especially in the financial 
sector, is that of “three lines of defense,” the first being line management/front 
office, the second the risk- management function (and/or other control 
functions), and the third compliance and audit. This framework is typically 
brought out to emphasize that the risk-management function does not operate 
in isolation, and that robust risk management requires all three defensive lines 
to be in place” (McKinsey, 2012).  
This definition is, except for the role of compliance, entirely in line with those by the 
Big 4. 
In 2014, as demonstrated in Figure 6.6, McKinsey presented a more 
conventional view of the lines of defence, though it still varies from those by the 
Big 4, and includes a separation by the scope of risk. 
 
FIGURE 6.6: THREE LINES OF DEFENCE ACCORDING TO MCKINSEY IN 2014 
 
 
Source: “Enterprise-risk-management practices: Where’s the evidence?” 
(McKinsey, 2014) 
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McKinsey mentions risk committees in the third line, and audit and 
compliance in the second line. Based on observations during the field research, 
compliance might also belong to the first line, since these people support both the 
first and the second lines, and the distinction between the two is blurred. The main 
blurring, however, could be attributed not to whether a given activity belongs to the 
first or second line, but the inconsistent use of the term “Compliance” and the 
activities it encompasses. At its widest, it is used to cover the scrutiny of a new 
client instruction form for confirmation that it meets the relevant conduct 
requirements (anti-money laundering, best advice, treating customers fairly, 
understanding customer needs etc.)  Such scrutiny could be in the form of taking 
random samples or be part of the process prior to the instruction going live. The 
intermediary may refer to the proposal needing to go through the company’s 
compliance team before being issued – in practice this is always a first line activity; 
unless the Sweeting “offence and defence” model is militantly followed (see more 
on this model below). 
At the other end of the spectrum, a business may have a head of Compliance 
and Regulation (or a similar title) – a second line role that will oversee the 
formation and effectiveness of compliance policy and articulate the appetite for 
compliance risk.  This person and their team will ensure that the two functions 
described above exist and are effective as well as requiring material breaches to be 
escalated for inclusion in management information within a risk report. 
According to a senior manager in a risk division of an insurance firm, while 
HR is in charge of remuneration, which thus in theory gives them control over risk 
behaviour and incentives, in fact HR people do not have the power to change risk-
taking behaviour in more direct ways, whereas line management of each division is 
more important in determining remuneration structures. HR, however, can have an 
impact on the way TLD becomes crystallised within the organisational setting by 
changing the ways employees within different lines are remunerated. To 
demonstrate, in one institution I observed, the 1st and 2nd line staff received annual 
bonuses which were split into a component based on personal performance and a 
component based on corporate performance (the latter being a stated formula based 
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on the key financial metrics for the calendar year, a simplified version of the Total 
Shareholder Return metrics that typically underpin the vesting of executive share 
options).  While the actual split varied by grade, 50/50 was not uncommon.  The 
third line staff however did not have a corporate performance bonus component; 
their entire bonus was based on personal performance.  According to a conversation 
with a senior director in that firm, the rationale was that internal auditors should not 
feel conflicted if they had cause to unearth a serious audit issue that would lead to a 
hit to published results and hence a lower bonus. 
When a new Group CRO was appointed in that institution, briefly before the 
period of my observation, he together with HR decided that the 2nd line was also 
exposed to such a conflict and were therefore moved to a 100% personal 
performance bonus structure.  A senior interviewee within that firm explained that 
in his opinion: “I saw this as an unhelpful portrayal of the role of risk: risk should 
help the company generate better decisions, meaning ones that suitably reflect the 
risk-reward trade-off.  So I saw it as entirely consistent that by challenging a 1st line 
proposal, I was helping achieve a better overall corporate return on capital which 
should feed into our results” (Insurance_5, 2013).   
This example demonstrated that the TLD model had provided a structure 
whereby the mix of personal and corporate bonus could be set separately for each of 
the three lines, and therefore the line definitions were reinforced by the theoretical 
construct of an organisational model.  
However, all of these definitions have a point in common, which is that 
internal audit belongs to the third line. Taking into consideration that these are the 
big 4 audit firms, it is not surprising that the third line – internal audit – is given a 
relatively significant proportion of each representation and indeed is represented as 
having higher weight than the other lines by e.g. PwC and Deloitte. KPMG also 
adds external audit and other independent assurance providers to this third line, 
which might be an indication of functionality (internal and external audit typically 
do some work together or at least co-ordinate their work programmes), rather than 
of the hierarchical positioning as External Audit is outside the firm.  
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Despite not being internal to the firm’s organisation, external audit is also 
often mentioned as a part of the firm’s corporate defence. External audit provides a 
separate independent assurance, and is “critical to protecting a financial institution 
and provide a basis for corporate boards to ensure that asset valuations and 
accounting are correct. Indeed, the failures of financial firms are closely intertwined 
with lapses in the oversight of their external auditors” (Ludwig, 2012). However 
despite its criticality, external audit is not a part of the TLD. Internal audit is 
independent of business unit management, or should be, but remains paid and 
employed directly by the firm (except in the case of very small firms which are 
outside the scope of this research). 
In July 2013, the Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors issued a set of 
recommendations entitled “Effective Internal Audit in the Financial Services 
Sector”. One of the things this guidance explains about the role of Internal Audit is 
that “Internal Audit should include within its scope an assessment of the adequacy 
and effectiveness of the Risk management, Compliance and Finance functions” 
(IIA, 2013). This guidance was welcomed and endorsed (Bank of England, 2013): 
According to Martin Wheatley, Chief Executive of the Financial Conduct Authority 
from 2013 to 2015: “Internal auditors must be front and centre of ensuring their firm 
acts with integrity and will be alert to potential risks” (Bank of England, 2013). 
Regulators welcome expansion of the internal audit role because “Internal audits are 
used to ensure that risk management and compliance systems are working properly 
and that businesses are operating within the law” (Ludwig, 2012). 
Protiviti, a risk management consultancy, adds to this that the  “3rd line of 
defence is provided by the board audit committee and the internal audit function” 
(Protiviti, 2012). While the board audit and risk committees are also sometimes 
mentioned in the charts showing the way the three lines of defence work, they are 
typically depicted as above and separate from the three lines, not a part of them, 
again due to the fact that the board is not a part of the internal risk management 
infrastructure. This separation is due to the fact that lines of defence are seen as 
feeding information up to the board-level and helping the board members make 
informed decisions: second line into the Board Risk Committee and the third line 
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into the Board Audit Committee. The third line also feeds into the Board Risk 
Committee in matters regarding risk management, as was explained in Chapter 5. In 
addition to the question of how the lines are separated, the following section 
presents an overview of major challenges that organisations might face when 
implementing the three lines of defence model. 
 
6.3. OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES OF THE TLD FRAMEWORK 
 
On the spectrum between management and oversight, the first line business 
unit risk management is closest to management not oversight, and the third line 
(internal audit) is the most pure oversight function. Based on the field observations 
and desk research, I assume there is no sharp distinction between these two 
categories, and they could be understood as belonging to the same spectrum, which 
assumes a level of fluidity of the concepts and their implementation.  
The second line of defence – risk management – is where there is most 
disagreement about whether staff should be involved in risk management actively, 
by e.g. participating in approval of each significant transaction, or instead oversee 
risks in a way that is similar to internal audit. The following section presents an 
analysis of difficulties in operationalising the three lines of defence model and 
introduces the main criticisms associated with this idea. The three lines of defence 
could be seen as an organisational instrument to facilitate oversight within financial 
institutions in practice. Due to the ambiguity of particular aspects of the meaning 
and the lack of a universally agreed definition, one could describe three lines of 
defence as an “overused metaphor” (Bonisch, 2013). Strikingly, none of the 
conversations I had with employees in the first line had referred to themselves as 
‘the first line’, and indeed were frequently not aware of what the metaphor means, 
while that language of self-identification has been unanimous in the second and 
third lines. 
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Some argue the framework does not include all the levels that it should 
(Lyons, 2012), e.g. while executive and non-executive directors have a part to play 
in oversight and information from different lines feeds into them, they are neither a 
separate line of defence nor are they a part of the regular three. Following this line 
of discourse, one could also argue that, as an example, the board risk committee, 
being in charge of the second line of defence, is also part of the second line, but on 
the other hand this argument is flawed because non-executive directors do not 
actively interact with the lower-level first line in the same way as the second line 
does, and they are indeed part of the more complicated oversight hierarchy that this 
thesis investigates. 
The TLD model has come into greater prominence recently, but, as we have 
seen, it was in operation before the crisis and one might argue it did not prove itself 
effective in preventing or containing the crisis, though supporters argue it has been 
made stronger since. The UK Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 
report published in June 2013 explained that “Fashionable management school 
[Three Lines of Defence] theory appears to have lent undeserved credibility to some 
chaotic systems. Responsibilities have been blurred, accountability diluted, and 
officers in risk, compliance and internal audit have lacked the status to challenge 
front-line staff effectively” and indeed provided a “wholly misplaced sense of 
security” (UK_Parliament, 2013).  
This sense of security was caused by the fact that there were three separate 
groups who were supposed to ensure proper conduct towards risks. However, this 
might have been more of a problem than a solution, since one could argue that when 
there are several people in charge – no one really is. Another way of looking at it is 
that having several lines of defence diffuses responsibility rather than creating a 
more rigorous system. It is thus not surprising that there currently is some 
regulatory scepticism about the three lines of defence model, but for the purpose of 
this research it is useful to observe that there is simultaneously a degree of public 
focus on the model that it did not have before. Broadly speaking, regulators and 
firms are attempting to strengthen TLD, rather than seeking a radically different 
replacement for it. 
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The commonly accepted failing of the TLD model during the crisis led to 
several additional influential responses, e.g. the publication of The Internal Audit 
Guidance “Effective Internal Audit in the Financial Services Sector” in July 2013 
(IIA, 2013). This guidance acknowledges that “Effective Risk Management, 
Compliance and Finance functions are an essential part of an organisation’s 
corporate governance structure” (IIA, 2013) – indeed the guidance was specifically 
designed in order to clarify and strengthen the role of the third line of defence, and 
it explains that internal audit needs to continue remaining independent from the 
other functions, and “be neither responsible for, nor part of, them” (IIA, 2013). The 
Internal Audit Guidance has also brought attention to the risk-based internal audit 
by saying that internal audit should make a “risk-based decision as to which areas 
within its scope should be included in the audit plan” (IIA, 2013). 
In my own research, during an interview with a head of risk in a major 
insurance firm, he expressed scepticism about risk-based internal audit, because, he 
explained: risk management is a top-down activity, while internal audit is a detailed 
horizontal process. Their tasks complement each other in that they provide a 
thorough investigation by looking at issues from different angles. If audit will be 
required also to become top-down like risk management, the whole point of internal 
audit might be lost. The ambiguity in definitions discussed above might present a 
challenge in operationalising TLD. Several other potential practical issues in 
operationalising it are discussed below. 
 
6.3.1. THREE LINES OF DEFENCE IN PRACTICE 
 
One of the reasons the three lines of defence approach was encouraged by the 
FSA as well as a dense network of other actors (consultants, auditors, etc) is that it 
gives structural content to oversight and therefore makes the process itself auditable 
and comparable. TLD is an easily understandable concept, but as is evident from 
countless consultancy attempts at explaining how TLD should be organised within 
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the institutions, there might be challenges in practical implementation due to the 
fact that that it is primarily about the structures and functions that should be in 
place, not the complicated information flows between them. Effectiveness of risk 
management strongly depends on how each of the lines interacts with the others, 
and that is more difficult to observe and measure than the committee structures that 
are in place. Sweeting observes that while TLD provides a good explanation about 
the division of responsibilities, “it leaves open the degree of interaction between the 
three different lines, in particular the first and second” (Sweeting, 2011). 
 
6.3.2. MODELS OF INTERACTION 
 
 In order to explain the variety of implementation practices, Paul Sweeting 
identifies three styles of risk management interaction alongside the three lines of 
defence model: (1) ‘offence and defence’, (2) ‘policy and policing’ and (3) ‘the 
partnership model’.  
1. The ‘offence and defence’ model is the textbook approach to risk 
management, because it explains that the first line is purely interested in 
maximising gains, while the second line is only focusing on minimising the 
risks: the “first and second lines are set up in opposition. There is no incentive 
for the first-line units to consider risk [...] Conversely, the [second line] has an 
incentive to stifle any risk taking – even though taking risk is what an 
organisation must often do to gain a return” (Sweeting, 2011) I did not expect to 
find this approach in its pure form in the organisations I observed in the 
financial sector, because the financial crisis emphasised the importance of risk 
management, and a fully profit-driven first line would not be encouraged. The 
‘offence and defence’ model is unlikely to be rigorously followed in practice, as 
it is common to encourage cooperation between the lines as outlined by the 
following two modes of interactions. 
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2. The ‘policy and policing’ model involves the Risk Management 
function “setting risk management policies and then monitoring the extent to 
which those policies are complied with” (Sweeting, 2011). This makes Risk 
Management more of an oversight function, because it is policing whether the 
behaviour of the first line is in accordance with its frameworks and 
requirements, rather than having an active confrontation. The risk management 
function in the headquarters of an insurance firm I observed in 2013 was closer 
to this model, where setting and refining of risk policies for the businesses was a 
frequent conversation point. For example, the Head of Model Oversight (part of 
the second line risk management) when describing the role of the second line 
towards the first line said: “Our role is to tell them where they should improve, 
and when they say they note it, it is our role to decide whether we are happy that 
our concern was noted and minuted, or whether we want to insist that they come 
back with their corrected homework. And then we hope and check whether they 
do their next homework better” (Insurance_5, 2013). The question that arises, 
therefore, is not just how to implement the structure, but also what does 
management does with the output of the TLD. This approach may have been 
prevalent in that organisation due to the fact that this firm has a federal 
organisational structure, which means that the business units have power over 
their own processes, and the role of the headquarters is to oversee the risk 
management within the business units and ensure they have the right structures 
and frameworks in place.  
 
       According to a senior risk executive within the investment bank where the 
first participant observation was conducted: “Risk is not exactly the police, risk 
works with the business. So when a trade is not done or a business decision is 
taken not to go ahead with something, usually it’s the result of a maturing 
process. It’s not like Risk saying you can’t and the business saying ‘Yes, I can’, 
it doesn’t work that simplistic” (Bank_5, 2012). The ‘policy and policing’ 
model can be seen in operation when the firm has a clear risk appetite set at the 
top, with clearly articulated self-components which allow it to be used in 
individual business units. In a bank, for example, this might have the form of 
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limits on exposures in different credit risk categories (usually defined by credit 
ratings). In an insurance company it might be carried out as limits on particular 
types of business, e.g. on exposure to longevity risk. If these limits are well-
defined the 2nd line of defence can then effectively police them, elevating 
breaches to the Board Risk Committee. These limits can be accompanied by so-
called ‘triggers’ somewhat below the absolute limit, which allows early 
warnings of potential breaches. 
 
3. The ‘partnership model’ involves business units and risk management 
“working together to maximise returns subject to an acceptable level of risk. It 
can be achieved by embedding risk professionals in the first-line teams and 
ensuring that there is a constant dialogue” (Sweeting, 2011). This was the goal 
of the bank I observed in 2012: their risk division was split into those who were 
on the trading floors with the first line, and those who were in a central risk 
management function separate from the first line. The risk managers separate 
from the first line were supposed to interact with the first line on a regular basis, 
and physically spend some time there (working with the first line directly, on 
their floor) every week. However, during the interviews most people mentioned 
that in practice they didn’t always have the time to go there, and thus did not 
have as much of a constant dialogue as they would have liked. A certain level of 
distance is also needed for the second line in order to be able to “give an 
independent assessment of the risk management approaches carried out by those 
units” (Sweeting, 2011), without getting so involved in the everyday practice 
that they miss some issues and normalise the deviances. 
The above three examples of how the interaction between business lines can be 
categorised demonstrate that there is a lot of variety within the seemingly simple 
three lines of defence model. It is a simple, almost too simplistic, model that makes 
risk functions in the otherwise complex domain of enterprise risk management 
appear vividly distinct: in reality, however, these lines are much more blurred, and 
the categories are fluid, which makes labelling interactions as one or the other less 
possible.  
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The idea that lines are complementary and are used to refine decisions rather 
than stop decisions from being made presents a very different way of approaching 
the structure than if the interaction between them means checking on/policing each 
other. Policing might lead to fighting for territory instead of collaborating 
productively. It would also be possible to argue that the third line is not really a 
“line of defence” in terms of protecting business from the outside world, like the 
first and second lines, but instead the third line is checking whether the first two are 
functioning according to the rules, which is principally different from providing 
judgment regarding the nature of the transactions themselves (not just the way they 
were executed). 
One point that arose during several interviews is that calling the organisational 
structure “lines of defence” has a negative connotation, because it is not clear what 
the business is defending itself against. Are the lines of defence there in order to 
protect the business from the follies of its own management, or in order to protect it 
from some external danger? According to an interview with a head of model 
oversight in a risk management function in a large insurance firm: “the three lines of 
defence should be called the lines of opportunity. Each line is not trying to stop the 
process at each stage, but improve it instead” (Insurance_5, 2013).  
Indeed, all lines could also be seen as working together towards the protection 
of the common risk appetite crucial to the business. Their effectiveness could 
therefore be conceived as depending on how clearly risk appetite is defined. That 
dimension is discussed further in the next chapter. 
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6.4. CONCLUSION 
 
To summarise, a famous observation by George Box in the Journal of the 
American Statistical Association that “All models are wrong, but some are useful” 
(Box, 1976) is relevant here: despite its obscure origins, variation of meanings, and 
challenges in implementation, the Three Lines of Defence has evolved into the main 
method of organising risk management within firms. Despite being the main 
organising principle, it is not clear whether it is preferable to alternatives that were 
not discussed above. It can be seen as an attempt to create (hopefully constructive) 
challenge and tension within the firm by setting up units with different objectives, 
reporting lines, and methods of compensation. Ultimately it can be seen as the 
structure set in place to define and defend the company’s risk appetite; therefore 
while risk appetite has been mentioned earlier, the way it happens as a process is 
discussed in the following chapter.  
This Chapter began by demonstrating the unclear origins of the framework 
that did not prevent the TLD model to come into prominence and be widely used 
and accepted. The chapter then moved on to showing a selection of existing 
interpretations of the organisation of lines, and pointed to the fact that 
representations by the Big 4 accentuate the role of internal audit. Finally, the 
chapter explained that the TLD model expresses the idea of risk oversight, u it 
provides the Board with multiple approaches to risk within the firm, and allows a 
reassurance that risks are covered as completely as possible.  
Essentially, the differences of opinion that may arise from within this multi-
level risk approach could have been inconspicuous were each of the lines not 
required to produce explicitly separate information. This variety of opinion should 
in theory increase the effectiveness of Board oversight: non-executive directors are 
by definition external; therefore they depend on accurate information, presented as 
complete and multi-sided as possible in order to inform their strategic decisions.  
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A major caveat in TLD, however, is that despite the additional reporting lines 
into the board committees, all the units ultimately report to the CEO, so the 
independence may not be as real as it looks. Some think the system is unlikely to 
discipline risk-taking effectively, partly due to the blurring of reporting lines and 
responsibilities. It is unlikely to work well unless there is effective oversight by 
people who do not report to the CEO. So the fact that regulators have in addition 
began to place heavy reliance on the Board of Directors and especially on 
independent directors in the Board Risk Committee could also be seen as being 
connected to the TLD. 
The TLD model depicts a “conceptual delineation of control levels” (ECIIA, 
2012), which provides a structural solution around which the processes and 
information flows need to be organised in order to make it truly operational. Due to 
the fact that the lines are not as clear-cut as they might initially appear to be, there 
might be gaps in the information flows which are not covered by the model – thus 
TLD could also be explained as the information flow problem.  
Reporting lines are problematic because it is difficult to achieve meaningful 
independence when all the employees are working for the same firm. Additionally, 
the streams of information have to be structured in such a way that there are no 
“dead ends” where information gets lost when it flows upstream to the level where 
the key messages might be lost. The overarching objective of the three lines of 
defence is that separate functions report on the same issues from different 
perspectives which ensures that the board gets as full a picture as possible about 
what is happening within the organisation, which is the focus of the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7: INFORMATION INTERMEDIARIES 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“The ability of the board or a committee to perform its oversight role is, to a large 
extent, dependent upon the relationship and the flow of information between the 
directors, senior management, and the risk managers in the company” 
(Wachtell, 2015) 
This chapter examines the way information for Board members is assembled, 
measured and filtered, with the process of setting risk appetite at the core of it. So 
far risk appetite has been examined from the perspective of theoretical definitions, 
but this chapter looks at the way it is operationalised in practice. Specifically, the 
focus is on the interaction between the board and management in this process, based 
on the observations and interview materials. The objective is to provide a level of 
detail that is often missing from general statements common in practitioner 
literature such as “The board of directors must establish the institution-wide Risk 
Appetite Framework” (FSB, 2013b). 
Chapter 5 analysed how risk oversight is exercised by the Board and its Risk 
Committee, while Chapter 6 demonstrated that the Three Lines of Defence is 
currently the most commonly used organisational architecture that makes the risk 
management work of the Board possible. As these chapters explained, information 
is at the core of any oversight practice; providing it, accurately and 
comprehensively, is also a continuous struggle for the various parties involved. A 
major part of that struggle is caused by the ambiguity of the meaning of ‘oversight’ 
itself, as well as what information is needed. The chapter explores these struggles, 
primarily from the NED perspective, but also with help of interviews from those 
who provide information for Boards.  This chapter is more speculative and based on 
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more fragmented data than the earlier chapter, and therefore hopefully demonstrates 
more opportunities for future research. 
The Walker review of corporate governance cites defective information flows 
as the central cause of the failures of financial institutions: “Failures that proved to 
be critical for many banks related [...] to defective information flow, defective 
analytical tools and inability to bring insightful judgment in the interpretation of 
information and the impact of market events on the business model” (Walker, 
2009). It is notable that Walker differentiates between information itself and the 
board’s ability to use that information to make relevant judgments, but he sees the 
provision of defective information as a key factor behind boards’ failures in the area 
of risk oversight.  
Most interviewees acknowledged the significance of the information flows 
and risk appetite process, but the particular elements of it were rarely problematised. 
Risk appetite is a key area where the knowledge that NEDs need in order to exercise 
their role has to be constructed by the information intermediaries and the NEDs 
working together, in a continuous process.  
My thesis focuses on knowledge-based, financial institutions, where 
information suppliers are present on many different levels throughout the firms, but 
the specific focus here is on information intermediaries who transform risk-related 
information in order for it to be used for risk oversight and strategic decisions at the 
board level. In the two organisations I have observed, the functions that served as 
central nodes of information transmission were called Portfolio Analysis, Risk 
Reporting, ERM, and Risk Oversight. Each of them had a slightly different domain 
of responsibilities, for example Portfolio Analysis was primarily preparing 
management information for the board level, while Risk Reporting was more 
focused on the flows of information within the risk function, but the unifying aspect 
of all four was a close reporting proximity to the CRO and the board, as well as the 
fact that the core of their role was processing and making information relevant.  
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“So you’re giving them this piece of MI25 […], so what. That’s exactly what 
the Board needs to know: not the data, they need information which is the data 
made relevant (Insurance_13, 2013). 
This quote demonstrates that relevance to overseers comes from processing 
vast amounts of data into usable information, and the role of information 
intermediaries is to make that transformation with the right audience in mind. 
The chapter uses the perceptions of people involved in producing, digesting, 
and receiving various information flows, primarily focusing on the Board, in order 
to investigate those flows. These processes could be seen at the core of corporate 
governance, which might be conceived as having the purpose of eliminating or 
minimising information asymmetry problems. Various management structures in 
the firm, including the overseeing NEDs, depend on the effectiveness of the 
infrastructure of systems and controls within and surrounding the firm and its ability 
to convey the appropriate information to the appropriate parties in a timely manner.  
A simplified overview of the information flows within the risk management 
function is that the staff preparing information report into the CRO, who reports into 
the Board Risk Committee, and the Chairperson of the Board Risk Committee 
draws conclusions based on that information, thus providing a degree of assurance 
to both the full Board and the regulators. According to the interviewees, the 
regulators are placing growing reliance on this corporate governance mechanism, 
and require boards to answer directly to them from time to time, as a part of the 
‘close and continuous’ supervision that was discussed earlier.  
A distinction between information producers/suppliers and information 
users/receivers is needed for clarity purposes: I classify NEDs are information users, 
while CROs are both information users and information producers, depending on 
which part of their role one looks at, and the people below them, for the purposes of 
                                                
25 MI = Management Information: a frequently used abbreviation to describe papers 
and packs of data that are used by the management and the board.	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this research, are seen here as largely information producers. This classification is a 
result of analysis of practice observations and reviews of literature. 
According to the interviewees, NED Risk Committee members attempt to use 
information from various external sources (e.g. conferences, regulators, consultancy 
and audit reports), but their primary information providers are within the firm: 
CROs have a direct reporting line into Board Risk Committees and supply Boards 
with information packs.  
The two categories that were made apparent during the interviews were related 
to how different NEDs ensure they receive enough information to successfully 
perform their role: whilst several of the interviewees said they attend conferences, 
read financial press, use their economies of scope from memberships on other 
boards and have many informal chats with the CRO as well as with their direct 
reports, others were more inward-oriented and focused on their own experience and 
expertise as a source of knowledge, e.g. as an example of the former:  
 
“I spend a lot of time going round to any sessions that all kinds of other people 
are running […] because I want to make sure that I’m sufficiently up-to-date 
that I can ask the right questions” (Interviewee_08, 2014). 
 
In addition to the sources both from within and outside of the business, the 
importance of face-to-face interaction was acknowledged by the following 
interviewee, who also listed a number of sources he relies on to get a broader 
understanding: 
 
“You can’t do it by emails and quantitative data, you actually have to be out in 
the business, you have to learn what’s going on and you have to build a broad 
perspective from many different sources, be they regulators, be they 
investment analysts, be they academics and what is happening in the economy 
and where the emerging risks are” (Interviewee_06, 2014). 
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While others, when answering the same question, put more emphasis on the 
value of their intrinsic knowledge when evaluating the various complexities of the 
business:  
 
“Essentially it’s a role where you use your instincts and emotional intelligence 
probably more than you use sort of rational IQ. Because you have less than 
perfect information, you’re always less well-informed than the management” 
(Interviewee_06, 2014). 
 
NEDs demonstrated the understanding of basic agency theory in 
acknowledging that managers are inevitably better informed about their own 
business than are NEDs, but combined it with a somewhat less scientific emphasis 
on instincts and emotional intelligence. Regardless of how NEDs achieve a belief 
that they are sufficiently informed, information received by the Board in formal 
instalments prior to their meetings is typically included in so-called “management 
information packs” which usually contain both qualitative and quantitative data 
about an organisation. I have participated in the creation of these packs in both 
organisations I have observed, and they involve a lot of input from various parts of 
organisation. Therefore, unsurprisingly, there is some heterogeneity across firms in 
regard to where the information comes from and how it gets processed, although 
some core information, on accounting profits for example, is fairly standardised 
across the industry. 
 “One of the most conspicuous outcomes of post–financial crisis reflection has 
been the regulatory imperative that boards need to do a much better job of 
defining and enforcing their risk appetite” (Power, 2012). 
  Risk appetite in theory was discussed in Chapter 4, as an object that regulators 
use as a part of the responsibilisation process. The following section discusses risk 
appetite as a process, rather than a fact, and looks into what goes into its creation 
and into the measurement of performance against it. 
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  Defining risk appetite is one of the first necessary steps (COSO, 2012b) in the 
risk management process, which follows risk identification and assessment. After 
these steps are completed, it is risk management’s job to make sure that risks are 
under control. However, “Boards are expected to provide an oversight role of the 
risk management systems and processes as well as continuously reviewing both the 
planning and outcomes of such processes” (Caldwell, 2012). In July 2013, the 
Financial Stability Board issued a document entitled “Principles for An Effective 
Risk Appetite Framework” where it outlines the key elements of the risk appetite 
framework and reporting, as well as defining the roles and responsibilities of those 
involved in the risk appetite setting and monitoring process. The relevant actors 
they list are: the board of directors, CEO, CFO, CRO, business-line and entity level 
management, and internal audit. These actors are in line with the three lines of 
defence model explained below. Regarding the board’s involvement, FSB says that 
the board members need to: “include an assessment of risk appetite in their strategic 
discussions […] and ensure adequate resources and expertise are dedicated to risk 
management as well as internal audit in order to provide independent assurances to 
the board and senior management.” (FSB, 2013a) This signals a strong required 
involvement in overseeing the processes that surround the risk appetite frameworks. 
Without information from within the firm, NEDs would be ‘flying blind’; yet 
securing its accuracy and relevance is problematic. Apart from the complexities of 
identifying, collecting, analysing and transmitting “appropriate” information, there 
is an inherent weakness in the process because most of the information NEDs 
receive comes from sources within the firm, including from the management 
running the business, whose decisions NEDs are supposed to oversee. Therefore, 
information could be seen as ‘constructing’ the NED role. And the providers of 
information outside line management, despite having significant power and 
influence in the NED decision-making process, may themselves be influenced by 
risk takers in the firm and by the profit motive. Even though steps have been taken 
to divorce the remuneration of risk managers from the profitability of individual 
business units, CROs are typically rewarded with shares or options, whose value 
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will be affected by the rate of business expansion, as was discussed in more depth 
from the observation of remuneration in the previous Chapter. 
To allow an examination of the information flow and risk appetite 
mechanisms, and the links between them, this chapter is structured the following 
way: after a brief discussion of information intermediaries, information flows are 
considered within the context of the TLD corporate governance model, and the role 
of information intermediaries within this process is examined. Then, the role of risk 
appetite in business strategy as well as the iterative process involved in setting it is 
explained based on the interview findings and participant observations. The chapter 
concludes by discussing the challenges that information providers and receivers 
have to face, which are made more critical by the new weight regulators are placing 
on these processes. 
7.2. INFORMATION INTERMEDIARIES 
 
Information Intermediaries have been spoken about by economists as a part 
of discussion of market structures. Dzielinski uses information intermediaries as 
analogous to news agencies within the corporate disclosure regime: their purpose, 
he says “is providing an objective account of events, especially nowadays when the 
physical aspect of news dissemination is much less of an issue” (Dzielinski, 2013).  
A similar use of the term, where information intermediaries are seen as brokers who 
help reduce the agency problem, has been also applied outside financial markets, 
where “buyers and sellers don't act independently, but rather exchange information 
through an intermediary such as a real estate broker or employment agency” (Sass, 
1984). Healy and Palepu also discuss information intermediaries which are part of 
the corporate disclosure infrastructure and are external to the firm – “The credibility 
of management disclosures is enhanced by regulators, standard setters, auditors and 
other capital market intermediaries” (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Information 
intermediaries “such as financial analysts and rating agencies, who engage in 
private information production to uncover managers’ superior information” 
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& Palepu, 2001), in their definition, are needed to solve the ‘lemons’ 26 information 
asymmetry problem. 
This chapter extends the current understanding of information intermediaries 
as market agents into the space within organisations. It is important to note here that 
the analytical term ‘information intermediaries’ is a theoretic construct derived from 
the academic analysis of observations, not a concept borrowed from practice itself: 
it is thus a result of focus on the practical information dimension of oversight rather 
than a presumption. 
I use the term information intermediaries to refer to people who are present 
within firms in order to transmit and transform information and thus enable agency 
relationships. The core of the problem is the familiar issue of information 
asymmetry, which is one of the main characteristics of agency theory. But in studies 
of the principal/agent problem, information flows are often treated as a black box. 
Hence, this thesis opens that box with the aid of a view from practitioners on both 
sides of the divide. 
 “The Reporting Team [has] a whole bunch of Excel templates […] And 
output the contents of that spreadsheet in a nice format to whatever the 
audience is that they want to see it. Without the Reporting Team the risk 
managers, senior risk managers and senior management would not be able to 
understand and view what their exposures were” (Bank_6, 2012). 
Transformation of data into usable information involves more than merely 
combining information into one report, and in the end has the purpose of directing 
attention of decision-makers: 
                                                
26 The ‘Lemons Problem’ was made popular by the economist George Akerlof who 
investigated the market for used cars and found that due to quality uncertainty, people 
with good cars will not place their cars to be sold on the used car market, which 
results in a decreased quality of the remaining cars, causing a downward spiral. 
Reliable independent sources of quality re-assurance are needed. 
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“The information that we provide is not just data dump, it is information that 
can be viewed and understood: it’s about providing that information in a way 
which […] allows people to understand where their attention should be drawn 
to. And this is why it’s not just a case of setting up the reports and letting them 
run day in day out, it’s a case of constantly evolving to whatever the business 
needs are” (Bank_6, 2012). 
Information intermediaries are the people who create information flows within 
the oversight structures. They are at the centre of the agency and information 
asymmetry problem: they simultaneously act to eliminate the problem by providing 
managers and board members with relevant information, while at the same time also 
amplifying the problem as they filter, abridge, and edit the information they transmit 
to higher levels, thus inherently limiting what the overseers see and potentially 
skewing its meaning.  
From the structural perspective, information intermediaries can be understood 
as the links in the risk oversight process where the information asymmetry problem 
gets played out. This characteristic became apparent during the participant 
observations: in an investment bank during the participant observation, there was a 
newly created position of Chief Operating Officer (COO) to the CRO, whose 
responsibilities involved overseeing the operations of the risk division, as well as an 
Enterprise Risk Management division (called “portfolio analysis”) that was created 
in order to gather all the risk management information and make it more suitable for 
board decision-making.  Within the insurance firm, the COO to the CRO was called 
“head of risk”, and the ERM function created the board level papers. They take 
information from Risk Silo Management (see e.g. Mikes, 2005) and make the 
information these divisions produce meaningful and usable beyond the excel sheets.  
This “filtering” or “editing” process involves deciding what is significant: this 
passage point between information in organisation and oversight structures is key 
because it is a standardised process of how information reduction happens. All the 
information has to be funnelled in some way to get to the board in a useful format. 
This function is the one in control of the tap that decides how much of it gets to drip 
to the board. Upward flow is very problematic, because decisions have to be made 
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about what is material for the oversight function. The people who decide are the 
critical carriers of the oversight function.  
I observed an important variation across firms in this process: during my 
participant observation in the portfolio analysis group of the major investment bank, 
I was working for the “oversight” function that decided which information was 
passed on to management above. I observed that it actually didn’t involve much 
thinking at the analyst level – it was a standardised execution of a pre-determined 
process of reducing information and passing it up.  Which information gets to go up 
was determined on top, and execution was done in the lower levels.  
I found this process to be much more consultative in an insurance firm where I 
conducted a participant observation in 2013. The ERM group there consisted of 5 
people all of whom, regardless of the level of seniority, participated in the 
discussion and selection of potential risks to be escalated –the suggestions from this 
list were brought up to the head of risk, and then to the CRO, each of who were able 
to add or delete points, and it later went back down to the ERM function to prepare 
the MI itself. This was done, according to an interviewee within that insurance firm, 
in order to mitigate the risk that “The people doing the filtering may not be senior or 
insightful enough to identify the important stories.  A simple materiality measure 
will be inadequate. The RC has a forward-looking remit and needs to know not just 
what big or bad things have happened since the previous MI pack was compiled, but 
what issues, that may be small now, have the potential to blow up” (Insurance_5, 
2013). 
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7.2.1. TLD: ECOLOGY OF INFORMATION FLOWS 
 
As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, oversight needs to be organised, 
in order to happen, and the way it has been commonly done is through the Three 
Lines of Defence framework which, as discussed in Chapter 6, is a 
conceptualisation of one way - now the dominant way - of organising the practice of 
oversight. NEDs receive information from each of the three lines, specifically CRO 
reports directly to the Chairman of the Risk Committee and the risk committee 
oversees the second line risk function. Within the TLD, information flows permeate 
every level both within each line and across the functions. The focus of this chapter, 
in line with the objective of this research to understand how risk oversight 
functions, is more specifically on management information flows as a narrower 
dimension at the core of oversight. As a senior risk offer in an insurance firm 
explained:  
“I see governance as making sure that the right information is going to the 
right decision maker” (Insurance_1, 2013). 
Indeed, it is possible to argue that the TLD is only effective if there is a 
mechanism for identifying and transferring the right Management Information 
between lines.  For internal audit, this might be seen as less of an issue, since their 
charter is the equivalent of a search warrant on any other part of the business.  The 
Head of Internal Audit has direct access to the Chair of Audit Committee and the 
Chair of the Board. For risk control and compliance, there does need to be a level of 
trust and willingness on the part of the first line to provide time and materials to the 
second line.   
According to a senior interviewee within an insurance firm, “The one sure 
way for TLD to fail will be in an environment in which the first line keeps its files 
and mouths closed, providing risk with only what it deems suitable” (Insurance_5, 
2013).  The interviewee further explained the scenarios that, based on his 
experience within several major financial instructions, were likely to be the barriers 
to effective communication between the first and second lines: “if the first line 
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functional head has much more power than the second line equivalent, or if the risk 
leadership is not attentive enough to recognise that they are seeing only what the 
first line chooses to show them, and do not demand information in a helpful manner, 
or where the 1st line does not see the relevance of the requirements and does not 
have the time or manpower to carry out all the demands of the 2nd line” 
(Insurance_5, 2013) . 
The board members including NEDs are the receivers at the top of the 
information hierarchy, usually seen as outside and above the TLD framework: 
during the participant observations it was evident that they receive the most digested 
and filtered reports yet use that information to make strategic decisions that might 
later affect the whole organisation.  
At the same time, reporting lines define and construct the TLD – these lines 
are drawn to reinforce the ‘independence’ of the different lines of defence. The 
CRO’s reporting line to the Risk Committee is meant to demonstrate some level of 
independence from the CEO (though this can only be partial as they still have to 
work together on a day to day basis). The infrastructure of the TLD reporting lines 
is supported by numerous reporting teams, such as ERM, Risk Oversight, Portfolio 
Analysis, etc. which vary by institution. 
When speaking about the role of the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
function, an insurance risk executive explained that they are “responsible for 
maintaining and operationalising the risk policies, monitoring adherence to them, 
making sure that the appropriate management information flow happens.  So aiding 
governance from a risk perspective” (Insurance_1, 2013). Indeed, the Three Lines 
of Defence system in its entirety can be seen as defending the firm’s risk appetite, 
because people within those structures not only help set it, but also operationalise it 
through their actions. The following section explains the definitions and process of 
risk appetite setting, because it is one of the cornerstones of the risk management 
and risk oversight process. This centrality makes risk appetite a good example to 
use in explaining the role of information suppliers and NEDs in the risk oversight 
process.  
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7.3. STRATEGIC ROLE OF NEDS 
 
According to COSO’s “Enterprise Risk Management — Integrated 
Framework”: “Risk appetite is developed by management and reviewed by the 
board. Oversight should begin with a studied discussion and review of 
management’s articulation of risk appetite relative to the organization’s strategies” 
(COSO, 2012a). The high-level definitions of risk appetite were discussed in 
Chapter 4. However, articulation of risk appetite relative to the organisation’s 
strategies is a less straightforward task than it might sound, not least due to the 
ambiguous nature of the concept (Andersen et al., 2014; Power, 2009). The 
following section explores how risk appetite is set in practice. 
Risk appetite could be defined as a set of metrics, quantifying triggers and 
limits for a range of exposures.  Boards are tasked with approving Risk Policies, 
which according to a senior interviewee within an insurance firm means that the risk 
committee: “reviews and approves the words that describe what management should 
consider when faced with certain business risks” (Insurance_5, 2013).  An appetite, 
in its numerical sense, is a way to make a parts of a risk policy operational and 
measurable, though some components (e.g. risk culture) might remain qualitative. 
The interviewees all shared an appreciation of the centrality of the task to 
operationalise the risk appetite process, as it is mandated in regulated financial 
firms, and the close link between risk appetite and strategy. According to Andersen 
et al, “The risk appetite adopted by a firm should be tied to the firm’s strategy as a 
part of good risk governance. However, the linkage mechanisms are still unclear” 
(Andersen et al., 2014).  
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Indeed, the interaction between Risk Appetite and strategy is very direct, as 
explained e.g. by a Chair of the Board Risk Committee in a major insurance firm: 
 
“Risk appetite is fundamental to a bank because it’s the flipside of the coin of 
strategy […] risk appetite starts with what type of business do you want to be” 
(Interviewee_06, 2014). 
 
The close link between the strategy and risk appetite is also there according to 
the PRA description of Board Responsibilities:  
 
“A key role for any board is to set the firm’s strategy, to ensure that the key 
goals in that strategy are within the agreed risk appetite and to oversee 
executive implementation of that strategy” (PRA, 2015b). 
 
NEDs also show some belief that the process of setting risk appetite is 
meaningful, in spite of its well-understood imperfections, and believe that the 
oversight process carried out in this way does have a measurable impact on the risks 
the business takes on. They describe the way the process is intended to operate: 
 
“You hope is that there’s a kind of chain of influence from the risk appetite 
policy to the risk function, from the senior executives, so that in every big 
decision that the organisation has to make there is a risk discussion about 
how that might change our profile or whatever, which is consistent with the 
risk appetite” (Interviewee_02, 2014). 
 
They add a distinctive role for the Risk Committee, not as a pure ‘policeman’ 
but as a key determinant of the balance between profit-seeking behaviour and risk 
management, demonstrating an implicit belief in the accuracy and relevance of the 
information they are provided with, and explain that risk appetite needs to be 
regularly updated. 
 
“We make adjustments every year to our risk appetite and our main risk 
categories and decide how much risk we want to take based on the business 
model” (Interviewee_09, 2014). 
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Risk Appetite, since it is related to strategy, is not only about restricting 
behaviour, but also about encouraging appropriate risk-taking: it is not a purely 
negative process, defining risks which are ‘out of appetite’. A well-positioned risk 
appetite statement will allow the business to take risks where they are adequately 
remunerated, and are of a scale which does not threaten the stability of the firm. 
“You want to see some of your risks in the active zone, otherwise you’re not 
running enough risk in a business based on risk” (Interviewee_09, 2014). 
 
NEDs articulate the dynamic nature of the process, and the need regularly to 
reassess the relevance of the calibration of the risk appetite in the light of changing 
business conditions. They also accept that there may be circumstances in which a 
breach of risk appetite is not necessarily a sign of system failure. A breach may be 
an indicator of more serious trouble ahead, or may be the trigger for a reassessment 
of the appropriate degree of risk to be assessed. NEDs explicitly acknowledge that 
there may be circumstances in which the business moves ‘out of appetite’:  
 
“It was completely pointless to have risk appetite levels that you were never in 
any danger of breaching” (Interviewee_04, 2014). 
 
Therefore NEDs, in theory, get risk data and then add judgements to 
determine risk appetite. In practice, some interviewees observed the crucial role in 
this process of managing directors who are closer to business and are thus able to 
have a stronger influence on the risk appetite setting. “Oversight”, by the nature of 
the term, implies one party looking down at the other, which contains an inherent 
principal-agent issue because the agent needs to give information to the principal for 
the principal to be effective. This makes the focus on information flows crucial. 
“Capacity to assemble information, a key feature of the man-made disasters 
literature, will be a function of how transaction velocity and complexity create gaps 
in diagnostic performance measures” (Power, 2007). Exhibit 1 provides an example 
of the FSA’s suggested view on information flows and the level of detail within the 
various reporting levels of the business.  
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FIGURE 7.1: FSA’S OPERATIONAL RISK FRAMEWORK 
 
Source: “Enhancing frameworks in the standardized approach to operational risk” 
(FSA, 2011) 
 
 
7.3.1. THE INTERACTIVE PROCESS 
 
One of the key purposes of information as discussed here is to facilitate the 
process of setting and monitoring risk appetite, which is now also officially one of 
the primary tasks of Boards, though some interviewees mentioned that in reality 
they do so though the information intermediaries, who thus arguably have 
significant power in that process. A risk officer in an insurance firm, speaking about 
the nature of her role, explained: “Our accountabilities increased considerably. 
Management information is a case in point.  In the past we would never be reporting 
risk matters to the board directly.  Now we do it on a monthly basis” (Insurance_6, 
2013). Information flows, therefore, can be seen as an indicator of the importance 
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that is attributed to a certain issue, and risk appetite is now seen as being very 
important. As one NED put it:  
“[RA is] the model that runs the business and therefore I think no-one will be 
able to hide behind the idea that risk isn’t important. It forces you to put risk 
right at the top of the agenda” (Interviewee_05, 2014).  
After the risk appetite is set, it is then policed by different control mechanisms 
within the firm.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, Board Risk Committees are a more recent 
formation than Audit Committees, and a Risk Committee does not have as clear a 
set of routine duties as an Audit Committee has in relation to the financial 
statements. There is some guidance which gives an indication of the regulators’ 
expectations, but that guidance has itself been evolving rapidly. Therefore, any 
attempt to describe the process of a risk committee must be accompanied by 
important caveats. It will inevitably be a snapshot taken at a moment in time, and 
may not represent practice at all major firms. There are also important differences in 
process driven by the requirements attached to particular types of regulated firms. 
For example, bank risk committees have major tasks related to stress tests and 
capital plans, while insurance companies must produce an ORSA (Own Risk and 
Solvency Assessment) which is intended to be a kind of ‘risk map’ for the firm or 
group as a whole. 
There are, nonetheless, some common features of Risk Committee behaviours. 
The firms I have observed produced schedules of ‘top risks’ their firm faces, 
according to a NED who chairs risk committees in two firms. These may be risks 
self-identified by individual business divisions, or they may originate in the 
committee itself, or be a mixture of the two. Those top risks, and the steps taken to 
mitigate them, will be reported to the full Board by the Chair of the Risk 
Committee. The Risk Committee will also review the risks identified by the 
regulator, whether they are generalised macroeconomic or market risks embedded 
in stress tests for banks, or those highlighted in the Bank of England’s Financial 
Stability Review. The Risk Committee will additionally assess the potential impact 
of regulatory risks, which by definition will not be highlighted by the regulators 
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themselves. These include the risk that the firm’s own controls may be weak, 
causing it to fail to comply with regulation, and that regulatory actions may raise 
requirements unexpectedly, or that regulators will retrospectively review past 
practices against a newer and tougher standard. 
All these processes are intended to input to the core function, now mandated 
and monitored by regulators, of setting a risk appetite for the business as a whole, 
and also for its component parts/business units. This has arguably now become the 
most important regular task for the Risk Committee on behalf of the board. There 
may be ad hoc decisions which have a significant impact on the business – for 
example putting in place a hedge against potentially damaging unanticipated market 
moves: e.g. foreign exchange rate protection, or a large equity put, or cases where 
disagreements between the first and second lines of defence are escalated to board 
level. Risk appetite can be seen as the gearbox which transmits the Board’s view to 
the individual businesses. Without a clearly defined risk appetite, monitored 
accurately and as far as possible in real time, a general disposition at the top of the 
firm that excessive risk taking should be avoided would be no more than an 
aspiration.  
According to one interviewee, overseeing information at the NED level serves 
a purpose of providing “an assurance that the organisation understands the risks it 
faces and has a reasonable approach to the mitigation of those. And that you’re […] 
in a no surprises environment” (Interviewee_02, 2014). ‘No surprises’ means that 
the risks are within the risk appetite, and risk does not crystallise in unexpected 
ways. 
To illustrate, in a global firm that I have observed, the scale of selling of 
insurance products with particular characteristics, in this case offering policyholders 
an equity-linked guarantee, for example, was debated. The hedging of risks was 
considered, but the committee took the view that hedges rarely offer perfect risk 
mitigation, unless they are prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the Risk Committee 
decided in this case to constrain sales growth, even though local business managers, 
and even their own risk managers, were satisfied with the risk-return trade-off. As a 
result, the Committee recommended qualified restrictions on sales to the Board, and 
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after they were approved, those limits were transmitted to local management, who 
are required to report regularly to the CRO on compliance with them. The CRO 
will, in turn, report any breaches and exceptions to the Committee, together with a 
recommendation on the appropriate response. The limits were also notified to 
regulations, who had expressed concerns about the degree of equity risk being 
assumed. 
 This description of the process begs a number of questions: does the 
information presented to the central risk management function accurately capture 
the risks of particular exposures or products? Is that information comprehensive? 
Does it cover all the risks to which business units are exposed? Are the hedging 
strategies in place, which are intended to reduce the reported risks, robust? In the 
case of sub-prime mortgage exposures in the years leading to the financial crisis, 
many banks reported low or non-existent net exposures which were coherent with 
their stated risk appetite; but the hedges and offsetting short positions they put in 
place protected them only against modest falls in market prices. The hedging 
strategies assumed that more significant price falls were out of the question. As a 
result, the exposures reported up to the Risk Committee (or Audit Committee at that 
time) were fundamentally misleading and were providing a sense of safety that was 
misplaced.  
That is the background against which the rest of the section examines the in-
firm process of information assembly, selection, processing, communicating, and 
challenging by information intermediaries and the Risk Committee, acting for the 
Board. The purpose of this section is to emphasise the interactive, iterative, 
continuous nature of the practice of risk appetite setting. As a Chair of Risk 
Committee in a FTSE 250 insurance firm explained: 
“Risk appetite statement is a kind of interactive control rather than brittle 
imperative” (Interviewee_02, 2014). 
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COSO’s thought leadership “Understanding and Communicating Risk 
Appetite” paper suggests the following simple framework for visualising the 
continuous and interactive nature of the risk appetite process: 
FIGURE 7.2: COSO RISK APPETITE PROCESS 
 
     (COSO, 2012a) 
 
The COSO risk appetite process framework in Exhibit 7.1 includes three 
steps: (1) develop risk appetite, (2) communicate, and (3) monitor. Importantly, that 
process is shown in a continuous cycle. Both information intermediaries and the 
board are involved in each of those actions. The rest of this section is structured in 
accordance with this framework because of its clarity and simplicity, despite the 
inherent potential over-simplification. 
 
7.3.1.a. Development 
 
NEDs are dependent on the intermediaries in order to obtain the information 
they need, and indeed one frequently voiced criticism of boards is that most if not 
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all their information comes from inside the firm. Therefore, even though they bring 
knowledge and experience, they must rely on internal information only, which has 
been criticised by the interviewees. On the other hand, information intermediaries 
within the organisation require NEDs to tell them what they need in order to be able 
to remain relevant. As another interviewee put it after being asked whether the 
information he receives is sufficient: 
“There’s no one-word answer to that but we keep on trying”. 
(Interviewee_12, 2014) 
 Although information on business and financial performance originates in the 
business units and the finance function, from the perspective of risk oversight the 
risk management function performs the essential role of synthesis and selection. As 
one interviewee put it:  
“The role of the risk function is to aggregate all that stuff and to help the board 
in the end decide on the risk appetite, decide on the risk policies and then 
provide them with one level of assurance that those things are being met” 
(Interviewee_08, 2014).  
A head of the ERM function at the top level of major insurance firm explained 
that the role of his group in relation to the board risk committee is the following: 
“We would put forward a recommendation for them.  So we would say on the 
basis of a number of considerations, output from the internal model, 
discussions with senior management, the business unit level top risks. Then 
the [board] would discuss those and add or delete as appropriate” 
(Insurance_6, 2013). 
This interviewee explained the key role of information intermediaries, as 
people who consolidate information from various sources within the firm, and then 
process it into recommendations that help the board decide on the appropriate 
statements.  
The vice-CRO of the same firm, however, saw the ERM role differently and 
gave it less significance: 
“The people who decide what gets passed on are [CRO and the director level]. 
Yeah, [ERM group] produced a pack, they drafted it, but actually it goes 
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through a massive amount of governance.  Weeks of governance really before 
it actually gets finally released” (Insurance_13, 2013). 
The fact that even within the same organisation people in neighbouring offices 
have such different conceptions about the roles within management information 
production is demonstrative of a fundamental difficulty of studying information 
intermediaries, since their roles are so open to different interpretations. 
When a mid-management level employee within the ERM group spoke about 
how the priorities about what is communicated to the board are selected, he 
explained: 
“We give our recommendations of what out of the whole spectrum of 
information available is most appropriate for them. […] It’s quite a subjective 
view as to what they should be seeing and what not” (Insurance_4, 2013). 
When asked about the same issues, a senior internal auditor within the same 
firm focused on the procedural side of information flows, which involved a lot of 
collegiate decision making across the departments: 
“There’s various structures you have in place to filter information but it is very 
collegiate. We have a leadership team, a strategy team and all the Executive 
Directors from all of our regions  […] we’re not all coming into a room trying 
to bash out in a day, so there is a lot of work goes on before we get to that 
stage” (Insurance_2, 2013). 
Building up on the explanation of the process of how the ERM group comes 
up with risk recommendations for the board risk committee to focus on, an 
interviewee observed: 
“There is a very detailed set of standards that have to be followed […] 
Typically, we would use the list from the previous year […] then of course the 
conversations with senior management and the list of BU top risks as well” 
(Insurance_6, 2013). 
While one employee saw some subjectivity in the process, the formation of 
recommendations is also heavily process-driven according to another. The balance 
between those two elements, individual decisions and institutional rigour, is 
something that both information intermediaries and receivers need to manage.  
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According to a head of insurance risk within a major insurance firm, 
management information process “is built upon a framework underpinned by the 
risk appetite - This typically comprises a series of fairly distinct statements, some of 
which will be both quantitative and instantly calculable” (Insurance_5, 2013).   
Based on my observations while producing these statements, these may be 
portrayed using the Red-Amber-Green status update tables and charts, with red 
being a breach of risk appetite and amber a warning that some lower threshold has 
been exceeded and that action may be needed to prevent a future breach. One Chair 
of risk committee in a FTSE250 firm mentioned that his firm also included blue 
sections:  
“If the box is blue, we’re well within risk appetite. If the box is green, we’re 
within risk appetite. If the box is yellow we’re outside of risk appetite but 
believe we could get back in within a reasonable timeframe” (Interviewee_05, 
2014). 
In both firms I have been immersed in, the suite of metrics that underpin the 
risk appetite were referred to as Key Risk Indicators (KRI), and their outputs as 
levels of risk utilisation: KRIs provided a structured and repeatable basis for risk 
Management Information. Indeed, a big part of the role was updating the numbers 
from previous periods based on new data and new calculations, to confirm they 
remained in accordance with the existing risk appetite.  
When it came to the role and production of KRIs, the head of insurance 
explained: “Given their pivotal role in informing the Risk Committee whether the 
business has stayed within appetite, their production would typically be subject to 
more rigorous scrutiny than other MI” (Insurance_5, 2013).  The scrutiny is also 
rigorous due to the fact that NEDs often mentioned that KRIs would be the part of 
their information packs they prioritised. According to a chairman of one of the 
largest insurance firms when speaking about key risk indicators:  
“Red, amber and green […] a classic risk committee agenda starts with those 
slides. So on the aggregate risk profile the conversation is about do we believe 
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that the outlook in the next 12 months is green? And you can have all the data 
in the world but do we believe it?” (Interviewee_06, 2014).  
This quote demonstrates also the risk committee’s need to rely heavily on the 
Risk Function to ensure that the KRIs are telling the right story and are produced 
reliably. Based on the conversations with the colleagues at the firms I observed, 
firms find it easier to demonstrate that they have appropriate processes for data 
verification and checking than to prove that they are presenting information which 
accurately captures the firm’s risks and allows NEDs to monitor them effectively. 
 
7.3.1.b. Communication 
 
Information flows are needed in order to facilitate the necessary 
communication upwards between the businesses and the board, as well as across the 
three lines of defence. As the COO of a risk function in a major investment bank 
explained, the risk managers’ role is not just about understanding and managing, but 
also importantly about communicating risk to the board: 
“The previous CRO understood the risk exceptionally well – probably better 
than most people, but wasn’t so good at communicating that detail to the 
senior management and the board. This communicating is important because 
ultimately the senior management and the board have to understand what our 
quite complex message is and where it takes the share price” (Bank_17, 2012). 
According to Andersen et al., “effective strategic risk management depends on 
on-going interactions between the strategic planning, risk management, and 
management control processes where the executives actively communicate with 
operational managers” (Andersen et al., 2014). Communication is not just a transfer 
of abridged information, but also involves a level of understanding and prioritisation 
in order to be able to make the message meaningful: 
“[Producing Risk Oversight reports] in order to get there you can't just copy 
and paste […] you're relying on that team having knowledge of the other 
areas. […] You need to change it into what's important and how you put it 
together in a meaningful message” (Insurance_9, 2013). 
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Information intermediaries themselves are aware of the fact that NEDs depend 
on them and of their role within the risk appetite setting process. In particular, it is 
the key task of the senior risk management team to provide information which 
allows the Board to set and monitor the firm’s risk appetite. Once the information 
intermediaries digest the issues and communicate their proposals to the board, the 
board risk committee has to approve and modify the list of top risks, which in turn 
leads to a transition of ownership from the information intermediaries to the board. 
“The role of the group risk department to understand the issues, propose 
something that is sensible and get the Board’s buy in and once the Board has 
bought in to our proposal, they become the owners.  They are ultimately 
responsible for it and the Board does it via the [Risk Committee] who is part 
of the Board which is more clued in to the risk issues” (Insurance_1, 2013). 
This transformation of ownership that one interviewee described brings the 
reinforcement and monitoring back to information intermediaries who now have to 
monitor the progress against this appetite. 
Arguably, creating executive summaries is less value adding than spotting 
oddities in the data. Based on my observations in both firms, over a half of 
Management Information that goes to the Risk Committee was a filtered version of 
Management Information that has appeared in packs going to lower level 
committees in the risk oversight hierarchy within the firm organisation.  This 
observation of course is inherently conditional on the firms being large enough. For 
example, I received a detailed report on Operational Risk incidents that originally 
went to a Group Operational Risk committee; and was a part of a group that was 
asked to make a summary of the more material incidents which then went to a 
Management or Executive Committee. At the end of this process, Risk Committee 
got a confirmation that nothing out of appetite has occurred and received a 
numerical breakdown of the types of incidents over the extended period. This 
process involves a caveat that before reaching the Risk Committee, it goes through 
several levels of governance, and therefore introduces material time lags.   
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7.3.1.c. Monitoring 
 
After the board approves risk appetite, information intermediaries are left in 
charge of monitoring performance against it, and potentially also overseeing its 
implementation by line management on behalf of the board. In order to do so, more 
work is needed at the lower levels to translate it into implementable policies that 
they can then help the board monitor: quantified limits need to be put in place, and 
data needed for monitoring has to be collected and analysed against the limits. If a 
limit is in danger of being breached or has actually been breached, actions need to 
be taken as well as communicated to the board, which then helps modify future risk 
appetite limits. 
“The Board will set something which is a bit more high level [...] Then we 
will try and come up with something quantitative which fits that, then send it 
back to them and they’ll look over it” (Insurance_4, 2013). 
 This quote shows one of the iterative aspects of the risk appetite process, 
where translating higher-level suggestions into usable limits is a task of the 
information intermediaries. Information intermediaries also collect the data required 
to monitor performance against it, and escalate it to the CRO or the board if 
necessary: 
“The ERM function ensures that the information is collected from around the 
business in order to be in a position to know whether we remain within our 
risk appetite, and also the information is collected in a timely enough way so 
that the escalation procedures be implemented should you find that you're not 
within appetite” (Insurance_5, 2013). 
The process of preparing, transmitting, and receiving information is 
continuous and iterative: NEDs react to the information they receive, and request 
more (or less) information from time to time in a regular dialogue with 
management. However management, in turn, suggest what data could be focused 
on. Once the board risk committee approves risk appetite they become its owners, 
and information intermediaries are in charge of monitoring it and updating their 
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suggestions for the following period. A caveat here is that “ownership” itself is an 
unclear concept that is frequently used by practitioners as if it is a fact but the actual 
meaning is open to interpretation. Throughout the risk appetite process, 
“ownership” moves iteratively between the board and the intermediaries as 
discussed above. This process presents a number of challenges that are discussed in 
the following section. 
 
7.4. PRACTICE CHALLENGES 
 
Although the practitioners interviewed were inclined to interpret their role in a 
positive light, they accepted the limitations of the process, and mentioned its 
reliance on good information. The Three Lines of Defence governance structure 
with the Board Risk Committee overseeing the second line of defence can only 
make sense if the information presented to the overseers is accurate, sufficient, 
reliable, and understandable, based on the practitioner understandings: e.g. “Risk 
management is about the right people taking decisions armed with the right 
information, timely, relevant, complete, all those kind of things, at the right time, 
and hopefully that means they’ll take the right decisions” (Insurance_15, 2013)”. 
Does it provide a sound basis on which to measure those risks, which are potentially 
threatening to the firm? There are clear tensions within firms surrounding these 
problems.  
In an attempt to frame these questions, taxonomy below provides a summary 
of some of the core challenges that were noted by the interviewees: -­‐ Accuracy: are the numbers correct? -­‐ Relevance: do they capture the main big risks which the firm faces? -­‐ Understandability and granularity: are they presented in a way that NEDs 
can be expected to understand them? -­‐ Sufficiency: is it enough to draw appropriate conclusions?  -­‐ Timeliness: how fast are the information flows? 
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Integrating understanding with literature, information flows are significant in 
all the three theories that were discussed earlier: agency, management control, and 
regulation literatures. Relating to the agency theory, directors have an inherent 
information disadvantage: it is conventional to blame board failures on the 
information asymmetry, but “board dysfunction can be the result of having either 
too little or too much information” (Bainbridge & Henderson, 2014). On some 
boards, “directors are either deprived of information […or] an “indigestible 
overload of information” is dumped” on them (Ward, 2003). There is an inherent 
agency problem here that cannot be resolved because both too much and too little 
information is problematic in its own way. 
The accuracy problem might be expected to be unlikely, given the technically 
advanced data systems and the process of review and analysis involved as the 
information flows upwards, but there are recent cases where data presented to the 
Board was wrong: e.g. the RBS capital ratio mistake in October 2014, whereby 
during the calculation of the Tier 1 ratio for the 2014 European Banking Authority 
stress test results,  “RBS’s modelled capital deduction for its Deferred Tax Asset 
(“DTA”) did not adequately reflect these cumulative tax credits within the 
published Capital Template” (WSJ, 2014). The chairman of the bank was forced to 
apologise in public for that mistake.  
 
The relevance problem is more serious and was more commonly mentioned by 
the interviewees who were aware of the agency problem. Information is not neutral 
and purely objective, but information controllers are crucial and exert major 
influence. For example, a risk manager within the insurance firm explained that 
when it comes to supplying information to the board: “We cannot overwhelm them 
with information. We have to be very selective in what goes to the board.  Not 
selective in the sense of not putting everything […] you can't put everything, you 
have to put the things that matter, things that have a sense of urgency, and they 
direct the business” (Insurance_11, 2013). 
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NEDs themselves are conscious of the problems of relevance and overload, in 
particular. Most interviewees saw the latter problem as being more difficult than the 
former. They are concerned that if data are presented to them, they will be assumed 
to have read them, and future regulatory or legal action will proceed on that basis. 
So for NEDs information overload is potentially hazardous, as well as time-
consuming. 
 
“We used to get a very, very detailed pack [...] and part of me used to think - 
oh God, why are we getting all of this stuff?” (Interviewee_04, 2014). 
 
None mentioned that they had been denied information, or had relevant data 
concealed from them (though logically they may not have been aware of such 
omission). Since the global financial crisis, management in financial firms have 
been acutely aware of the personal risks they would run if they were found to have 
concealed information from the Board, or indeed from regulators (who now have 
access to board papers if they wish):  
 
“Information isn’t always what you need, because you can […] be deluged 
with information, thousands and thousands of pages of information. What you 
need is to make sure that you’ve identified the key risks that are important to 
the organisation and that you’re being informed of developments around those 
areas of risk” (Interviewee_09, 2014).  
 
NEDs were mindful about their strategic role in identifying the key risks and 
accepted that sometimes they themselves insist on a high volume of data, to guard 
against potential criticism from regulators that they were neglecting to address the 
necessary level of detail. The suggested solution was to combine breadth and depth 
by administering so-called “deep-dives”, which are particularly detailed reports into 
certain topics. 
 
“If you get too much detail […] you cannot see the wood for the trees. One 
way of dealing with it is to get reasonably high-level data quite often and then 
have deep-dives. And that’s the way it gets dealt with certainly on bigger and 
more complex organisations” (Interviewee_08, 2014). 
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Interviewees recognised that it is a part of the responsibility of the risk 
committee itself to design the information packs so that the information is relevant 
to their concerns, while not impinging on the managerial space, which is a danger 
once the reports become too detailed. 
 
“The issue is to ensure that you don’t get sucked into too granular a level 
because you have to keep the boundary between executive and non-executive. 
The management run the business, they are responsible for running the 
business and we hold them to account for running the business” 
(Interviewee_10, 2014). 
 
However, the exact amount of information required is difficult to determine, 
and as one interviewee has put it: 
 “Everyone always says: I don’t want too much detail, but when they don’t get 
detail, they always ask for more details” (Interviewee_02, 2014).  
This observation summarises a process that results in a continuous iterative 
interaction between the management information providers from within the firm 
and the NEDs. 
“I think that papers that go to a board in most instances should be prepared for 
the board and not management papers that have just been stuck into a board 
pack” (Interviewee_09, 2014). 
While NEDs were conscious of being careful to not ask for information that 
does not already exist as it might result in a lot of work at lower levels, at the same 
time it was also acknowledged that information required for making managerial 
decisions is different from that needed for the oversight decisions and should be 
separated. There is also a temptation to provide for NEDs the data which goes to 
management, even if that is not necessarily relevant to the NEDs particular tasks, 
and may indeed be too detailed for them readily to digest. Also, it is possible that 
the information the firm prepares is conditioned by its own perception of the risks 
it faces, while NEDs may, with their broader experience, see different threats 
which require different analyses to be prepared. 
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One practice I observed during my participant observation which can help 
NEDs is the conduct of post-event reviews. The Board of an investment bank 
which incurred very large losses on the US sub-prime mortgage securities carried 
out a review, using an external law firm reporting to the audit committee of Board, 
to understand how and why the losses had been incurred. One element of the 
assessment was that the Board (and top management) had not seen data which 
properly captured the scale of the potential losses. Data on exposures net of hedges 
had been presented, but those hedges only protected the bank against modest falls 
in the prices of the securitisations. So the gross exposures, which were not 
separated or controlled, proved more relevant. That review led to many changes in 
the way information was collected and presented to the Board. 
As is evidenced from the interviews, NEDs show that they see information 
flows as being a crucial part of risk oversight and are well aware of the problems 
they have to face, and adopt a variety of strategies to try to overcome them. But in 
spite of all these strategies there are structural issues, e.g. there is no equivalent in 
the Risk Committee world of the external audit function, which can provide some 
independent verification of data. There is also a shortage of meaningful comparative 
information, which would illuminate the internally produced data, and provide early 
warnings of trouble ahead: e.g. if a bank’s loan losses, or non-performing loans, are 
escalating more rapidly than that of its principal competitors, that can be an 
indication that the bank has been lending aggressively or imprudently.  
To demonstrate, when discussing the issue of being informed and triangulating 
data, one interviewee explained: 
 
“You have to build a multifaceted set of relationships. I would talk the 
auditors, both external and internal. I would talk to the regulators; they’re a 
great source of information. Fundamentally, you are on the same side as the 
regulator […] and benchmarking can be a useful input. I’d talk to the 
consultancies. […] The data that you get presented is one input” 
(Interviewee_06, 2014). 
 
Relationship-building as an important part of information flows has been 
emphasised by many interviewees: both in terms of building trust and with 
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management below them, and external relationships such as regulators, auditors, 
and consultants. Another positive factor which helps NEDs to be well informed is 
that UK boards have both executive and non-executive directors which gives “the 
non-executives greater exposure to the executives and the business strategy, and 
makes it less possible for executives to hide or withhold information from the 
board” (Roberts et al., 2005). An important part of being properly informed for 
directors can still mean reaching outside the organisation for comparative data, as 
was indicated by several interviewees, but there is a marked contrast between this 
emerging requirement and the reality of what the interviewees are saying. 
 
7.5. CONCLUSION 
 
Interviewees and consultancy reports regarding their roles show that what 
risk committees can (and potentially should) do within their responsibilities is the 
following: 
- Ensure that crystallised risks are reported and lessons learned, both for 
information provision and the definition of risk appetite 
- Require management systems to be introduced and assessed independently 
- Require that all relevant measurements they consider relevant are used and 
reported to the Board 
- Set a ‘risk appetite’ in each area and monitor performance against it 
 
But the ability of NEDs to perform their oversight role could be seen as 
depending crucially on the quality and accuracy of the information they receive. In 
particular, without information which is relevant, the setting of the firm’s risk 
appetite, and monitoring performance against it, is likely to be difficult if not 
impossible.  
However, despite being such an important part of the corporate governance 
discussion, most of the information NEDs receive comes from within the firm and 
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is prepared by ‘information intermediaries’ who have not been given enough 
academic attention prior to this chapter. They face tensions in performing their 
role: they are part of the management of the firm, and informed by its culture and 
values: they may thus find it problematic to provide information which conflicts 
with the firm’s declared strategy. Perhaps unconsciously, they are influenced by 
the narrative of strategy and performance articulated by senior management. Also, 
they often lack the ability to benchmark performance data against competitors and 
have little incentive to do so. 
“I don’t think that basic information flows are difficult, the question is can 
you get comparative information?” (Interviewee_12, 2014) 
It is also useful to note here that if the information is simply wrong it is 
very difficult for a board to know it is wrong and challenge it. A board can 
challenge the interpretation that management provides, it can dispute its relevance 
and complain about timeliness, it can become concerned about not knowing 
enough to make a clear decision, but unless the board has alternative sources of 
information or is able to make its own comparisons against expectations, it cannot 
know that the information is simply wrong, which is why triangulation of 
information with external sources has been emphasised a number of times. But 
while NEDs themselves see the need for external sources of information, there is 
little consistency in their approach to finding it, and ad hoc strategies seem 
currently to be the favoured option. 
Both NEDs and information intermediaries, as well as consultants who 
support them, show awareness of challenges related to information flows, but have 
not so far developed strategies to overcome them. The problem is particularly acute 
in relation to setting and monitoring Risk Appetite. Few NEDs are confident that 
they have the information which would allow them effectively to perform that 
function. There is therefore a risk that the Risk Appetite process, seen as crucial by 
regulators, and accepted as a core demand in the NED role, is not as effective as it 
should be. Regulators are increasingly challenging firms to prove that the Risk 
Appetite process is effective and produces practical actions. 
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This Chapter began by describing the tension between the theory (as it is 
embodied in the policy statements) and the lived reality of the roles of information 
intermediaries and non-executives. It has sought to extend current understanding of 
the agency theory black box of information flow processes by introducing 
information intermediaries who are internal to the firm and are vital in information 
production, communication, and monitoring and who therefore empower the boards 
to perform their roles. The Chapter further suggests a rough taxonomy based on the 
practitioners’ perceptions which allows the quality and relevance of information 
flows to be assessed (accuracy, relevance, etc). It highlights the ‘solutions’ which 
NEDs themselves are considering, which include greater use of comparative data 
and may in future involve external validation. It argues that without some external 
input the fundamental agency problem will be very difficult to resolve, despite all 
the involved parties being aware of it.  
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION 
 
8.1. CONTRIBUTION AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
  
This thesis has covered oversight in considerable depth, and contributes to 
knowledge in several specific areas. The primary aim of this research was to 
understand how the concept of risk oversight related to financial institutions is 
operationalised in practice, through observations and through actors’ explanations 
of their roles.  
This thesis analyses the critical themes that underpin the emergence of risk 
oversight in practice, particularly since the Walker Report in 2009. While 
examining the history of risk regulation in the UK, I have identified the principal 
actors directly and indirectly involved in the risk oversight process, such as the 
regulators, financial firms, consultancies, audit firms and professional bodies. I have 
also discussed their interactions with other actors: risk managers, firm management, 
board members, etc., and the way these interactions have resulted in the creation of 
risk oversight and three lines of defence as we understand them now. 
Through the field immersions, this research identified “risk oversight” as a 
new area for explicit attention within financial institutions which is distinct from 
risk management. It presented an overview of how financial firms and their 
regulators currently conceive the practice of risk oversight at different levels, with a 
specific emphasis on the risk oversight role of the board of directors. 
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This thesis has examined the concept of risk oversight in two ways: 1) by 
reviewing the regulatory and consultancy field discourses and 2) by describing the 
structures and actions implemented as a response to the above by actors that lead to 
changes in the practice of risk management and the running of financial institutions.  
In the Literature chapter, three distinct intellectual reference points for 
thinking about risk oversight were explored. These included agency theory as the 
underlying perspective, regulation theories, and literature on corporate governance 
and audit committees. The following chapters on Regulators’ responsibilisation 
practices, Board Risk Committees, Three Lines of Defence, and Information 
Intermediaries, highlighted the practical life of risk oversight.  
 
Chapter 4 on Regulatory perspectives on oversight traced the development of 
regulatory attitudes to risk oversight and identified the emerging convergence of 
corporate governance standards and the approaches taken by the financial 
regulators. While the two strands of regulation begin from different starting points, 
and have very different scope and legal backing, they now complement each other 
in the case of regulated financial firms, as both emphasise the key responsibility of 
boards. Secondly, the chapter showed the process of responsibilisation of NEDs that 
is intended to promote boards being more involved. Some of the NEDs who find 
themselves subject to these new definitions of their role and responsibilities are 
nervous about the consequences. They argue that the restrictions and expectations 
imposed on them are now so onerous that the willingness of appropriately qualified 
people to serve on boards may be compromised. The regulatory ideal of NED 
independence could be seen as posing a tradeoff with competence, because arguably 
it takes time to become more aware of the firm, but agency theory does not take that 
tradeoff into consideration. 
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The so-called ‘reversal of the burden of proof’ in the new senior management 
regime applied to banks is seen as a particularly worrying development by NEDs 27. 
If well qualified individuals are dissuaded from joining boards – as some argue is 
already the case – then the paradoxical result may be to diminish the effectiveness 
of board oversight, which might in turn lead to more intrusive regulation, which 
would result in a process of de-responsibilisation of NEDs.  An overly onerous 
regime might also lead to overconfidence, with a misplaced belief that the prospect 
of material failures in oversight can be ‘regulated away’.  As in any industry, 
perpetual scrutiny and enhancements of safeguards is required; not a belief that a 
given process will always militate against the effects of human error. Finally, the 
establishment of quite prescriptive regulations covering capital requirement 
calculations or corporate compositions can give rise to a systemic risk, whereby a 
failure or omission in the regulatory framework, exposed by an unforeseen event, 
may lead to many firms failing at the same time in similar ways. 
Chapter 5 discussed the way NEDs operationalise their roles and oversee the 
three lines of defence from the outside. They therefore act as both principals and 
agents at the same time. As the earlier chapters showed, by the design of their role, 
and their (very) part-time involvement, they are unable to interfere directly at lower 
levels in the organisation, however assiduous they may be. They are therefore 
                                                
27	  Please note that between the submission of this thesis in September 2015 and its 
publication in 2016, the reversal of the burden of proof regime suggestion has been 
abolished by HM Treasure in the October 2015 ‘Senior Managers and Certification 
Regime’ policy paper: “The senior manager is liable if he or she cannot show the 
regulator that he or she took the steps that it was reasonable for a person in that 
position to take to prevent the breach occurring or continuing, thus reversing the 
normal burden of proof. The government will amend the provisions so that the 
regulators will only be able to take action if they can show that the individual failed to 
take the steps that it is reasonable for a person in that position to take to prevent a 
regulatory breach from occurring. Therefore concerns over the severity of the original 
proposals and in particular the implications for the willingness of NEDs to assume 
Risk Committee chairing roles may need to be softened.  The new rules take effect in 
March 2016”. This thesis, therefore, can be looked at as a historic snapshot.	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obliged to place reliance on systems and controls put in place to try to ensure that 
relevant and unbiased information is presented to them.  
The quality of information is a big issue in governance, because information 
flows to boards come upwards from management, and there is a tension between 
lived realities and theory about how neat this process is. Another theoretical insight 
here is a description of how agency-like problems get addressed in the field by 
actors who are trying to overcome the information asymmetries discussed above. 
The chapter shows the concept of enforced self-regulation operates through the 
NEDs who have a relationship with regulator. Audit committee literature could also 
be extended by looking at the parallels with risk committee’s notion of success in 
chapter 5.  
Chapter 6 discusses Three Lines of Defence as a tool of operationalisation of 
risk oversight, and finds that representations vary depending on the institution that 
produces them: the big 4 audit firms place a larger emphasis on audit’s role than do 
strategy consultants. Iteratively, over time representations affect practice: practice 
starts to look like representations, thus creating a self-reinforcing loop. Overall, 
however, oversight became operationalised in practice through the Three Lines of 
Defence framework, and indeed it is now so engrained that it appears difficult to 
speak of risk oversight at the level of financial institutions without speaking of 
TLD. Aspects of TLD existed before the global financial crisis, and its failures were 
demonstrated during the crisis to an extent that it is possible to argue that it has 
failed. Future researchers might ask why, if it existed and failed, it became even 
more institutionalised as a consequence of the crisis. 
The thesis has demonstrated the way a regulatory aspiration for improving risk 
governance manifests itself through focusing on the more visible aspects of risk 
oversight, namely Three Lines of Defence structures. However, the practice of risk 
oversight, seen through the perceptions of NEDs, is more complicated and  is not 
necessarily directly aligned with how regulation suggests it might work. That poses 
the question: What does it mean for oversight to work? One can put structures in 
place, but ultimately as this thesis demonstrates, agents such as NEDs and the 
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information intermediaries who serve them, are the ones who make oversight into 
something real and consequential. 
 Chapter 7 on information intermediaries examined the setting of a risk 
appetite by the board of directors as a process, not an outcome, and discussed 
practical implementations of what it takes for risk appetite to work. Information 
intermediaries were shown not to be passive, but rather to actively create the 
possibility of governance, because they actively manage information, and transfer it 
from managerial data into information for governance and oversight. While the 
parallel could be drawn with other internal actors, such as for example management 
accountants, who produce information for decision-making purposes, explicit 
separation of information intermediaries in the risk process is analytically useful. 
The key function of Boards is now conceptualised on being to articulate a risk 
appetite, which will allow the firm to prosper in good times and survive in bad 
times. That framework is intellectually appealing but will only work well if the 
information needed to define and monitor the risk appetite is accurate and relevant. 
The chapter was more speculative than the others, and raised a number of questions 
for future research.  
This thesis contributed to knowledge by tracing the dynamics between the 
content of normative and regulatory pronouncements and the practices and 
interpretations that follow, and produced new empirical data on the newly emergent 
phenomenon of risk oversight. Specific contributions to existing literature are 
threefold.  First, in relation to the agency literature, the discussion of NEDs shows 
how they act as both agents and principals and the tensions and tradeoffs to which 
this gives rise. Second, in relation to the literature on, enforced self-regulation, the 
thesis demonstrates the convergence of financial regulation and corporate 
governance on risk oversight and NED responsibilities.  Third, in relations to the 
audit committee literature the thesis shows how risk committes are both similar to 
and different from audit committees.  
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8.2. PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
As a regulatory object, risk oversight formed over time, and “exploded” after 
the financial crisis. This thesis calls for a deeper investigation of causal 
relationships between the way organisational structures were implemented and the 
organisational outcomes. Specifically, one could investigate the issues related to the 
development of ERM over time, and also deepen the understanding of information 
flows and risk appetite processes that were touched upon in Chapter 7. It would also 
be fruitful to investigate organisational responses to more narrow issues such as 
cyber risks or reputational risks.  
 
While the data set was strong and included a number of in-depth interviews, 
its qualitative nature resulted in the typical limitations: for example, I have not 
conducted a survey, nor gathered big enough data samples to be able to give wider 
recommendations about best practice or make a judgement about what does and 
does not work. Additionally, no cross-country comparisons were given, which could 
also be a relevant future research area. 
The research was not intended to be a longitudinal pre-and post- global 
financial crisis study, which limits its ability to make extrapolations about change 
beyond the actors’ descriptions of what had changed. Theory of crises could be 
applied here in order to examine how oversight has developed and whether the 
trajectory could have been different had there been some different type of global 
financial crisis. Risk oversight is an interesting area of future research because it has 
a very high degree of practical relevance, while also being an underexplored area in 
academic terms.  
Other unanswered practice questions include: how can the new oversight 
regime avoid repeating the mistakes that it is put in place to avoid, and ensure it 
does not lead to an overly strong sense of security? How can the financial industry, 
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which relies on taking measured risks, avoid the moral hazard of feeling too safe, 
assuming the institution cannot fail?  
One of the objects of regulatory attention has been restitution plans, 
informally called ‘living wills’, whereby firms have to explain their plan for 
handling orderly default. Examining how living wills affect the practice of financial 
institutions, especially after one of the banks fails, would be an interesting focus for 
future research. 
One could also examine Basel III and Solvency II in more detail, particularly 
in terms of their effect on boards of directors, and their oversight role; and be more 
critical of the fact that risk managers might be becoming data processors due to the 
amount of time they spent on capital requirements. 
 
Another aspect of regulatory attention has been on stress tests: the Bank of 
England’s latest stress test28 requirements ask banks to test against a possible 
dramatic deterioration in global economic conditions and to demonstrate their 
resilience29. While the banks are producing elaborate reports, one question that 
                                                
28 Source: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/pages/fpc/stresstest.aspx 
29 The test was run for the first time in 2014 and included the eight largest banks and 
building societies. Six banks and Nationwide building society will be tested this year. 
Together they account for around 70% of the stock of lending to UK businesses and 
around 75% of the stock of UK mortgage lending. 
The apocalyptic scenario laid out by the Bank includes a combination of the 
oil price at US$38 per barrel, Chinese residential property prices falling 35% below 
their level at end-2014, domestic consumption and investment both falling, aggregate 
euro-area real GDP growth at -2.1%. In Europe, the euro depreciates by 25% against 
the US dollar, and residential property prices fall by 20%... “It is not a set of events 
that is expected, or likely, to materialize”, the Bank reassuringly emphasises, but 
“rather, it is a coherent ‘tail-risk’ scenario that has been designed specifically to 
assess the resilience of UK banks and building societies to a deterioration in global 
economic conditions”. 
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arises is: how does that kind of exercise fit into the current approach to risk 
management and risk oversight?  
Having described the apocalyptic scenarios as a part of stress testing, what 
will banks and their regulators do about it in the future? Simply note that if all these 
trends occur at once they will be obliged to de-risk their balance sheets further, 
against a scenario which the Bank itself says it does not expect to see? Or will an 
understanding of the available managerial courses of action in such scenarios 
improve board risk oversight? How can the risk committees continue being relevant 
and useful? Are they indeed relevant and useful?  
The variation in the meaning and interpretations of ‘risk oversight’ was vast, 
and I did not expect to find a standard application of the term. This thesis has shed 
light on this concept and discussed how oversight is done in practice through 
dissecting it at the level of regulators, NEDs, and actors within the firms. As 
demonstrated above, ambiguity about what constitutes risk oversight is one of the 
features of the term. This plurality of multi-level accountabilities could be explored 
in more depth by future researchers. 
Layers of complicated information flows present major problems in financial 
institutions, but so far there is little sign that these problems have been resolved. It 
is likely that there will need to be new external sources of information if the Risk 
Oversight function overseen by the Board is to deliver the high expectations placed 
upon it, and some interviewees have indicated a demand for independent advisory 
services like external audit. 
To answer the question in the title: are the changes in risk oversight within 
financial regulation really like closing the stable door after the horse has bolted? 
Some believe that regulators have overreacted. From a laissez-faire pre-crisis 
regime, they have moved to a highly prescriptive and top-down set of requirements, 
imposing burdens on boards of directors which sit uneasily with their role as 
protectors of shareholder interests. The perspective emerging from this research is 
somewhat different. Regulators have attempted to put in place mechanisms which 
will better cope with issues that might emerge in the next crisis. 
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It would be unreasonable to expect the next crisis to be the same as the last 
one: with identical root causes or the way these causes manifest themselves to result 
in a crisis. However, the systems in place now are attempting to cover a wider range 
of scenarios and to handle problems better, not just replaying past events. While 
risks such as a credit crunch and a lack of market confidence that materialised in the 
last crisis are still being considered, other major risks yet to emerge, such as cyber 
risks or insurers’ illiquidity are now being captured and better understood. 
There is a risk that regulators seek to guard against ‘four of the next three 
crises30’, or in other words overregulate with negative consequences for risk taking 
and capital availability. The extensive focus on orderly default demonstrates the 
regulatory stance that firms must be allowed to fail, but to do so without causing 
overly strong systemic repercussions. Regulators may therefore see themselves as 
requiring flood defences to be put in place – generic safety measures that are 
designed to limit the damage but without assuming the exact source of the problem. 
Therefore, flood defence is a better metaphor than ‘closing the stable door’ to 
assess the intended consequences of the new system. The new oversight structures 
have introduced discipline that is intended to protect against a wider range of 
potential conceivable risks. Only time will tell whether they have succeeded. 
  
                                                
30 Jacob A. Frenkel asks: “Should we design a system that is capable of eliminating 
three out of the next four crises or should we design a system that is designed to 
eliminate four out of the next three crises? It is not a game of words - there is a big 
difference. If you eliminate four out of the next three crises you have overintervened, 
you have prevented free enterprise from operating - you have over-regulated. You 
will look good because no bank has been closed during your regime. But you have not 
allowed free enterprise to thrive. If you have eliminated three out of four crises then, 
yes, life is risky but you should be able to handle it. I think that is a very important 
issue - what systems we want, and knowing that we will never be able to eliminate all 
risk” – Distinguished Lectures Series; Warsaw, 25 November 2002 (Frenkel, 2002) 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I: TLD INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
[This firm] describes its Risk Management approach as 3-lines of defence. 
- What do you think it means? What do you think about three lines of 
defence? 
- Whom do you report to? Whom is your team/function accountable to? 
- Should 2nd line (RM) be doing management or oversight? 
Interaction between lines: 
- How clear are the separations? 
- How are disagreements between the lines escalated and resolved? 
- Do you feel that you are in the position to overrule 1st line? Are reporting 
lines such that issues are sorted on your level, or is it typically escalated, 
negotiation is done at the top, and then the decision is brought down again? 
- How do you interact with those in the 3rd line?  
Information Flows: 
- How does the information you produce enable the board to function? 
- Do you think you get all the information you need to do your job 
effectively? 
- Is most information you use generated within the business, or are you 
using external sources? 
- How much control do you have over what information you get? 
 
 
 
  
 216	  
APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR NEDS 
 
ABOUT THE ROLE 
- What are the main challenges of being a non-executive director (+ info – how 
long, what other firms, etc) 
- What does it mean to be a successful NED 
- To whom are you responsible? 
- How do you balance your oversight vs. management roles? 
- What can a board risk committee accomplish and for whom? 
- When you say you are doing oversight (assurance etc), what is it that you are 
doing exactly? 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CRO 
- What are the reporting lines and relationships between you and the CRO? 
- Do you feel that executive management support you in your non-executive 
role?   
- [Is the CRO on your board?] Do you think CRO should be on the board, and 
does it make any difference? 
QUALITY OF INFORMATION 
- What is the goal of information – what do you want to achieve with the 
information you are getting? 
- Some organisations have adapted three lines of defence model of governance. 
What are your thoughts about it? [What output do you see from the three 
different lines? What reports are you getting?] 
- Do you think the information you get is sufficient to perform your role? 
- How do you gain confidence that you are seeing the organisation as it really 
is? 
- What specific information is particularly useful for your job? 
- How much influence do you have over the information you get?  
- What is the role of risk appetite: does it change decision-making behaviours? 
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APPENDIX III: LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 
 
• What the Sony hack can teach risk committees  
(Financial Times, Dec 31, 2014, co-authored with Howard Davies) 
 
• The dilemma of defining risk appetite in banking  
(Financial Times, Sep 9, 2014, co-authored with Howard Davies) 
 
• Audit is no longer the chore the board dreads most  
(Financial Times, July 28, 2014, co-authored with Howard Davies) 
 
• Book Review: "Managing Risk and Opportunity: the Governance of 
Strategic Risk Taking" by Torben Andersen, Maxine L. Garvey, Oliviero 
Roggi  
(LSE Review of Books June 27, 2014) 
 
• Book Review: "Risk: A Study of its Origins, History and Politics" by 
Matthias Beck and Beth Kewell  
(LSE Review of Books March 22, 2014)  
 
• Risky business set to grow  
(Financial World, December 2013, co-authored with Howard Davies) 
 
• Banks need to question their ‘three lines of defence’  
(Financial Times, July 9, 2013, co-authored with Howard Davies) 
 
• French critics of allowing foreign-language instruction are fighting lost 
battles  
(Times Higher Education, June 13, 2013, co-authored with Howard Davies) 
 
• How to avoid reputational ruin: a guide for banks  
(Financial Times Oct 3, 2012, co-authored with Howard Davies) 
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